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ABSTRACT 
The corporate social responsibility (CSR) debate arose out of the recognition 
that  corporations  today  hold  tremendous  power,  and  that  the  direct  and  indirect 
implications of their actions are far-reaching, affecting a wide array of stakeholders in 
both positive and negative ways.  Corporate decision-makers are confronted daily with 
a  complex  set  of  often  conflicting  demands,  including  economic,  ethical,  legal, 
personal  and  professional  demands.    They  are  forced  to  weigh  these  competing 
demands in their decision-making processes, ultimately deciding which demands will 
influence  their  corporations’  actions.    Understanding  the  rationality  employed  by 
corporate  decision-makers  and  business  scholars  is  important  in  the  study  of  CSR 
because  it  allows  us  to  gain  insight  into  how  they  interpret  the  constellation  of 
demands placed upon them and how they orient their actions – and their corporations’ 
actions – accordingly.   
I  approach  this  analysis  of  the  CSR  discourse  with  two  primary research 
questions.  First, what patterns exist in the arguments put forth in the CSR literature, 
and can these patterns be classified into theoretical categories of CSR?   Second, 
what  rationalities  underlie  the  predominant  arguments  (theories)  in  the  CSR 
literature, and how do these rationalities inform the CSR debate?  Upon coding the 
CSR  literature  according  to  four  points  of  paradigmatic  contention  between 
adherents to different arguments for or against CSR, three endogenous theoretical 
frameworks began to emerge:  corporate libertarian theory, enlightened self-interest 
theory,  and  moral  theory.    While  most  critics  and  advocates  of  CSR  in  the 
mainstream discourse point to one or more of the dozens of empirical studies on the 
CSR-firm financial performance relationship to support their arguments, I suggest 
that many of the arguments put forth in the CSR discourse are not predicated on 
empirical evidence, but rather on an underlying normative orientation and rationality.   
Through this qualitative analysis of the CSR discourse – both the academic and non-
academic discourse – the conflicting rationalities employed by participants in the 
CSR discourse become apparent.   
In the face of economic globalization, characterized by transnational capital 
flows, highly mobile corporations, and increasing power of corporations in relation 
to the state, corporations have become some of the most powerful actors in the world 
today.  Despite the fact that their agency is constrained by the demands of the market 
system, their actions greatly affect our lives, our world, and our future.  The need for 
a moral discourse on the role and responsibilities of business corporations in society 
today is pressing.  In addition to seeking to understand the rationalities underpinning 
the predominant arguments for and against CSR, this research seeks to contribute to 
this growing moral discourse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporations today hold tremendous power, commanding immense resources 
and significant political and economic influence.  The direct and indirect implications 
of their actions are far-reaching, affecting a number of stakeholders in both positive 
and negative ways.  The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) arose from 
the recognition that business leaders make decisions that greatly affect not only their 
direct stakeholders, such as employees and stockholders, but the lives and fortunes of 
us all (Bowen 1953, p. 3).  In the face of economic globalization, characterized by 
transnational  capital  flows,  highly  mobile  corporations,  and  increasing  power  of 
corporations in relation to the state, this observation is as true today as at any point in 
history.  As Stone (1975, p. xii) argues: 
 
[W]hether or not we feel that corporations are to blame for our present 
dilemmas, there is at least one terribly practical and appropriate sense in 
which we do well to consider them increasingly ‘responsible.’  For aside 
from governments and governmental agencies… corporations have long 
since become, for better or worse, the most effective ‘private’ forces to do 
both widespread good and widespread harm.  For this reason, to solve 
society’s problems is, in no small measure, to come to grips with the 
corporation problem. 
 
The concept of CSR arose from a constellation of historical events and trends, 
dating back hundreds of years, although the present-day CSR discourse can be traced 
to the years immediately following World War II.  Today, CSR is as relevant and 
important as ever, and still a hotly debated topic in business circles.  However, the 
term itself has become so widely used in so many contexts that it has become almost   2 
cliché.  Nevertheless, the continued presence of CSR, and CSR-related theories,
1 in 
academic, popular and business discourse is important because it signals the existence 
of a belief that corporations, like all actors in society, have certain responsibilities for 
which they should be held accountable.   
The sociological implications of the corporate social responsibility debate are 
significant in that corporations exert a tremendous amount of influence in shaping our 
social, political, economic, and environmental landscapes.   As states’ abilities to exert 
authority over powerful and highly mobile corporations lessen in the global economy, 
understanding  the  rationalities  and  other  factors  underlying  business  scholars’  and 
corporate executives’ arguments for or against CSR will allow us to gain insight into 
corporate  decision-making  processes  and  the  factors  guiding  their  decisions.    In 
addition  to  seeking  to  understand  the  rationalities  underpinning  the  predominant 
arguments for and against CSR, this research seeks to contribute to the growing moral 
discourse surrounding the role and responsibilities of business corporations in society. 
Because so many definitions of CSR have been put forth, adding yet another 
definition to the literature would contribute little.  For the purposes of this analysis, I 
operationalize CSR as did Davis (1973, p. 312), when he stated that CSR refers to the 
firm’s consideration of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, 
and legal requirements of the firm. To be clear, CSR is a voluntary process, and not 
the result of formal coercion by the state or economic coercion through large-scale 
consumer boycotts or other formal means.   
                                                 
1 CSR related theories include Corporate Social Performance (CSP), Stakeholder Theory, Corporate 
Citizenship, Corporate Societal Accountability, and Stakeholder Management, among others.  Today, 
the most influential CSR-related theory is Corporate Sustainability.   3 
Thesis Overview  
I  approach  this  analysis  of  the  CSR  literature  with  two  primary  research 
questions.  First, what patterns exist in the arguments put forth in the CSR literature, 
and can these patterns be classified into theoretical categories of CSR?  Second, what 
rationalities underlie the predominant arguments (theories) in the CSR literature, and 
how do these rationalities inform the CSR debate?   
While the beginning of the present-day CSR discourse is generally traced back 
to the immediately post-World War II years (Carroll 1999; Preston 1975), the concept 
of CSR has been literally centuries in the making.  I begin this thesis with an overview 
of  the  significant  historical  events  that  have  shaped  the  corporation-society 
relationship,  from  the  birth  of  the  first  corporations  in  the  16
th  and  17
th  centuries 
through the Great Depression and the New Deal.  I also discuss some of the historical 
antecedents of CSR, including corporate welfarism and paternalism, and the granting 
of concessions to non-socialist labor unions. 
In Chapter 2, I cover in greater detail the rise of CSR, beginning with World 
War II.  In tracing the rise of CSR, I reference several historical events and trends that 
have greatly influenced the business-society relationship and the contemporary CSR 
discourse.  I also discuss current developments in CSR outside the academic sphere, 
including  the  rise  of  socially  responsible  investing  (SRI)  and  the  United  Nations 
Global Compact, the world’s largest corporate citizenship initiative. 
In  Chapter  3,  I  present  my  research  methods  and  theoretical  framework.  
Because  I  approach  this  study  with  two research  questions,  I  attempt  a  dual-level 
theoretical analysis, employing both a CSR theoretical framework and Max Weber’s 
theory  of  rationality.    In  developing  a  theoretical  framework  of  CSR,  I  employ  a 
qualitative, inductive approach to analyze the CSR literature.  I code the literature by 
common  points  of  differentiation  –  what  I  call  points  of  contention  –  among  the   4 
arguments for or against CSR.  Upon doing so, three endogenous theories emerge 
from the literature, which I present as Weberian ideal types in order to capture the 
essence  of  the  various  arguments  being  put  forth  and  to  facilitate  a  comparative 
analysis. 
In seeking to better understand and critique the predominant theories of CSR 
within the context of the social and economic challenges facing corporations today, I 
employ Max Weber’s theory of rationality as an analytical tool.  Weber’s theory of 
rationality  proves  valuable  in  analyzing  the  CSR  discourse  in  that  it  helps  us  to 
understand  the  way  in  which  various  scholars  and  business  executives  understand 
society and business’ place in society, and how they orient their actions and arguments 
accordingly.    Weber’s  theory  is  also  valuable  in  helping  us  determine  how  the 
rationalities of particular value spheres, such as the economy, play out in practice and 
in the discourse, and how they influence the CSR debate.  To augment and enhance 
the value of Weber’s theory of rationality as an analytical tool, I also employ Weber’s 
theory of bureaucracy. 
In Chapter 4, I present my findings, which take the form of the three general 
CSR theories.  The theories emerge from the CSR literature as a result of my coding 
scheme, which is based on four recurring points of contention along which the various 
arguments  for  or  against  CSR  diverge.    I  identify  three  CSR  theories  that  I 
subsequently  title  corporate libertarian theory,  enlightened self-interest theory,  and 
moral  theory.    Corporate  libertarian  theory  holds  that  the  only  responsibility  of 
business  is  to  maximize  profits,  and  the  shareholders  are  the  only  group  owed 
responsibility  by  business  managers.    Corporate  social  responsibility  is  seen  as 
harmful  to  profits,  and  to  the  free  market  system,  and  should  therefore  not  be 
undertaken (Rodgers 2005; Forbes 2004; Henderson 2004a, 2004b, 2001; Friedman 
1970, 1962).  Enlightened self-interest theory is predicated on the belief that CSR is   5 
good  for  business  and  should  therefore  be  undertaken  by  corporations.    Serving 
society’s needs today will present new business opportunities and will help business 
remain  profitable  in  the  future  (Sparks  2003;  Birchard  1999;  Burke  and  Logsdon 
1996; Drucker 1984; Richardson 1981; Ford II 1970).  The moral theory differs from 
the other two theories in that it sees the corporation as existing to benefit society.  This 
is not to say that corporations should not seek profits; the moral theory simply argues 
that  many  stakeholders  are  owed  responsibility,  and  that  their  interests  must  be 
considered in a corporation’s decision-making processes.  Profits are important, but as 
an end, they do not justify all means (Mackey 2005; Handy 2002; Goodpaster and 
Matthews 1982; Davis 1973; Houser 1957; Bowen 1953). 
In the final chapter, I employ Weber’s theory of rationality, as well as his 
theories of value spheres and bureaucracy, to analyze the three CSR theories.  In doing 
so,  I  seek  to  understand  the  rationality  underlying  each  theory  and  how  the 
employment of a given rationality informs arguments made by participants in the CSR 
debate.  In the final discussion, I argue that the mainstream CSR discourse is taking 
place in a forum that accepts uncritically the realities of the current market system.  
This intellectual prison (Woller 1996) greatly constrains the scope of the arguments 
being put forth.  I then present an alternative view of the business-society relationship, 
arguing that CSR, while important, is unlikely to remedy many of the ills inherent in 
our system.  I conclude this thesis by asking whether or not there is a place for CSR 
today. 
Background on CSR Discourse 
While  my  analysis  of  the  CSR  discourse  is  unique  from  the  mainstream 
literature in its aim and its analytical framework, it is important to make note of the   6 
major works in the CSR literature.
2  Presenting a brief review of some of the most 
important  contributions  to  the  modern  CSR  literature  will  help  frame  and 
contextualize my analysis. 
The roots of the modern CSR discourse are often traced back to the 1950s, 
particularly Howard Bowen’s (1953) The Social Responsibilities of the Businessman 
(Carroll 1999; Garriga and Melé 2004; Post 1975).  However, K. William Kapp’s 
(1950) The Social Costs of Private Enterprise would greatly shape the early academic 
CSR discourse.  Kapp sought to debunk the notion – based in neoclassical economic 
value theory – that a corporation’s internal cost-price accounting accurately measured 
the true costs of the production process.  He argued that there was an omitted truth in 
this calculus that failed to recognize that the activities of private enterprise have often 
far-reaching social and environmental costs that must be borne by individuals or the 
larger public.  Kapp argued that, by concealing the true cost of the production process,  
 
the competitive cost-price calculus is not merely meaningless but nothing 
more than an institutionalized cover under which it is possible for private 
enterprise to shift part of the costs to the shoulders of others (Kapp 1950, p. 
233).  
 
Howard Bowen’s (1953) The Social Responsibilities of the Businessman, while 
not the first work addressing CSR,
3 is widely considered the seminal work in the CSR 
discourse, and one that marked the beginning of the modern, serious discussion of the 
topic  (Carroll  1999,  p.  270).    Bowen  argued  that  the  social  responsibility  of  the 
businessman refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make 
those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the 
                                                 
2 I would like to acknowledge the work of Archie B. Carroll (1999), whose extremely thorough review 
of the CSR literature proved exceedingly helpful in my own literature review.    
3 Earlier works of note include Berle and Means’ (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
and Chester Barnard’s (1938) The Functions of the Executive, as well as Kapp’s (1950) The Social 
Costs of Private Enterprise.   7 
objectives and values of our society (Bowen 1953, p. 6).  Bowen’s theory was rooted 
in his belief that the several hundred largest businesses were vital centers of power and 
decision making and that the actions of these firms touched the lives of citizens at 
many points (Carroll 1999, p. 269).  He saw that …it is simply inevitable that large-
scale  business  operations  will  have  diverse,  and  often  unexpected,  impacts  on  the 
larger society; the corporate manager can no more disclaim responsibility for these 
impacts than for his own reckless driving (Preston 1975, p. 435).  Business leaders, 
who  must  necessarily  remain  interested  in  profits,  must  also  accept  the  social 
implications of their calling (Bowen 1953, p. 135) – that is, they must acknowledge, 
accept, and engage with the social responsibility that comes with their position of 
power.  While Bowen argued that CSR is far from a panacea (Bowen 1953, p. 135), he 
recognized  that  it  contains  important  truth  (Bowen  1953,  p.  7)  that  must  guide 
business executives’ thoughts and actions in the future.    
Keith Davis, who Carroll (1999, p. 271) called the runner-up to Bowen for the 
father of CSR designation, was a leading voice in the CSR discourse of the 1960s and 
1970s.    His  Iron  Law  of  Responsibility  stated  that  the  social  responsibilities  of 
businessmen need to be commensurate with their social power (Davis 1960, p. 71).  
He  believed  that  when  social  responsibility  and  power  were  relatively  equal,  the 
avoidance of social responsibility [on the part of business] leads to gradual erosion of 
social  power.  (Davis  1960,  p.  73)  Simply  put,  if  business  does  not  accept  the 
responsibility that comes with the social power they possess, another institution, the 
state, will surely step in and assume that responsibility and the power that comes with 
it.   
Clarence  C.  Walton  (1967)  argued  that  the  intimacy  of  the  relationships 
between the corporation and society necessitates a moral theory of CSR that argues 
that such relationships must be kept in mind by top managers as the corporation and   8 
the related groups pursue their respective goals (Walton 1967, p. 18). Walton was one 
of the first to explicitly emphasize the voluntary element of CSR, as opposed to acting 
in  response  to  coercion,  an  observation  that  has  proven  central  to  the  modern 
discussion of CSR. 
Milton  Friedman’s  (1970)  New York Times Magazine  article,  appropriately 
titled The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, represented the 
most significant condemnation of CSR to date, and remains arguably the most famous 
criticism  of  CSR  ever  put  forth.    In  addition  to  criticizing  CSR  for  its  analytical 
looseness and lack of rigor, Friedman (1970) argued that 
  
there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as 
it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and 
free competition without deception or fraud. 
 
In 1973, Davis operationalized CSR as referring to the firm’s consideration of, 
and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements 
of the firm (Davis 1973, p. 312).  He famously defined CSR as [beginning] where the 
law ends (Davis 1973, p. 313), arguing that it is:  
 
the firm’s obligation to evaluate in its decision-making process the effects 
of its decisions on the external social system in a manner that will 
accomplish social benefits along with the traditional economic gains which 
the firm seeks.  
 
In 1984, Peter Drucker argued that doing good was a necessary component of 
doing well for corporations, meaning that for business to be successful, it must take 
into account the expectations of the public to address society’s most pressing needs.  
For Drucker (1984, p. 62), the responsibility of corporations is to meet society’s needs, 
and to do so profitably:    9 
 
…the proper ‘social responsibility’ of business is to tame the dragon, that is 
to turn a social problem into economic opportunity and economic benefit, 
into productive capacity, into human competence, into well paid jobs, and 
into wealth. 
 
Archie B. Carroll (1983) argued that CSR involves the conduct of a business 
so  that  it  is  economically  profitable,  law  abiding,  ethical  and  socially  supportive 
(Carroll 1983, p. 604; see also Carroll 1979).  Two years later, in 1985, Aupperle, 
Carroll,  and  Hatfield  conducted  a  study  in  which  they  showed  that  executives’ 
priorities match the four components – [economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary] – 
of Carroll’s definition of CSR (Carroll 1999, p. 287).  
Carroll  (1991)  later  depicted  CSR  as  a  pyramid,  with  the  economic 
responsibility forming the base.  The next three responsibilities, in order, are the legal, 
ethical  and  philanthropic.
4   Carroll  argues  that  business  should  not  fulfill  these 
[responsibilities] in sequential fashion… each is to be fulfilled at all times (Carroll 
1999, p. 289, commenting on Carroll 1991, p. 42). 
Donna  J.  Wood  (1991)  argued  that  the  basic  idea  of  corporate  social 
responsibility is that business and society are interwoven rather than distinct entities; 
therefore,  society  has  certain  expectations  for  appropriate  business  behavior  and 
outcomes (Wood 1991, p. 695).  By emphasizing the interconnectedness of business 
and society, Wood’s model treated the role of manager not as the purely objective role 
of maximizing of profits for shareholders, but as a more complex and subjective role 
of balancing the company’s interests with those of the public.  Wood (1991, p. 698) 
considered managers to be moral actors who must exercise discretion in meeting the 
needs of various stakeholders.   
                                                 
4 Although corporate philanthropy is widely associated, even equated, with CSR, I do not consider it to 
be CSR and do not include it in my analysis.     10 
Birchard  (1999)  argued  CSR,  when  successfully  integrated  into  a  firm’s 
competitive strategy, could prove beneficial for firms.  In what he called doing well by 
doing good, Birchard (1999, p. 3) argued that a reputation as a good corporate citizen 
presented a tantalizing method of differentiation, which could lead to a competitive 
advantage  for  firms  by  attracting  and  maintaining  customers  and  investors,  and 
avoiding costly government regulation.   
In  1999,  Carroll  presented  arguably  the  most  thorough  review  of  the  CSR 
literature to date.  After reviewing the literature, Carroll predicted that, as the new 
millennium began, CSR would remain an important concept because at its core, it 
addresses and captures the most important concerns of the public regarding business 
and society relationships (Carroll 1999, p. 292). 
David Henderson, former head of the Economics and Statistics Department at 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), has emerged 
as the heir to Milton Friedman as the most outspoken and widely recognized critic of 
CSR.  Henderson (2001, p. 163) condemns CSR as a Salvationist doctrine that: 
 
despite its general and growing support, is deeply flawed.  It embodies a 
mistaken view of issues, events and economic relationships, and its general 
adoptions by businesses would reduce welfare and undermine the market 
economy. 
 
In  the  wake  of  several  high  profile  corporate  accounting  scandals,  Handy 
(2002) posed the question What’s a business for?  In his now widely cited Harvard 
Business Review article, he argues that managers must continue to meet shareholders’ 
needs,  but  to  turn  shareholders’  needs  into  a  purpose  is  to  be  guilty  of  a  logical 
confusion (Handy 2002, p. 5).  He argues that:  
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The purpose of business… is not to make a profit, full stop.  It is to make a 
profit so that business can do something more or better.  That ‘something’ 
becomes the real justification for the business. (Handy 2002, p. 5) 
 
David Vogel (2005) argues that, when incorporated as one element of a firm’s 
strategic plan, CSR can be beneficial to some firms in some cases.   However, he 
suggests that the claims by CSR proponents that not engaging in CSR will hurt a 
firm’s performance are overstated, as markets and consumers have rarely punished 
firms for not practicing CSR.  Even so, Vogel concludes that a niche market does exist 
for CSR. 
Also in 2005, Reason Magazine published a debate between John Mackey,
5 
Milton Friedman, and T.J. Rodgers.
6  Mackey argues in favor of CSR, arguing that it 
is the responsibility of business to create value for all its constituencies.  Friedman and 
Rodgers  both  argue  against  it,  equating  CSR  with  altruism  at  the  expense  of 
shareholder interests and harmful to the free market system.  While not taking place in 
a scholarly journal, this debate has grown to be one of the most notable contributions 
to the public CSR discourse since Friedman’s 1970 New York Times Magazine article. 
Michael Porter and Mark Kramer (2006) argue that CSR fails on two levels: 
first, both in discourse and in practice, society and business are depicted as standing at 
odds with each other, when in reality they are interdependent and should be treated as 
such.  Second, CSR is too generically applied in most instances to be of any strategic 
value.  In contrast to generically applied CSR policies, Porter and Kramer argue that 
strategic CSR – that is, CSR that benefits a firm’s competitive context – will help 
firms differentiate themselves and gain competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
                                                 
5 Mackey is the co-founder and CEO of Whole Foods Markets, the world’s largest natural foods market 
chain. 
6 Rodgers is the founder and CEO of Cypress Semiconductor.   12 
Brief Literature Review of Empirical CSR Research 
To date, dozens of empirical studies have been conducted to determine the 
relationship  between  CSR  and  firm  financial  performance.    However,  due  to 
inconsistent methodologies, the inherent difficulties in operationalizing CSR, and the 
challenges  in  determining  the  direction  of  causality,  these  studies  have  produced 
inconsistent results.   Despite these inconsistencies, empirical studies are widely cited 
by  participants  in  the  CSR  debate  as  support  for  their  claims  that  CSR  is  either 
beneficial or harmful to business.  The following studies are a representative sample of 
the empirical studies conducted to date.  While my research does not fall into this 
category,  it  will  help  to  shed  light  on  some  of  the  factors  contributing  to  the 
inconsistencies in the empirical CSR literature. 
The deregulation of the 1980s changed the legal and regulatory framework in 
which  corporations  operated  and  spurred  business  scholars  to  seek  more  robust 
measures  of  the  links  between  CSR  and  firm  financial  performance,  with  both 
proponents and opponents of CSR searching for empirical evidence to support their 
claims.    Empirical  studies  seeking  to  establish  a  CSR-firm  financial  performance 
relationship  continued to  proliferate  through  the  1980s  and  1990s,  and  many  such 
studies continue to be undertaken today.  The results of the studies have been mixed, 
but generally show weak support for CSR.  McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988, 
p. 868) found that firms low in social responsibility… experience lower [return on 
assets] and stock-market returns than do firms high in social responsibility. They also 
found  that  previous  firm  financial  performance  influenced  CSR  more  than  CSR 
influenced concurrently high financial performance.  This may suggest, according to 
the authors, that firms with high financial performance are in a better position to act in 
a socially responsible way (McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis 1988).   13 
Waddock  and  Graves  (1997)  concluded  that  socially  responsible  business 
practices are both a result of, and a contributing factor to, firm financial performance.  
Using the buzzwords of the day, they argued that firms can ‘do good by doing well,’ 
but they can also ‘do well by doing good.’    
Roman et al. (1999), in their meta-analysis of studies relating corporate social 
performance to corporate financial performance, found a trend suggesting that good 
CSR was, in fact, good for business.  Of the studies they analyzed, 33 suggested a 
positive relationship, 14 suggested no significant relationship or were inconclusive, 
and only five suggested a negative relationship between corporate social performance 
and corporate financial performance.   
Not  all  of  the  studies  conducted  on  the  CSR-firm  financial  performance 
relationship suggest a positive relationship.  Laffer, Coors and Winegarden (2004, p. 
5) found that being a CSR-leading company was negatively or not correlated with 
compound annual net income growth, net profit margin, and stock price appreciation.
7     
Overall,  the  majority  of  studies  show  very  tentative  support  for  a  positive 
CSR-firm financial performance relationship (Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001; Roman et 
al. 1999).  However, the findings of these studies, taken together, are so inconsistent 
that they are far from providing conclusive evidence that CSR benefits a firm’s bottom 
line (See Wartick and Cochran 1997; Griffin and Mahon 1997).  Inherent problems of 
inconsistency in defining and operationalizing CSR for empirical analysis (Griffin and 
Mahon 1997), as well as the often intangible costs and benefits of engaging in CSR 
(Vogel 2005; Birchard 1999; Griffin and Mahon 1997), have made quantifying the 
CSR-firm  financial  performance  relationship  difficult.    What’s  more,  problems  of 
determining  the  direction  of  causality  continue  to  plague  empirical  CSR  studies 
                                                 
7 In this study, Laffer, Coors, and Winegarden repeatedly refer to CSR as ‘so called’ corporate social 
responsibility, which, when combined with Laffer’s public condemnation of CSR, suggests a bias.    14 
(Campbell  2007;  Birchard  1999).    As  Griffin  and  Mahon  (1997)  suggest,  the 
inconsistent  and  often  contradictory  results  obtained  by  those  researching  the  link 
between a corporation’s social performance and its financial performance stem from 
conceptual,  operationalization,  and  methodological  differences  in  the  definitions  of 
social  and  financial  performance  (Griffin  and  Mahon  1997,  p.  7).    Despite  these 
challenges of quantification, nearly all those who enter the CSR debate, whether they 
argue for or against CSR, point to empirical studies to support their arguments.    
Potential Contributions 
  While my research does not directly attempt to address these challenges 
of empirically quantifying the CSR-firm financial performance relationship, I intend to 
contribute to the literature by addressing some of the root causes of these challenges.  I 
suggest that many of the arguments put forth in the CSR discourse are not predicated 
on  empirical  evidence,  but  rather  on  an  underlying  normative  orientation  and 
rationality.  Through this qualitative analysis of the CSR literature – both academic 
and non-academic literature – the conflicting rationalities employed by participants in 
the CSR discourse become apparent.  Understanding the rationalities employed by 
those arguing for or against CSR allows us to see how those rationalities inform their 
arguments, and helps shed light on the inherent inconsistencies in the literature. 
While the CSR literature is expansive, with the top business journals regularly 
featuring CSR articles and other journals devoted entirely to CSR, most articles either 
focus on defining CSR, trying to quantify its effects on a corporation’s bottom line, 
arguing  for  or  against  it,  or  on  how  to  make  CSR  a  part  of  a firm’s  competitive 
strategy.    The  theory  that  has  been  put  forth,  while  important,  is  fragmented.   
Campbell  (2007),  one  of  the  few  sociologists  researching  CSR,  recognizes  this 
theoretical void in the CSR literature.  He argues that, while much time and effort has   15 
been spent attempting to define CSR and determine its relationship to firm financial 
performance,  
 
little theoretical attention has been paid to understanding why corporations 
act in socially responsible ways or not… Indeed, much of the literature on 
corporate social responsibility has been more descriptive or normative than 
positivist in tone. (Campbell 2007, p. 1)  
 
This research seeks to contribute to the development of a more integrated and 
more robust theoretical framework with which to view the CSR debate.    
Finally, this research seeks to contribute to the growing moral discourse on the 
role  and  responsibilities  of  corporations  in  today’s  society.    Under  neoliberal 
globalization,  characterized  by  transnational  capital  flows,  the  deification  of  the 
market,  and  the  decreased  power  of  states  vis-á-vis  transnational  corporations, 
corporations have become, for better or worse, some of the most powerful actors on 
Earth.   As this research will show, however, corporations are not free, unconstrained 
agents.  Rather, they are greatly constrained by the demands of the global market 
system.    Nevertheless,  in  the  face  of  increasing  global  inequality,  environmental 
degradation, and other pressing challenges, the need for a robust moral discourse on 
the  role  and  responsibilities  of  corporations  is  urgent.    By  presenting  the  major 
arguments  in  the  CSR  discourse  and  critiquing  them  through  the  lens  of  Weber’s 
theory  of  rationality,  this  research  seeks  to  contribute  to  this  moral  discourse  by 
adding clarity to the discourse and beginning to fill the theoretical void in the CSR 
literature. 
As with any social phenomenon, CSR cannot be examined in isolation from 
the historical factors that helped shape it.  While the CSR discourse, as it exists today, 
can be traced back to the years following World War II (Carroll 1999; Preston 1975), 
historical  factors  going  back  centuries  contributed  to  forming  the  current  business   16 
landscape and shaping the present-day CSR debate.  Because of the importance of 
history in contextualizing this analysis of CSR, I turn in the following two chapters to 
tracing the pertinent historical factors that gave rise to CSR, as well as discussing its 
contemporary context. 
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CHAPTER 1  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT FROM WHICH CSR AROSE 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been a buzzword and a major point 
of  contention  in  the  business  arena  since  it  entered  the  popular  vernacular  around 
World  War  II.    However,  before  analyzing  the  present-day  CSR  discourse,  it  is 
important to trace the historical factors that informed and gave rise to CSR discourse 
and practice.  In this chapter, I discuss many of the historical factors that gave rise to 
present-day CSR, from the chartering of the first corporations in the 16
th and early 17
th 
centuries to the start of World War II.  In doing so, I provide an historical context in 
which to situate the contemporary CSR discourse.  Understanding the context from 
which CSR arose will help contextualize the subsequent analysis of the CSR literature 
and contribute depth to the sociological analysis of CSR using Weber’s theories of 
rationality and bureaucracy. 
Early History of the Business Corporation 
The history of the business corporation can be traced back to the mid-16
th and 
early 17
th centuries and the chartering of three corporations – the Russia Company 
(1555), the British East India Company (1600), and the Dutch East India Company 
(1602) – by European crowns.  These early companies were chartered to conduct the 
business  of  the  state  –  namely  trade  and  exploration.    The  charter  of  the  Russia 
Company, an English company chartered to conduct trade with Russia, called for it to 
serve as the  
   18 
marchants adventurers of England, for the discovery of lands, territories, 
iles, dominions, and seigniories unknowen, and not before that late 
adventure or enterprise by sea or navigation, commonly frequented. 
 
In  serving  their  respective  crowns  and  conducting  the  business  of  their 
respective states, the British East India Company
8 and the Dutch East India Company
9 
grew  into  hugely  wealthy,  powerful  and  influential  organizations.    While  initially 
chartered  to  conduct  trade  in  the East,  the  British  East  India  Company  eventually 
became a de facto imperial power, garnering a powerful military and governing India 
and  other  ‘colonies’  (Landow).    Meanwhile,  the  Dutch  East  India  Company  – 
chartered to oversee and conduct trade, build forts and engage in both treaties and in 
wars in the name of the Dutch Crown, from the southern tip of Africa east to the 
southern tip of South America (Korten 2001; Crump 2006) – became with world’s 
largest trading company, a title it held for much of its existence (1602-1799).  At the 
height of its power, the Dutch East India Company controlled over half of the world’s 
sea-going shipping (Crump 2006).   
These  early  corporations  are  notable  for  being  the  first  truly  multinational 
corporations, as well as being among the first companies to operate on a joint-stock 
basis, making them the primogenitors of the present-day publicly held corporation.  
The  emergence  of  the  joint-stock  system,  where  individual  shareholders  purchase 
shares  in  a  corporation  and  are  repaid  in  proportion  to  their  investment,  was 
necessitated by the changing nature of the adventures on which these early companies 
embarked.  Economies of scale in shipping were dictating larger ships, not within the 
financial capacities of one man, or even, ordinarily, several.  The need to provide 
protection  from  pirates  was  dictating  synchronized  sailings  of  fleets,  with  armed 
escorts  (Stone  1975,  p.  14).  This  development  was  significant  in  that  it  separated 
                                                 
8 The official name of the British East India Company was the Governor and Company of Merchants of 
London Trading into the East Indies. 
9 The Dutch East India Company was also called the United East Indies Company or VOC.   19 
ownership  of  the  firm,  which  rested  with  the  shareholders,  from  the  firm’s 
management.  While these early companies were, by nature of their charters, strictly 
accountable to their respective crowns, this separation of ownership and management 
of  the  firm  would  eventually  raise  a  new  set  of  questions  as  to  responsibility  or 
accountability for the firm’s actions.   
As important as the emergence of the shareholder system in the development 
of the present-day business corporation is the history of the corporate charter.  Initially, 
all corporations received their charters from their respective monarchs.  While the 
corporate  charter  gave  a  company  its  license  to  operate,  it  was  not  without  its 
limitations.  Not only did the crown demand a certain share of a company’s profits, but 
it  determined  the  terms  under  which  a  company  operated  and  had  the  ability  to 
withdraw  the  charter  at  any  time.    Not  surprisingly,  the  history  of  corporate-
government relations since [the first charters] has been one of continuing pressure by 
corporate  interests  to  expand  beyond  corporate  rights  and  to  limit  corporate 
obligations (Korten 2001, p. 61). 
While accountability to the monarchy hardly made these early corporations 
accountable to the public, the early history of the newly independent United States 
brought surprising changes.  The American corporation, in its original formulation, 
was a public rather than a private institution – and one that owed accountability to the 
American people (Derber 1998, p. 121).  American corporations – and their charters, 
which were given by the state, as opposed to the crown – were treated under the law as 
concessions or grants from the government and the law was unambiguous about the 
‘publicness’ of the corporation (Derber 1998, 122). Corporate charters were given by 
individual states, rather than the federal government, so as to keep control close to the 
people  (Korten  2001).    Corporate  charters  contained  strict  rules  as  to  how  a 
corporation could conduct business, how long its charter would remain effective, how   20 
much  land  it  could  own  and  how  many  assets  it  could  accumulate  (Derber  1998; 
Korten  2001).    The  state  reserved  the  right  to  terminate  a  corporate  charter  if  it 
deemed the corporation’s actions to be antithetical to the public interest (Derber 1998).   
From  the  time  of  American  independence  until  the  start  of  the  Civil  War, 
chartered corporations proliferated, but they remained relatively small in size, with 
even  the  largest  companies  employing  no  more  than  a  few  hundred  employees 
(Edwards 1979, p. 23).  Because businesses remained small and privately owned, both 
profits and responsibility for all facets of the business’s operations rested with the 
owners of the business.  Edwards (1979, p. 24) suggests that the ‘firm’ as an entity 
separate  from  the  activities  of  the  entrepreneur hardly  existed.    Even  in  instances 
where shareholders owned the firm, those shareholders remained close to the firm and 
aware  of  its  operations.    Unlike  today’s  absentee  owners  (shareholders),  early 
shareholders were personally invested in the firm, both from a profit standpoint and, 
since  they  lived  in  the  communities  in  which  the  firm  operated,  a  community 
standpoint.  Citizens, including shareholders, and government kept corporations under 
a  watchful  eye  to  ensure  that they  were  acting responsibly  and  serving  the  public 
interest.  This level of public control of business, while widely accepted at the time, 
likely would be considered subversive today (Derber 1998, p. 121).  Derber contends 
that today’s corporations, ‘owned’ by absentee shareholders and so large that they can 
shape or evade State regulation, would have made very little sense to Americans in the 
early years of our nation (Derber 1998, p. 121).   
The Industrial Revolution and the Rationalization of Production 
The early American corporation was surrounded by rhetoric of publicness, but 
as Derber argues, [n]o image of the early charters should obscure the reality of the pre-
Civil  War  corporation  as  a  monopoly  privilege  reserved  largely  for  the  wealthy   21 
(Derber  1998,  p.  125).    This  reality  was  by  no  means  a  uniquely  American 
phenomenon, and it would become more pronounced with the Industrial Revolution.  
In  order  to  facilitate  the  expansion  of  production  brought  on  by  the  Industrial 
Revolution, factories needed to be re-organized.  The Industrial Revolution thus also 
led to the rationalization of the production process and a fundamental change in the 
relationship  between  owners,  workers  and  the  means  of  production.    While  the 
workers were becoming proletarianized through the internal division of labor, factory 
owners grew wealthy as a result of the increased productivity of their factories.   It was 
in the face of the changes of the day that the field of sociology was born.
10   
In February of 1848, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published The Manifesto 
of the Communist Party (hereafter referred to as The Communist Manifesto), in which 
they criticized the capitalist system, particularly the industrial capitalist system, as a 
class-based system of exploitation.  Marx and Engels (2002, p 76) observed that the 
capitalist system, and its bourgeois or capitalist class, has 
 
resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless 
indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable 
freedom -- Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and 
political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal 
exploitation. (Marx and Engels 2002, p. 78) 
 
At the time of the publication of The Communist Manifesto, communism was 
already a well-established movement in Europe.  But no work, before or after, with the 
possible exception of Marx’s Capital (1867), would have as profound an impact on 
the Communist Party and the role of communism in world history as this work.   As 
Marx and Engels say in the opening line of The Communist Manifesto, A spectre is 
haunting Europe -- the spectre of communism (Marx and Engels 2002, p. 76).  This 
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spectre of communism would play a significant role in American history, serving as a 
rallying call for social movements, particularly the labor movement, and opponents of 
American capitalism, including the Socialist Party.  Marx’s work also served to ignite 
the fears of capitalists, who imposed sometimes oppressive anti-communist laws and 
policies. 
The Rise of, and Early Challenges to, Corporate Power in the United 
States 
David C. Korten points to the years of the American Civil War (1861-1865) as 
a time of unbridled growth of corporate profits and power.  Taking advantage of a 
corrupt and disorganized political system of the Civil War years, private corporations 
were able to procure, often through bribes or ‘purchased’ legislation, massive military 
procurement contracts and huge grants, of both money and land, to drive the westward 
expansion of the railway system.  The greater its profits, observed Korten, the greater 
the emergent industrial class was able to solidify its hold on government to obtain 
further benefits (Korten 2001, p. 64).   Shortly before his death, President Abraham 
Lincoln, disturbed by the phenomenon of consolidation of private wealth and power 
he was witnessing, observed: 
 
Corporations have been enthroned… An era of corruption in high places 
will follow and the money power will endeavor to prolong its reign by 
working on the prejudices of the people… until wealth is aggregated in a 
few hands… and the Republic is destroyed. (as quoted in Korten 2001, p. 
64) 
 
According  to  C.  Wright  Mills,  the  formal  beginning  of  the  supremacy  of 
corporate power came with the immediately post-Civil War congressional elections of 
1866 and was consolidated by the Supreme Court decision of 1886, which declared 
that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the corporation.  That period witnessed the   23 
transfer of the center of initiative from government to corporation (Mills 1957, p. 271).   
The Supreme Court decision to which Mills was referring was the Court’s astonishing, 
precedent-setting  ruling  in  Santa  Clara  County  v.  Southern  Pacific  Railroad  that, 
despite  never  being  mentioned  in  the  U.S.  Constitution,  a  private  corporation  is 
considered  a  natural  person  and  deserves  equal  protection  under  the  Constitution.  
Subsequent  court  rulings  further  protected,  and  gave  explicit  rights  to,  private 
corporations, which were able to claim the full rights of an individual, but remained 
exempt  from  many  of  the  responsibilities  or  liabilities  that  accompany  citizenship 
(Korten  2001).    In  subsequent  years,  questions  of  whether  corporations  might 
necessarily be held accountable for their actions arose, but were widely disregarded by 
the  courts  (Stone  1975).    The  legal  precedent  set  at  this  time  concerning  how 
corporations were to be treated under the law would have far-reaching consequences 
that we still feel today. 
This era of growing corporate power, according to Mills, was an age of raids 
on the government by economic elite,
11 an age of simple corruption, where Senators 
and judges were simply bought up (Mills 1957, p. 271).  This was never more evident 
than in the trend of state legislatures, under heavy influence of corporations and their 
wealthy beneficiaries, rewriting the laws governing corporate actions and limiting the 
power of citizens and states to intervene in corporate affairs (Korten 2001).  In an 
effort to attract corporations to their states, state governments began rewriting the laws 
governing  corporate  charters,  removing  much  of  the  language  of  publicness  and 
granting  corporations  charters  of  unlimited  duration,  and  with  significantly  more 
freedom from government or public intervention.  Many states, coveting the jobs and 
other benefits corporations brought with them, often sweetened the deal by reducing 
                                                 
11 This group of economic elites, the owners of the major industries of the day, are often referred to as 
the robber barons.   24 
tax rates and loosening regulations.  In this environment, very few states could risk 
punishing, or even regulating, irresponsible corporations, as the corporations could 
simply move elsewhere.   
By the end of the 19
th century, firms that were still relatively small only a few 
decades earlier were expanding rapidly, many now employing thousands of workers.  
As  firms  grew  in  size,  they  struggled  to  find  the  most  effective  mechanisms  for 
controlling  their  labor  force.    The result  was  the  rise  of  hierarchical,  bureaucratic 
control,  characterized  by  impersonal  institutional  rules  governing  action,  internal 
division of labor and hierarchical structure power relations (Edwards 1979).   
In terms of large scale production, bureaucratic organizational structures were, 
at least in theory, unrivaled in their efficiency.   Max Weber argued in Economy and 
Society  (1921/1968)  that  bureaucracy  was  the  most  rational  means  of  exercising 
authority  over  people.    It  is  superior  to  other  forms  of  institutional  organization, 
argued Weber, in its precision, stability, reliability, adaptability and calculability, all 
of which are attributes appealing to business owners and managers.  But the cost of 
efficiency was high.  Weber feared that the rationalization that dominates all aspects 
of bureaucratic life was a threat to individual liberty (Ritzer and Goodman 2004, p. 
214).    Weber  believed  that  the  impersonal,  rational  calculation  inherent  in 
bureaucracies reduces every worker to a cog in [the bureaucratic] machine and, seeing 
himself in this light, he will merely ask how to transform himself from a little into a 
somewhat bigger cog… (Weber 1921/1968, p. liii).   Once established, argued Weber, 
bureaucracies are among the most difficult institutions to destroy.  Despite his fears, 
Weber concluded that the future belongs to bureaucratization (as quoted in Ritzer and 
Goodman 2004, p. 214).   25 
Corporate Welfarism: An Early Form of CSR?  
From the mid-19
th to early 20
th centuries, as industrial production in the United 
States  was  becoming  increasingly  consolidated  and  (formally)  rationalized, 
manufacturing  firms  began  changing  their  managerial  practices  to  further  increase 
their  efficiency.    In  order  to  convince  workers  to  accept  the  increasing  rigor  of 
industrial labor, and to attract and maintain the numbers of workers needed by the 
growing  industrial  sector,  firms  began  preaching  and  promulgating  a  belief  in  a 
paternalistic relationship between firms and their employees.  The resulting trend was 
one  of  widespread  adoption  of  corporate  welfarism,
12 which  refers  to  employers’ 
voluntary provision of non-wage benefits, greater employment security, and employee 
representation  (also  known  as  company  unionism)  to  their  blue-collar  workers 
(Moriguchi 2003, p. 2).  Corporate welfarism was not an entirely new phenomenon by 
the start of the 20
th century, but the practice attained its most widespread adoption 
during first three decades of the 20
th century.  
These services and activities provided under corporate welfarism were by no 
means altruistic.  Rather, this paternalistic practice was intended to achieve high job 
satisfaction, loyalty, and positive attitudes toward work among employees.  Corporate 
paternalism  also  included  the  provision  by  the  company  of  housing,  education, 
insurance, pensions, health care and athletic activities (Cheape 1984).   
The  company  town,  a  town  literally  and  figuratively  built  around  a  single 
company, is an extreme example of corporate paternalism and welfarism.  All of the 
town’s  businesses,  its  government,  and  its  public  services  were  controlled  by  the 
company.    Company  towns  grew  primarily  in  geographically  isolated  places, 
particularly around extractive industries like mining and timber.  Logically, the town’s 
fortunes  were  intimately  tied  to  the  fortunes  of  the  company.    Corporate  social 
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responsibility took on a new significance in these towns, as the company was literally 
responsible  for  the  well-being  of  the  town’s  residents.
13   While  very  few,  if  any, 
corporations  today  provide  the  bolus  of  services  and  benefits  of  these  early  20
th 
century  paternalistic  corporations,  this  lasting  notion  of  the  paternalistic  company, 
whatever its motivations, has proven influential in today’s CSR debate. 
As corporations grew larger, their bureaucratic structures grew more complex.  
This fact, along with the changing demands of the marketplace, created the need for a 
new type of manager: the professional manager.  This need for professional managers 
prompted many universities to establish business management programs.  By the mid-
1920s, 160 colleges and universities had established business programs (Galambos 
2000).   These  business  schools,  while  supplying  business  with  a  constant  flow  of 
professional  managers,  also  served  as  social  carriers  of  the  ideology  of  industrial 
capitalism. 
The Interconnectedness of Business and Politics 
At  this  time  the  interconnectedness  between  big  business  and  politics  was 
readily  apparent.    Corporations  recognized  that,  in  order  to  smother  potential 
opposition and create a more favorable business climate, they must increasingly assert 
themselves  into  the  political  sphere.    One  way  they  did  this  was  by  funding  the 
campaigns  of  congressional  candidates  they  saw  as  sympathetic  to  their  cause,  a 
practice that continues today.  As Pennsylvania Senator Boies Penrose said to a group 
of business leaders in 1896: 
 
You send us to Congress; we pass laws under which you make money;… 
and out of your profits you further contribute to our campaign funds to send 
us back again to pass more laws to enable you to make more money.  (as 
quoted in Nader et al. 1976, p. 20-21) 
                                                 
13 While most company towns eventually became incorporated, a few company towns still exist today.   27 
 
 
C. Wright Mills (1957) would later call this interconnected group of elites from 
business and politics the power elite.
14  This small group of elite men
15 who occupied 
the positions of power in the country’s dominant institutions, business and politics, 
held great influence over the direction of the country and the lives of Americans.   
 In terms of the economy and the business environment, the public had become 
a mere footnote in the equation.  The power and arrogance of many business leaders of 
the day can be seen in comments such as railroad tycoon William Vanderbilt’s Let the 
public  be  damned!  (Galambos  2000,  p.  944)    At  the  time,  the  most  powerful 
businessmen could afford such brash disregard for the public without fear of damaging 
repercussions.  But times were changing. 
The Rise of Labor 
At the dawn of the 20
th century, as corporate power and political power were 
becoming increasingly intertwined, organized opposition to corporate power was also 
growing.  Labor unions long predated the rise of large corporations, but had until now 
remained  relatively  small.    In  the  years  immediately  surrounding  the  turn  of  the 
century, labor unions grew rapidly in terms of membership, financial resources, and 
bargaining power (Galambos 2000).  By 1904, union membership had grown to over 
two million members, up from less than 450,000 just seven years earlier (Korten 2001, 
p. 66).  Even the largest of the corporations were hesitant to incur strikes from such 
powerful unions, leading many to believe that unions would provide the necessary 
countervailing force to constrain big business (Galambos 2000) and protect the rights 
of workers.   
                                                 
14 The power elite, for Mills, also included the military elites.  
15 During this period, those who sat at the top positions of business and politics were men.   28 
The  rise  of  labor  unions  gave  workers  across  the  country  hope  that  their 
interests would be represented in the workplace and that companies would be held 
accountable for their actions.  However, industrial tragedies like the deadly Triangle 
Factory Fire of 1911, where factory owners escaped punishment, exposed the poor 
working conditions in industrial factories and showed that any notion of corporate 
social responsibility was far from becoming a reality.  
In the 1912 presidential election, the Socialist Party captured nearly a million 
votes, totaling six percent of the popular vote (Edwards 1979).   The now thriving 
Socialist Party and the maturing labor movement were beginning to present the first 
serious challenge to capitalist rule in the U.S. (Edwards 1979).  Industrial capitalists 
feared the growing power of socialist and other popular movements, which threatened 
to bring fundamental change that might eliminate their privileged position (Korten 
2001,  p.  67).    In  response  to  these  movements,  rather  than  accommodating  the 
demands of these and other groups, the owners of industry began combining their 
assets and forming alliances that dominated the economy to an extent that they didn’t 
have to worry about citizen opposition or any notion of corporate responsibility.   
While the wealthiest of Americans had grown richer in comparison to their 
countrymen, the U.S. itself had grown rich.  By the eve of World War I, the United 
States  economy  had  grown,  in  terms  of  economic  output,  into  by  far  the  world’s 
largest economy.
16  But the growth of the U.S. economy didn’t benefit all Americans 
equally.  By this time, a few large corporations had emerged, mostly through mergers 
and acquisitions, and were beginning to dominate the central sectors of the economy.
17  
                                                 
16 From 1774 to 1909, the U.S. economy increased approximately 175-fold, meaning that it had grown 
at a rate of about 3.9 percent per year since 1774 (Gallman 2000, p. 2).  By 1913, the U.S. economy was 
nearly two-thirds the size of Europe’s 15 biggest economies combined
16 (Gallman 2000, p. 3-6).  Great 
Britain’s economy, the second largest in the world, was well under half the size of the U.S. economy.   
17 J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller put aside their rivalry in order to merge their already enormous 
holdings.  Their combined assets of $22.2 billion, spread across their 112 corporate directorates,   29 
The American public grew fearful that the great corporate combines of that day would 
use their power to crush competition and skim off monopoly profits (Galambos 2000), 
which is precisely what happened.  These large firms dominated the market through 
powerful oligopolies, or trusts, that allowed them to control the market and all but 
eliminate price competition (Lamoreax 2000).  This oligopoly of the wealthy, whose 
political power and ability attain economies of scale that no small firm could compete 
with, left the great number of smaller firms to struggle for market share in the more 
competitive peripheral sectors of the economy (Lamoreax 2000). 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent rise of the communist 
Soviet Union would ignite panic in the hearts of American capitalists, who feared the 
spread  of  communism.    This  fear  would  prove  influential  in  American  policy 
throughout much of the 20
th century and would greatly shape the future CSR debate, 
as private enterprise was seen as an important anti-communist institution.   
For  Weber,  capitalism  was  preferable  to  socialism  for  two  reasons:    first, 
capitalist bureaucracy, while oppressive to individual liberties, was less oppressive 
than the bureaucracy that would be necessitated by socialism, where the state fulfilled 
so  many  of the  duties  that  private  entrepreneurs  fulfilled  in  capitalism.
18   Weber’s 
second  argument  as  to  why  capitalism  was  preferable  to  socialism  was  that 
capitalism’s separation of ownership from management would ensure that the owners 
of enterprise, the shareholders, would keep managers in check.  The separation of 
ownership from management would prove significant in the future CSR debate, but 
not as Weber envisioned.  Rather than providing the check on management power that 
Weber  foresaw,  this  separation  led  to  a  dynamic  where  management  saw  its 
                                                                                                                                           
equaled twice the total assessed value of all property in thirteen states in the southern United States 
(italics mine) (Korten 2001, p. 67). 
 
18 Weber believed that socialism, if fully implemented would lead to a disaster for mankind (Swedberg 
2005, p. 253).   30 
responsibility,  often  its  only  responsibility,  as  being  to  serve  the  interests  of  the 
shareholders.  And shareholders often demanded this type of responsibility. 
From 1918 to 1920, persisting labor unrest exploded into a series of large-scale 
union strikes that subsequently led to violent conflicts between workers and strike 
breakers.  States quickly acted to end the conflicts, with the end result being greatly 
disarmed labor unions.  By the early 1920s, the large corporations were, once again, 
 
ensconced in their respective industries, practicing cooperative… price 
setting and market-sharing behavior.  Competition had been reduced to 
‘competition among the few’… The anti-big business protests of farmers, 
small businessmen, labor, and consumers had become muted and 
meaningless. (Edwards 1979, p. 38) 
 
The Great Depression  
Edwards  (1979, p.  37)  sees  this  period  in  American  history,  approximately 
1890-1920, as the transition from a competitive marketplace to monopoly capitalism, 
where large corporations cornered the market, allowing them to wield unparalleled 
power.  Beyond individual corporate monopolies within specific industries, this period 
witnessed the broader triumph of monopoly capitalism (Edwards 1979). In order to 
establish their hegemony, writes Edwards (1979, p. 37-38), 
 
monopoly capitalists had to resolve conflicts within the capitalist class, 
establish new relations between the corporate economy and the state, and 
smash the growing labor and socialist opposition. 
 
During the 1920s, the U.S. economy soared and public confidence in business 
as a vehicle for national prosperity was high.  However, during the Great Depression, 
the relationship between business and society became strained, often antagonistic.  Big 
business held immense and increasingly concentrated power, and business executives 
tended to think and act in substantial isolation and ignorance of the needs and interests   31 
of  others (Heald  1970,  p.  308).   President  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  feeling  that  big 
business had too much power and that the excesses of big business were largely to 
blame for the crash of the unstable economy, unveiled the New Deal in an effort to 
stabilize the flagging economy and meet society’s most pressing needs.  The New 
Deal both strengthened and extended the government’s capacity to regulate business 
(Galambos 2000).  The creation of checks on corporate power, such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the passage of the labor-friendly Wagner Act 
(1935), had a dramatic impact on the markets from which all large companies obtained 
a significant amount of their capital (Galambos 2000, p. 945-946).  Roosevelt also 
revived and strengthened the country’s anti-trust laws in order to reign in the powerful 
trusts and return an element of competition to the market.  The State had asserted itself 
through  these  New  Deal  measures,  establishing  tangible  boundaries  of  acceptable 
corporate  behavior  and  laying  the  foundation  for  the  present-day  corporate  social 
responsibility debate.   
The passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 represented a major victory for the 
labor movement.  Under the Wagner act, workers and unions had State protection 
from the National Labor Relations Board, which fundamentally changed the terrain of 
corporate-labor  relations  (Galambos  2000).    After  initial  resistance  to  the  idea  of 
negotiating with the newly empowered labor unions, corporate executives began to 
recognize the benefits of working with moderate, non-socialist labor unions.  They 
realized that by granting certain workers’ rights, paying better wages and providing a 
better work environment, the workforce would be more loyal and more motivated, and 
the appeal of socialism – still a concern at the time – would be lessened (Korten 2001).  
In addition to bringing a level of industry-wide uniformity to such matters as wages 
and labor standards, cooperation with these moderate unions provided stability and 
predictability  within  the  system  without  ultimately  challenging  the  power  of  the   32 
industrialists or the market system (Korten 2001, p. 67).  This tentative tolerance of 
labor  unions  and  relatively  widespread  acceptance  of  some  level  of  social 
responsibility toward labor were significant in that it represented an important step in 
legitimizing the notion of corporations having responsibilities beyond profits.   
Under  the  New  Deal,  the  State  assumed  a  greater  and  more  direct 
responsibility  for  the  welfare  of  American  citizens,  providing  and  extending  to 
underserved  populations  most  of  the  services  formerly  provided  under  corporate 
welfarism.    These  services  included  welfare,  social  security,  and  workers’ 
compensation,  among  others.    This  increased  level  of  state  paternalism,  when 
combined with the economic hardships faced by individuals and businesses during the 
Great Depression, led to the decline of corporate welfarism.  With the exception of a 
few remaining company towns, this high level of corporate paternalism would not be 
seen again in the United States.  Nevertheless, corporate welfarism provided an early 
precedent in the discussion of corporate responsibility.   
Beyond effectively ending the practice of corporate welfarism, the New Deal 
was  instrumental  in  the  conceptual  and  practical  development  of  CSR  because, 
through  the  establishment  of  labor-friendly  and  anti-trust  laws,  and  regulatory 
agencies like the SEC, it put a formal framework in place to which business practices 
could be held to determine if they were responsible or not.  The immediate effects of 
these New Deal measures on corporate responsibility were obscured by the country’s 
entrance into World War II, but their lasting effects cannot be questioned.  The CSR 
debate would now focus more on business operations, and to some extent community 
involvement,  with  little  expectation  of  such  intimate  corporate  involvement  in 
workers’ lives.   33 
Conclusion 
From the first corporate charters to the Great Depression and the New Deal, a 
constellation of historical factors have contributed to shaping the concept of CSR.  
Recognizing these historical factors is important in contextualizing both the concept of 
CSR, itself, and the modern CSR discourse.  In the following chapter, I trace the 
evolution of CSR, including the recent historical events and trends that have greatly 
shaped the discussion of CSR.   
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CHAPTER 2  
THE RISE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
By  the  start  of  World  War  II,  the  idea  of  business  having  certain  social 
responsibilities was nothing new.  It had been discussed and practiced in various forms, 
including  corporate  welfarism  and  concessions  to  labor  unions  granting  workers 
certain  rights.    Even  so,  there  was  not  a  consistent  and  well-developed 
conceptualization or discourse on CSR.  While most acknowledge some discussion of 
CSR before World War II, business scholars today point to the years following the war 
as the beginning of the contemporary CSR discourse (Carroll 1999; Preston 1975).  
Over  the  past  60  years,  CSR  has  become  an  entrenched,  even  if  not  universally 
accepted, concept in the business arena.  In this chapter, I outline the rise of CSR, 
some of the historical factors that have shaped it, how expectations of business have 
changed, and how the concept of CSR has evolved.  
The Early Years of CSR  
During World War II, the amazing success with which American business met 
the productive needs of the country and the war effort led to a notably positive shift in 
the business-society relationship (Heald 1970).  Throughout the extended period of 
post-war  prosperity,  public  attitudes  toward  business  continued  to  improve  and 
American business regained its confidence.  Having learned from their experiences in 
the 1930s, when self-interested practices led to an unfavorable public perception of 
business, business leaders began to look more seriously than ever before at the role of 
business in society and the social effects of business’ actions (Bowen 1953, p. 44).  
The growing rhetoric of social responsibility on the part of business signaled not only 
society’s increasing demands on business, but business’ recognition of those demands.   35 
While the formal academic CSR discourse is generally traced back to Bowen’s 
(1953) The Social Responsibilities of the Businessman
19 (Carroll 1999; Preston 1975), 
some  business  leaders  had  been  publicly  advocating  for  business  assuming  social 
responsibilities for years.  For example, in 1950, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) 
Chairman Frank W. Abrams, an early and outspoken advocate of CSR, argued that a 
clear sense of responsibility to and integration with the public welfare is a prerequisite 
to successful business management in today’s complex world (Bowen 1953, p. 51).  
Abrams emphasized finding a balance between the interests of disparate stakeholders: 
 
the job of professional management is to conduct affairs of the enterprise in 
its charge in such a way as to maintain an equitable and workable balance 
among the claims of the various directly interested groups – stockholders, 
employees, customers, and the public at large. (Stryker 1966, p. 20)   
 
Early advocates of CSR were emerging and becoming more outspoken, but 
they  were  not  without  their  critics.    Abrams,  in  particular,  drew  the  attention  of 
Eugene V. Rostow, then dean of the Yale School of Law, who called it unsettling, to 
say  the  least,  to  have  the  respected  head  of  the  Standard  Oil  Co.  of  New  Jersey 
[referring  to  Abrams]  equating  the  management’s  duty  to  stockholders  with  its 
obligations to employees, customers, suppliers, and the public at large (Rostow 1960, 
p. 60).  Rostow went on to say that The law books have always said that the board of 
directors owes a single-minded duty of unswerving loyalty to the stockholders, and 
only to the stockholders (Rostow 1960, p. 63).  Rostow would not be the last to argue 
that,  as  the  shareholders  are  the  legal  owners  of  the  corporation,  the  primary 
responsibility of management is to them.  
In the early 1950s, the nation’s preoccupation with the specter of a worldwide 
communist conspiracy had reached its peak, (Heald 1970, p. 208) leading to the rise of 
                                                 
19 See Introduction chapter for overview of academic CSR literature.   36 
McCarthyism  –  the  extreme  anti-communist  feeling  that  swept  across  the  country 
during the late 1940s and 1950s.  McCarthyism, along with the start of the Cold War, 
which persisted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, greatly 
shaped  the  political  and  economic  landscape  of  the  day.    This  prevailing  anti-
communist sentiment and political rhetoric also played a part in shaping the discourse 
on the role and responsibilities of business in a capitalist society.  In many ways, big 
(private) business stood in direct contrast to the socialist system.  Indeed, American 
business  was  seen  as  the  country’s  greatest  weapon  in  the  developing  Cold  War 
(Galambos 2000), and both critics and advocates of CSR used this fact and the rhetoric 
of the day to garner support for their positions.  
The CSR debate was heating up by the late 1950s, but not everybody was on 
board.  Corporations held enormous power, and many feared that no mechanisms were 
in place to ensure the responsible exercise of that power.  In 1957, sociologist C. 
Wright Mills (1957, p. 125) argued that: 
 
…large owners and executives in their self-financing operations hold the 
keys of economic power.  Not the politicians of the visible government, but 
the chief executives who sit in the political directorate, by fact and by proxy, 
hold the power and the means of defending the privileges of their corporate 
world.  If they do not reign, they do govern at many of the vital points of 
everyday life in America, and no powers effectively and consistently 
countervail against them, nor have they as corporate-made men developed 
any effectively restraining conscience.  
  
Mills  (1957,  p.  125)  called  CSR  an  odd  view  of  the  conscience  of  the 
powerful.
20   Ever  critical  of  corporate  power,  Mills  argued  that  advocates  of  CSR 
[mistake] expedient public relations for a ‘corporate soul’ (Mills 1957, p. 126).   
                                                 
20 Mills (1957) comments on CSR through his unfavorable critique of A.A. Berle’s work.   37 
Social Movements Reshape the CSR Landscape 
 Fueling the CSR debate in the 1950s and 1960s was the rise of three social 
movements,  all  of  which  had  been  around  for decades,  but  were  at  this  time  just 
gaining momentum and demanding public attention.   The first of these movements 
was the civil rights movement.  While African-Americans and others struggled for 
equal rights and opportunities, meeting often violent resistance, public policy began to 
recognize the rights of all Americans, regardless of race.  As equal rights laws were 
enacted,  big  business  proved  to  be far  more  accommodating  than  smaller, family-
owned businesses (Galambos 2000, p. 954).  Large corporations, at least superficially, 
moved quickly to implement programs that would show good faith in providing equal 
employment opportunities to all, regardless of race or ethnic background (Galambos 
2000, p. 955).  This was in large part due to the public scrutiny large corporations 
faced,  which  left  them  more  open  as  targets  of  social  or  legal  reprimand  and 
necessitated the creation of a socially responsible image.   
Not all businesses moved quickly, or even at all, to accommodate the changes 
brought  on  by  the  civil  rights movement,  but many  did.   Many  leading  corporate 
executives spoke publicly of the responsibility of business in furthering equal rights.  
Henry Ford II, president of Ford Motor Company, argued that business should do its 
part to encourage equal opportunity for everyone, regardless of race, and that doing so 
would be profitable for business (Ford II 1970).  This argument that providing equal 
opportunity was good for business, especially coming from one of the country’s top 
executives, was important in business’ acceptance of equal opportunity policies and 
would become a well-worn argument for CSR in the decades to come.  For many 
companies,  however,  the  measures  taken  in  response  to  the  civil  rights  movement 
were largely cosmetic rhetoric or official policy, but were far from transformative.  
Still, big business, in their effort to show that they were responsible corporate citizens,   38 
proved to be one of the first major institutions to adjust to the new landscape created 
by the civil rights movement. 
Corporations faced similar issues and challenges in the face of the women’s 
movement, as women, who had been entering the workforce in increasing numbers 
since  World  War  II,  began  to  enter  formerly  male  dominated  professions.    The 
transition  was  far  from  smooth.    However,  as  was  the  case  with  the  civil  rights 
movement, big business was more responsive to the women’s movement than smaller, 
family-owned business enterprises, which faced less public pressure to change their 
practices (Galambos 2000, p. 955).   Again, these changes were often superficial, but 
the  position  of  big  business  in  the  public  eye  necessitated  timely  action  to 
accommodate women in the workplace, or at least to make it appear that way.  By the 
end of the 1960s, more women were in the workforce, and with more career options, 
than ever.  Despite the many successes of the women’s and civil rights movements, 
barriers to professional upward mobility persist to this day for women and African-
Americans, as well as other under-represented groups.   
Another  movement  that  gained  momentum  in  the  1960s,  a  movement  that 
would eventually exert a great deal of influence on business, was the environmental 
movement.  Many environmentalists point to Rachel Carson’s 1962 book Silent Spring 
as the beginning of the environmental movement.  In Silent Spring, Carson criticized 
the destructive, unhealthy, and short-sighted market system dominated by big business, 
where people and other life on Earth come second to profits.  She argued that both 
people and the environment are suffering under the status quo, and she called for a 
change, beginning with accountability on the part of business and government: 
 
[We live in] an era of industry, in which the right to make a dollar at 
whatever cost is seldom challenged.  When the public protests, confronted 
with some obvious evidence of damaging results of pesticide applications, it 
is fed little tranquilizing pills of half truth.  We urgently need an end to   39 
these false assurances, to the sugar coating of unpalatable facts.  It is the 
public that is being asked to assume the risks that the insect controllers 
calculate. (Carson 1962, p. 13) 
 
With  its  combination  of  emotional  appeal  and  scientific  reasoning,  Silent 
Spring galvanized environmentalists and is widely considered the spark that ignited 
the  American  environmental  movement.
21   The  environmental  movement  greatly 
affected the CSR debate, as any social responsibilities now also implied environmental 
responsibilities on the part of business. 
Capitalism, Freedom and an Intensifying CSR Debate 
Amidst  the  growth  of  the  CSR  discourse  and  the  social  movements  of  the 
1960s came the most outspoken critics of CSR to date.  Among them was economist 
and future Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, perhaps the most well-known and forceful 
critic of CSR.  In his book Capitalism and Freedom (1962), Friedman argued that the 
only responsibility of business managers is to serve the interests of their shareholders.  
He played on the prevailing Cold War anti-communist sentiment to lash out not only 
at the notion of business having social responsibilities, but also at those who advocate 
for such a notion:  
 
This view shows a fundamental misconception of the character and nature 
of a free economy… Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very 
foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a 
social responsibility other than to make as much money for their 
stockholders as possible.  This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine. 
(Friedman 1962, p. 133)   
 
While critics such as Friedman continued to attack CSR as anti-democratic and 
damaging to Americans’ freedom, others argued that CSR was necessary to protect 
                                                 
21 In 1972, in large part due to Carson’s work, the federal government banned DDT. 
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our freedom.  Former President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce M. A. Wright saw 
CSR as a way to meet society’s needs and protect the free enterprise system.  Freedom, 
as both Friedman and Wright use it, refers to market freedom, which stood in contrast 
to communist, state-controlled economies.  Wright (1966, p. 24) argued that: 
 
If American Businessmen want to preserve the principles of individual 
freedom and private initiative, they must devote an increasingly larger 
portion of their time to meeting the nation’s social needs.   
 
Meanwhile, critics from the left denounced CSR as insufficient in addressing 
society’s most pressing needs.  They saw corporations as creatures of the market that 
exist to efficiently maximize profits.  To expect corporations to voluntarily address 
society’s  social  and  environmental  problems  without  fundamentally  changing  the 
‘rules of the game’ in our free market system, they argued, is misguided.  In her 1968 
Harvard Business Review article Should Business Tackle Society’s Problems? Hazel 
Henderson (1968, p. 81) argued that: 
 
If we all understood the basic ground rules of private enterprise a little 
better, we would realize that the large corporation is not a rain god, and that 
no amount of prayer or incantation will unleash its power.  The spectacle 
of otherwise sophisticated people going on bended knee to companies and 
pleading with them to have the kind of conscience and moral sensibilities 
only rarely found in individuals in nothing less than laughable.  
 
For  Henderson  and  others  sharing  her  critique  of  CSR,  the  fundamental 
problem rests not with corporations, per se, but with the structure of the market in 
which they operate.  The rational market system demands rationally profit-oriented 
corporations, leaving little room for corporations to engage in CSR.  If society expects 
corporations to engage in CSR, argued Henderson and others, we must revamp the 
legal framework in which they function, creating a system that rewards responsibility   41 
and other outcomes beyond profits.  Until that day comes, any discussion of corporate 
social responsibility is only slightly more than an exercise in futility.  
While calls for systemic change increased during the 1960s, they continued to 
be answered with more conservative arguments by scholars such as Milton Friedman, 
who  returned  to  the  CSR  debate  in  1970  with  his  now  famous  New York Times 
Magazine  article  appropriately  titled  The  Social  Responsibility  of  Business  is  to 
Increase its Profits.  In addition to his criticism of CSR for its analytical looseness and 
lack of rigor, (Friedman 1970) Friedman continued, as he did in the 1960s, to portray 
any notion of corporate social responsibility as contrary to the democratic ideals of the 
nation.    Once  again  playing  on  the  prevailing  Cold  War-era  anti-communist 
sentiments, Friedman argued that the doctrine of ‘social responsibility’ involves the 
acceptance of the socialist view that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, 
are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative 
uses.  He continued: 
 
Whether blameworthy or not, the use of the cloak of social responsibility, 
and the nonsense spoken in its name by influential and prestigious 
businessmen, does clearly harm the foundations of a free society (Friedman 
1970) 
 
Economic Globalization and The Great U-Turn 
Following  World  War  II,  as  Japanese  and  European  competitors  were 
rebuilding from the damage caused by the war, American business moved forward 
confidently, with many American corporations and industries becoming world leaders.  
However, as the 1960s came to a close, things began to change.  For generations, 
American business had had little reason to fear foreign competition, as foreign imports 
accounted for only a small portion of consumer goods purchased in the U.S. (Harrison   42 
and Bluestone 1988) and American political and business leaders paid little attention 
to any talk of a threat from foreign businesses.   In the late 1960s and 1970s, foreign 
competitors,  particularly  Japanese  and  German  companies,  began  flooding  the 
American  consumer  market  with  superior  products  at  lower  costs  than  American 
companies were providing (Galambos 2000).   This was particularly true in industries 
such  as  electronics,  steel,  automobiles,  machine  tools,  and  tires  (Galambos  2000).  
Foreign competition, the highly controversial Vietnam War, increasing inflation, the 
oil shocks of the 1970s, and the Watergate scandal left American government reeling, 
and the U.S. economy in bad shape (Galambos 2000).   Suddenly, the long period of 
post-World War II prosperity was over.   
Harrison and Bluestone (1988) call this sudden change in economic fortunes of 
Americans The Great U-Turn.  During this time, the real wages of Americans fell and 
unemployment rose.  As corporations began outsourcing jobs to the lowest bidders, 
industries  such  as  the  steel  industry,  cost-burdened  by  the  high  wages  and  safety 
standards  demanded  by  laws  and  labor  unions  in  the  U.S.,  fell  victim  to  foreign 
competitors who could provide the same materials at a fraction of the price.  In 1969, 
less than 14 percent of consumer goods purchased in the U.S. were foreign imports.  
By 1979, that number had risen to 38 percent (Harrison and Bluestone 1988).  By 
1986, 45 percent of all consumer and business purchases were of foreign products 
(Harrison and Bluestone 1988).   Economic globalization was under way, changing 
forever the social, political, and economic landscape in which businesses operate.   
As the U.S. economy declined, frustrated and concerned Americans turned to 
politically  and  economically  conservative  leaders  at  state  and  national  levels  of 
government  to  stop  the  slide  (Galambos  2000).    Conservative  politicians  began 
enacting laws that they believed would spur business growth.  This entailed the first 
efforts  at  economic  deregulation  –  although  no  attempt  at  deregulation  would   43 
approach the sweeping deregulation of the Reagan Administration in the 1980s – and 
more liberally applied government subsidies to corporations.  But critics argued that 
the pro-business policies of the day, while intended to spark economic growth, often 
meant sacrificing social and environmental protections to corporate interests.  In their 
book  Taming  the  Giant  Corporation,  Nader,  Green,  and  Seligman  (1976,  p.  7-8) 
argued that: 
 
…the nonmarket impacts of giant corporations have become 
institutionalized.  Pollution of the human environment is rationalized as an 
economic necessity.  Subsidies have become an entrenched corporate 
welfare system inducing inefficiencies and political rewards.  Such 
corporate excesses align big government with big business against public 
interests.  As power begets power, large corporations are able to pursue 
their activities beyond the law, above the law, or against the law – a state of 
affairs clearly incompatible with democracy.   
 
Carrying  the  momentum  from  the  social  movements  of  the  1960s,  social 
activists such as Nader loudly criticized what they saw as unchecked corporate power.  
As  the  country’s  political  leaders  enacted  increasingly  pro-business  policies  and 
politically liberal opponents protested, big business found itself at the heart of many of 
the debates.  As corporations outsourced jobs and laid-off workers in hopes of staying 
competitive with their more streamlined foreign competitors, the public, still suffering 
under the economic downturn and concerned with the loss of jobs they were seeing, 
looked for a sign that they still mattered in the equation and that their fortunes would 
improve.  As the economy became increasingly global, corporations needed not only 
to show that they were responsible American citizens, but responsible global citizens. 
The Sullivan Principles and Three Mile Island: Two CSR Landmarks 
An important milestone in the history of corporate social responsibility came in 
1977, when General Motors’ first African-American board member, Reverend Leon H.   44 
Sullivan  (who  was  appointed  in  1971),  developed  the  Sullivan  Principles.    The 
Sullivan Principles, which came to represent an international standard for corporate 
behavior regarding race, were formulated as an effort to foster racial equality in South 
Africa,  where  Apartheid  had  been  in  place  since  1948.      Aimed  at  American 
companies  operating  in  South  Africa,  these  voluntary  principles  laid  out 
straightforward  guidelines  –  such  as  equal  facilities  and  pay  for  all  workers,  and 
increased  representation  and  opportunities  for  blacks  in  leadership  positions  –  for 
companies to follow in an attempt to bridge the gaping racial divide in South Africa.  
Initially, 12 large American corporations – among them General Motors, Ford, 3M, 
Mobil, and Union Carbide – agreed to abide by the Principles.   
But the Sullivan Principles were not without their critics.  Common criticisms 
were that these companies were simply reaping the public relations benefits in the U.S. 
and  that  these  principles,  even  if  they  were  effectively  implemented  (which many 
critics  saw  as  unlikely,  or  even  impossible),  were  unlikely  to  make  any  headway 
toward weakening the long-entrenched system of apartheid.  Despite these criticisms, 
the Sullivan Principles continued to gain supporters.  By 1984, over 100 corporations 
had signed on.  Today, the Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility are a 
voluntary code of conduct built on a vision of aspiration and inclusion, that provides a 
framework by which socially responsible companies and organizations can be aligned 
(Sullivan Foundation).  
In  1979, the  nuclear  leak  at  the Three  Mile  Island  nuclear  reactor  brought 
nation-wide attention to the environmental impacts of business, particularly nuclear 
power,  and  the  dangers  of  deregulation.   It  also  proved  a  significant  event  in the 
evolution of CSR.  At the time of the Three Mile Island accident – which was the 
worst civilian nuclear accident to date – government regulation of the nuclear industry 
was far from stringent.  In a rare example of an industry imposing stricter regulations   45 
on itself that required by law, the nuclear power industry, believing that more strict 
government regulation would likely have prevented this accident, took matters into 
their own hands and organized a system of self-regulation designed to set standards, 
monitor  performance,  and  punish  utilities  whose  behavior  failed  to  meet  the  new 
industry standards (Campbell 2007, p. 18).  This system of strict self-regulation was 
motivated primarily by self interest.  The nuclear power industry recognized that it 
needed to present itself to the public as a safe and highly responsible industry, and that 
all members of the industry were held to strict environmental standards.  In light of the 
accident, the nuclear industry knew that the American public was wary of nuclear 
power,  and  that  another  accident  could  bring  down  the  entire  industry  (Campbell 
2007).  Corporate  social  responsibility,  in  the  form  of  increased  safety  standards, 
became vital to the survival of the entire nuclear industry. 
Economic Deregulation Changes the CSR Landscape 
The United States entered the 1980s still firmly entrenched in the Cold War 
with the Soviet Union.  The ever-present prospect of nuclear annihilation and global 
communism  greatly  affected  the political  and  economic  rhetoric  and  policy  of  the 
decade.  Under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, the 1980s saw 
sweeping waves of federal economic deregulation and decentralization.  The logic 
used  by  Reagan,  Bush,  and  others  who  pushed  for  deregulation  was  based  on 
neoclassical economic theory and the belief that a free market would bring greater 
benefits to Americans, and to American business, than one burdened by government 
regulations.    American  business,  according  to  this  logic,  would  be  better  able  to 
compete with its international competitors who faced fewer government regulations on 
such issues as labor and the environment.  While conservative economists, politicians 
and  business  leaders  cheered  deregulation,  community,  labor  and  environmental   46 
groups  protested  that  corporate  interests  were  being  placed  above  public  interests.  
Deregulation allowed companies to pass onto society costs that they were previously 
forced to internalize (Sparks 2003).  ‘Costs,’ such as environmental damage caused by 
improper  waste  disposal,  were  largely  allowed  to  be  considered  externalities  in  a 
corporation’s cost calculus, meaning that, in many cases, corporations were not held 
fully accountable, financially or otherwise, for the affects their actions had on others.   
Deregulation  on  a  national  level  didn’t  mean that  all  states  supported  such 
policies.  Several state governments, in the hope of encouraging CSR in the wake of 
federal deregulation, passed regulations that legally authorized corporate boards of 
directors  to  consider  the  interests  of  stakeholders  beyond  simply  the  shareholders 
(Campbell 2007).  While far from mandating CSR, such regulations opened the door, 
at least in theory, for corporations to behave responsibly with less fear of legal reprisal 
from shareholder groups. 
Deregulation  greatly  reshaped  the  CSR  landscape  by  changing  the  legal 
framework  within  which  businesses  operate,  as  well  as  changing  government 
expectations of business.  Perhaps most importantly, economic deregulation handed 
significant freedom to corporations and eliminated many avenues of recourse by the 
public and corporate watchdogs.   
The Global Push for CSR, the Race to the Bottom, and the Rise of Fair 
Trade  
The 1980s and 1990s marked the beginning of a period of rapid globalization 
and the further unleashing of American-style capitalism
22 on the farthest reaches of the 
globe.  There seemed to be no limit to the reach of multinational corporations, which 
inevitably led to further questioning of the corporation-society relationship.   
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Existing concerns grew more pronounced that the rules of the game in the 
global market leave little room for corporations to deviate from the highly focused 
pursuit  of  profits.    Under  economic  globalization,  corporations  have  grown  huge, 
highly mobile, and immensely powerful.  In the face of cutthroat competition, they 
find themselves enslaved to the bottom line.  As transnational capital flows become 
increasingly difficult for states to regulate, and as corporations become increasingly 
powerful actors relative to states in the global economy, the debate on corporate social 
responsibility takes on added significance.    
During  the  1980s  and  1990s,  several  international  summits  –  including  the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), better known as the 
Brundtland Commission, and the Rio Summit (1992), among others – convened to 
discuss the changing social and environmental landscape in the face of globalization.  
Business was one of many institutions implicated in subsequent calls for sustainability.  
These  calls  for  changes  in  social  and  environmental  business  practices  served  to 
polarize the business community.  Many multinational corporations came out in favor 
of business working to become more environmentally and socially sustainable, while 
others vehemently rejected the idea.  The demands of global competition place firms 
in  a  position  of  having  to  constantly  streamline  their  processes,  and  the  idea  of 
changing  their  practices,  especially  by  imposing  higher  social  and  environmental 
standards, didn’t sit well with many corporate leaders. 
The rapid pace of economic globalization during the 1980s and 1990s spurred 
competition among companies to reduce costs in order to stay competitive.  This trend 
is commonly referred to by critics of global capitalism as the race to the bottom.  In 
cutting  costs,  environmental  and  human  considerations  are  secondary  to  cost 
considerations.   In developing countries, low wages and poor working conditions 
were, and still are, commonplace in factories that produce goods carrying the brand   48 
name of multinational corporations.  In trying to defend these practices, many business 
leaders and pro-free trade politicians argue that the pressures of global competition 
leave them no choice but to reduce costs in any way they can.  Further, by locating 
factories in developing countries, they argue, corporations are aiding in development 
and providing badly needed jobs.   
In  response  to  the  exploitation  of  workers  by  multinational  corporations 
operating under free trade agreements, Solidaridad
23 launched the fair trade movement 
in 1988.  The fair trade movement, aimed at ensuring humane working conditions and 
fair pay for workers, initially focused on agricultural products like bananas and coffee, 
as well as products, such as clothing, that were often manufactured in sweatshops, 
sometimes using child labor.  Offering fair trade products showed that a company was 
responsible, but fair trade products are expensive, making it unlikely to be widely 
adopted  by  firms  willing  to  move  factories  and  employ  sweatshop  labor  to  shave 
pennies per item off their cost sheets.  Nevertheless, fair trade products found a niche, 
and that niche continues to grow today. 
One effect of the fair trade movement was the increased awareness among the 
public on issues such as sweatshop and child labor.  Multinational corporations, so 
driven by competition and bent on profits, had scarcely responded to public pressure 
on such issues before this time.  In the coming years, major multinational corporations 
like  Nike,  GAP,  and  others  would  be  boycotted  in  protest  of  their  labor  practices 
(Sparks 2003; Schwartz and Gibb 1999).   
The  example  of  Nike,  GAP  and  other  multinational  corporations  being 
boycotted  because  of  their  labor  practices  lends  a  certain  level  of  weight  to  the 
common argument leveled by CSR advocates that, in today’s business environment, 
CSR is a fact of life for corporations.  The trend of increased scrutiny by watchdog 
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groups, NGOs and the media is likely to continue in the future, and corporations must 
behave  responsibly  or  risk  incurring  sanctions.    Economist  and  business  scholar 
Geoffrey Heald believes that: 
  
corporate social responsibility needs to be an important part of corporate 
strategy.  Indeed, it can be a matter of survival, as societies penalize 
companies perceived to be in conflict with underlying values. (Heald 2004) 
 
David Vogel (2005) also recognizes this motivation for socially responsible 
behavior.    However,  Vogel  argues  remarkably  few  firms  have  been  rewarded  or 
punished by the financial markets for their social performance (Vogel 2005, p. 73).  
Like  investors,  consumers  appear  equally  ambivalent  in  most  cases,  as  socially 
responsible  behavior  rarely  influences  consumer  purchasing  behavior.    In  a  few 
extreme cases, though, such as the Nike case, corporate irresponsibility has hurt firms 
by  generating  bad  public  relations,  drawing  boycotts,  protests,  regulation  or  other 
sanctions.  Rather than seeking accolades for their responsible practices, argues Vogel, 
many high profile firms, especially those firms that have been publicly reprimanded 
for their previous irresponsibility, engage in CSR in order to stay out of the spotlight. 
CSR and the Tyranny of the Bottom Line 
The first few years of the 21
st century will perhaps forever be remembered for 
the rash of high profile corporate accounting scandals, such as those involving Enron 
and  Arthur  Anderson.    By  any  standards,  these  are  blatant  cases  of  corporate 
irresponsibility.  The damage done to the reputation of big business was immediately 
apparent, although these scandals are unlikely to have caused any tangible harm to 
business, in general.  What makes the Enron case, in particular, so interesting is that, 
before  the  scandal  was  uncovered,  the  company  was  widely  regarded  as  a  model 
corporate citizen (Vogel 2002/3).  Vogel uses this paradox to make the point that CSR   50 
is not a black and white issue, and that not all CSR is good CSR.  Firms may be rated 
as highly responsible according to certain criteria, but may be behaving irresponsibly 
in other areas.     
In  February  2002,  largely  in  response  to  the  recent  high-profile  corporate 
accounting  scandals,  President  George  W.  Bush  unveiled  his  Ten  point  plan  to 
improve  corporate  responsibility  and  protect  America’s  shareholders,  based  on  the 
three  core  principles  of  information  accuracy  and  accessibility,  management 
accountability, and auditor independence.
24  While President Bush’s rhetoric was of 
responsibility to communities, the environment and others, he made it clear that the 
goal of his proposed reforms was to safeguard the rights of investors and to protect the 
free enterprise system.
25  Corporate responsibility is of vital importance, according to 
President Bush, because the whole design of free market capitalism depends upon free 
people  acting  responsibly.
26   However,  as  the  war  in  Iraq  escalated  and  as  the 
American public turned its attention to other issues, the White House also turned its 
attention  elsewhere.    On  the  White  House’s  official  Corporate  Responsibility 
homepage,  the  most  recent  official  presidential  acknowledgement  of  corporate 
responsibility came in 2003.
27 
The  corporate  accounting  scandals  and  innumerable  other  instances  of 
corporate  irresponsibility  are  often  portrayed  by  politicians  and  perceived  by  the 
public as bad people doing bad things.  But, while ethical shortcomings certainly play 
a part, it is rarely so simple.  Wall Street places an enormous amount of pressure on 
firms  to  maximize  short-term returns  to  investors.    Failure  to  meet  the  immediate 
demands of the stock market can mean ruin for corporate executives.  Often what is 
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seen as corporate irresponsibility is managers desperately trying to meet the short-term 
demands of Wall Street by cutting corners and shaving costs on expenses like labor or 
environmental standards. 
In Tyranny of the Bottom Line (1996), Ralph Estes argues that managers are 
held  hostage  by  the  corporate  scorecard  that  stresses  the  bottom  line  as  the  sole 
measure  of  corporate  performance.    At  the  risk  of  losing  their  jobs,  corporate 
managers are forced, in their organizational roles, to emphasize the bottom line, often 
at the expense of more desirable social or environmental ends.  But the bottom line is 
not an accurate measure of corporate performance, argues Estes, and strict obedience 
to  it  sometimes  forces  otherwise  ethical  managers  to  do  irresponsible  or  unethical 
things. 
The Rise of Socially Responsible Investing  
An  encouraging  trend  for  advocates  of  CSR  has  been  the  steady  rise  in 
socially  responsible  investing  (SRI).    Socially  responsible  investing  formally 
originated in the 1970s as an alternative investment option for investors that wanted 
to avoid sin stocks like tobacco, alcohol and, for some, oil.  The past 15 years have 
seen a proliferation and increasing sophistication of socially responsible investment 
funds.  Not only have these SRI funds grown in number, but they have proven to be 
competitive  with  mainstream  investment  funds.    The  Dow  Jones  Sustainability 
Indexes  (DJSI),  launched  in  1999,  are  the  first  indexes  that  track  the  financial 
performance of the world’s leading sustainability-driven companies.  The DJSI are 
growing rapidly and gaining credibility in investment circles, signaling to investors 
and corporations that CSR and cannot be dismissed as a trivial phenomenon.   
A  monumental landmark  in  the  development  of  SRI  came  in  April  2006, 
when United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan brought together a group of the   52 
world’s  largest  institutional  investors  to  launch  the  Principles  for  Responsible 
Investment, which include institutions representing more than $2 trillion in assets.  
Commenting on the Principles, Annan (2006) remarked:  
 
Developed  by  leading  institutional  investors,  the  Principles  [for 
Responsible Investment] provide a framework for achieving better 
long-term  investment  returns  and  more  sustainable  markets.  I 
invite  institutional  investors  and  their  financial  partners 
everywhere to adopt these Principles.
28 
 
Voluntary  initiatives  and  business  organizations  committed  to  sustainability 
and CSR have popped up in numbers over the past decade-and-a-half.  The World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, Business for Social Responsibility, 
and other groups, especially when buoyed by the success of SRI, put a legitimate face 
on socially responsible business and serve as a forum for the growth of new ideas and 
practices.   
The Global Compact 
In  December  of  2005,  less  than  one  year  prior to  the  establishment  of  the 
Principles for Responsible Investment, the 191 Member States of the United Nations 
General Assembly officially endorsed the Global Compact, an international voluntary 
corporate  citizenship  initiative.    The  idea  behind  the  Global  Compact  is  that 
international  companies  should  go  above  and  beyond  compliance in their  business 
practices – that they should commit themselves to observing and exceeding certain 
minima moralia in terms of labor, the environment, fighting corruption, and human 
rights (Leisinger 2006). 
As of March 2006, the Global Compact included over 2,900 participants and 
other  stakeholders  from  90  countries  (Kell  2006).  The  hope  behind  the  Global 
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Compact  was  to  engage  business  in  working  toward  fair  globalization  and  the 
attainment of the UN Millenium Development Goals, and to provide a framework for 
doing  so  (Leisinger  2006).    According  to  UN Secretary-General  Kofi  Annan,  this 
sense of what business can do for others -- and what it must do for itself -- is at the 
heart of the Global Compact corporate citizenship initiative (Annan 2006). 
The UN claims that the Global Compact enjoys unprecedented support and 
participation in the developing world, where a significant percentage of the Compact’s 
2,900 members reside.  This is no doubt an important element of any global initiative, 
but closer inspection reveals that many of the economic powers of the global North, 
particularly the United States, have been less enthusiastic participants.  The United 
States  and  its  numerous  multinational  corporations  are  major  loci  of  power  in  the 
global economy, yet only nine of the 219 US corporations included in the Financial 
Times  500  are  Global  Compact  members  (www.unglobalcompact.org).    Western 
European corporations from the FT 500 have been more supportive of the compact: 23 
out of 28 French corporations are members; 11 out of 19 German corporations are 
members; six out of 12 Swiss corporations are members; and five out of 12 Italian 
corporations are members. British support has been less than its European neighbors, 
with only 10 out of 33 corporations being Global Compact members.  Japan has also 
been slow to support the Compact, with only four of its 43 FT 500 corporations being 
members.  Until the power-holding nation-states and corporations fully engage with 
the  principles  put  forth  by  the  initiative,  the  Global  Compact,  however  noble  its 
intentions, risks a fate of inconsequence.    
Conclusion 
Today,  corporations  proudly  tout  their  socially  responsible  behavior,  as  a 
cursory glance at any major corporation’s website will surely attest.  But why do these   54 
corporations claim to be responsible?  Are they really responsible, or is it simply a 
public relations tactic?  Multinational corporations like Nike, GAP, and others have 
been called out and boycotted in recent years because of their labor practices in their 
overseas factories.  These companies eventually acknowledged the protests and have 
made efforts to improve their labor practices, although sweatshop and child labor are 
still employed by many corporations.
29  But for these large companies, the pressures to 
keep costs low to stay competitive still exist.  Any social responsibility they claim in 
terms of labor, the environment, or other issues comes at a cost.  The tangible benefits 
of CSR are sometimes small, if visible at all, and the studies on the economic impacts 
of  CSR  to  date  are  inconclusive.
30   Even  though  nearly  every  large  corporation 
prominently displays its corporate social responsibility on their websites and through 
other media, Vogel (2005) argues that most large corporations do not engage in CSR 
with the hope of reaping the benefits of public goodwill toward them.  Rather these 
corporations  engage  in  CSR  to  a  certain  level  in  order  to  stay  out  of  the  public 
spotlight.  
Regardless of the reasons behind firms’ acknowledgement of CSR, the fact 
that  nearly  every  major  corporation  publicly  touts  its  CSR  practices  and  business 
journals continue to regularly devote space to CSR signals the continued relevance of 
CSR in today’s economy and society.  Many advocates of CSR argue that the trend of 
increased scrutiny by watchdog groups, NGOs and the media is likely to continue in 
the future, making CSR a fact of life in business today.  Jeffrey Hollender, CEO of 
Seventh Generation, a company that makes eco-friendly home products, believes that 
CSR is 
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the future of business.  It’s what companies have to do to survive 
and prosper in a world where more and more of their behavior is under a 
microscope.
31 
 
The CSR discourse has evolved over the past 60 years as scholars and business 
leaders have attempted to adjust to the ever changing social, political and economic 
environment  in  which  business  operates.    Despite  its  conceptual  and  practical 
evolution,  the  CSR  literature  continues  to  be  characterized  by  inconsistency.    As 
Votaw (1972, p. 25
32) observed, corporate social responsibility means something, but 
not always the same thing to everybody.  Many CSR and CSR-related theories have 
been put forth, but these theories, while valuable, fail to offer insight into the thought 
processes underlying the arguments put forth in the CSR debate.  In the following 
chapter, I outline the research methodology and theoretical framework I employ in my 
search to answer my questions of whether or not an integrated CSR theory, or theories, 
exists, and what rationalities inform the CSR debate. 
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH METHODS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Having outlined the historical context from which CSR arose, and in which it 
exists, I turn now to the research methodology and theoretical framework I employ in 
my analysis of the CSR literature.  I approach this analysis of the CSR literature with 
two research questions: First, what patterns exist in the arguments put forth in the CSR 
literature  and  can  these  patterns  be  classified  into  theoretical  categories  of  CSR?  
Second, what rationalities underlie the predominant arguments for CSR, and how do 
these  rationalities  inform  the  CSR  debate?     The  nature  of  my  research  questions 
necessitates  a  two-tiered  methodological  approach.    I  begin  by  conducting  an 
inductive review of the business literature to understand the CSR discourse as it is 
presented.  I then turn to the sociology literature – particularly the theories of Max 
Weber – to develop a theoretical lens with which to analyze the CSR theories.   
Research Methods: 
In seeking to determine whether any patterns exist in the arguments put forth in 
the  CSR  literature,  and  whether  these  patterned  arguments  can  be  classified  into 
theoretical categories of CSR, I conduct a thorough review of the CSR literature.  In 
my review of the literature, I searched academic journals in the fields of business, 
economics  and  the  social  sciences,  as  well  as  magazines  containing  articles  by, 
interviews  with,  and  speeches  given  by  prominent  business  leaders  or  scholars 
discussing CSR.  I also searched books written by scholars in the fields of business, 
economics, law and the social sciences, as well as by prominent business leaders and 
social commentators.   
Because the CSR literature is so expansive, an  exhaustive literature review 
would have been impossible under the current constraints of time and space.  I judged   57 
an exhaustive review also to be unnecessary, as I fairly quickly reached a point of 
saturation in my review; that is to say, after searching over 200 books, speeches and 
articles on CSR, I reached a point where no new arguments or themes emerged from 
the literature.  In order to paint an accurate portrait of the CSR discourse, I include in 
my analysis seminal and other significant contributions to the discourse, as well as less 
often cited works that make unique contributions to the CSR discourse in that they 
offer an argument or perspective not put forth in the rest of the literature.   
I loosely model my analysis of the CSR literature after Curtis E. Beus and 
Riley  E.  Dunlap’s  (1990)  article  in  Rural  Sociology  titled  Conventional  versus 
Alternative Agriculture: The Paradigmatic Roots of the Debate, in which they present 
their  analysis  in  the  form  of  a  debate  between  adherents  to  conventional  and 
alternative  agricultural  paradigms.    Their  article  suggests  a  Kuhnian  paradigmatic 
struggle between the adherents of each respective agricultural paradigm.  Like Beus 
and  Dunlap,  I  analyze  competing  paradigms  by  comparing  them  with  each  other.  
While I do not present the CSR theories as a debate, per se, I do present them side-by-
side-by-side  in  order  to  allow  for  comparative  analysis  of  their  similarities  and 
differences.  As did Beus and Dunlap, I opted not to confine my analysis to the strictly 
academic literature.  Because most of the peer-reviewed academic literature takes a 
more value-neutral approach to its discussion of CSR, I found, as did Beus and Dunlap, 
that  speeches,  books  and  articles  by,  and  interviews  with,  business  scholars  and 
leaders proved much more fruitful in identifying the predominant arguments in the 
literature. 
In applying Beus and Dunlap’s model to the CSR discourse, I located several 
recurring points of paradigmatic contention in the CSR literature along which those 
arguing from different perspectives diverge in their arguments.  The four points of 
contention  I  identified  are:  1)  the  role  and  responsibility  of  business;  2)  to  whom   58 
corporations are responsible; 3) justification for engaging, or not engaging, in CSR, 
including reference to the bottom line; and 4) democracy, the free market, and the role 
of the state.  Within each of these general codes, I identified and coded the literature 
according to several sub-codes.  On the role and responsibility of business, the six 
most common arguments as to the role and responsibility of business are to make 
profits for shareholders, to drive innovation and progress, to ensure proper functioning 
of  the  free  market,  to  meet  society’s  needs  for  goods  and  services,  to  turn  social 
problems into economic gain, and to serve the public good.  On the question of to 
whom  corporations  are  responsible,  the  three  arguments  that  emerge  from  the 
literature are that corporations owe sole responsibility to shareholders (as long as they 
obey  the  laws),  that  corporations  owe  primary  responsibility  to  shareholders  and 
secondary  responsibility  to  other  stakeholders,  and  that  corporations  owe 
responsibility to a wide array of stakeholders affected by the corporation’s actions.   
Several arguments or justifications for or against engaging in CSR emerged from the 
literature, with the most common being that CSR is good or bad for business, that 
CSR leads to competitive advantage or disadvantage for a variety of reasons, that CSR 
is or is not serving the shareholders’ interests, that CSR is detrimental to or vital to the 
survival of the free enterprise system, or that CSR is the morally right or wrong thing 
to do.  Finally, within the category I title On democracy, the free market, and the role 
of the state, CSR is seen as everything from an anti-capitalist, collectivist doctrine to a 
necessary component of a healthy, democratic free enterprise system.  The state is 
generally seen as a constraining, albeit unavoidably necessary, force that CSR helps 
keep at bay.  Coding the literature according to these points of contention allowed me 
to  determine  whether  any  patterns  exist  in  the  arguments  put  forth  in  the  CSR 
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Upon coding the CSR literature according to these four points of contention, 
three endogenous patterns emerge, with each pattern representing a general theoretical 
category of CSR that is employed by contributors to the CSR discourse.  I call these 
theoretical frameworks corporate libertarian theory, enlightened self-interest theory, 
and moral theory.  Corporate libertarian theory holds that the only responsibility of 
corporations is to make profits for their shareholders, the owners of the business.  The 
second  theory  follows  the  reasoning  of  enlightened  self-interest,  arguing  that 
corporations should engage in CSR because it is good for business.  I call this theory 
the enlightened self-interest theory.  The third theory, also in favor of CSR, is based 
on the understanding of the purpose of business as more than providing society with 
goods and services and creating wealth for shareholders.  According to this argument, 
business exists to serve the public good and therefore has moral responsibilities to 
wide  array  of  stakeholders.    Managers  must  be  mindful  in  their  decision-making 
process to balance these disparate stakeholders’ interests.  I call this theory the moral 
theory.   
The  three  CSR  theories,  as  I  present  them  here,  have  not  been  formally 
articulated  in  the  CSR  literature.    Rather,  they  represent  endogenous  themes,  or 
patterns, that emerged from the CSR literature based on my coding scheme.  I present 
them here, then, not as formal theories, but as Weberian ideal types that I have created 
with the intention of adding clarity to the considerable noise of the CSR discourse.  
Weber developed the ideal type as a conceptual tool with which to approach reality 
(Swedberg 2005, p. 120).  When attempting to analyze a phenomenon empirically, 
sharp differentiation in concrete fact is often impossible, but this makes clarity in the 
analytical distinction all the more important (Weber 1921/1968, p. 214).  The ideal 
type allows the researcher to capture the essence of a phenomenon, rather than merely 
reproducing  its  often  confusing  real  form  or  empirical  situation  (Swedberg  2005).    60 
Each  ideal  typical  CSR  theory  presented  here  represents  an  amalgamation  and 
distillation of a set of recurring arguments either for or against CSR representing a 
particular normative orientation and internal logic.  Presenting them as ideal types 
allows for a comparative analysis, or a comparison of the theories with each other, 
enabling us to see the similarities and differences in and between them.  By doing so, 
[researchers]  can  generate  properties  of  categories  that  increase  the  categories’ 
generality and explanatory power (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 24). 
In my review of the CSR literature, I searched academic journals in the fields 
of business, economics and the social sciences, magazines containing articles by or 
interviews with prominent business leaders or scholars discussing CSR, and books 
written by scholars in the fields of business, economics, law and the social sciences, as 
well  as  prominent  business  leaders  and  social  commentators.    Because  the  CSR 
literature is so expansive, an exhaustive literature review would be impossible under 
the current constraints of time and space.  In order to paint a thorough portrait of the 
CSR discourse, I included in my analysis seminal and other significant contributions 
to the discourse, as well as less often cited works that make unique and worthwhile 
contributions to the CSR discourse.   
To  be  clear,  the  many  CSR-related  theories,  such  as  stakeholder  theory, 
corporate  citizenship,  and  corporate  social  performance,  among  many  others,
33 are 
treated here not as distinct theories in their own right, but simply as variants on CSR, 
all of which fall under the larger CSR umbrella.   
It is also important to note that I do not include corporate philanthropy in my 
analysis of CSR.  While corporate philanthropy is often equated with CSR, especially 
in the early CSR discourse, I see this as a conflation of related concepts.  I confine my 
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analytical  parameters  of  CSR  to  include  actions  taken  by  corporations  in  their 
business-related operations.  Corporate philanthropy is a separate phenomenon for two 
reasons.  First, it is not an activity directly related to the daily business activities of a 
corporation.  It may be peripheral, as in the case of tobacco companies having to give 
money  to  certain  types  of  charities  as  part  of  a  legal  settlement,  but  this  type  of 
corporate giving simply falls under legal compliance.  Second, it could be argued that 
corporations have no responsibility to donate to charity, in most cases, any more than 
any individual has responsibility to do so.  Corporate philanthropy may or may not be 
a beneficial activity for corporations or other stakeholders, and there may be cases 
where corporations are morally or ethically obligated to engage in philanthropy, but 
for the purposes of this analysis, corporate philanthropy remains a separate, although 
closely related, issue from CSR.  
Theoretical Framework: Max Weber’s Theory of Rationality  
To  answer  my  second  research  question  –  what  rationalities  underlie  the 
predominant arguments for or against CSR, and how do these rationalities inform the 
CSR debate? – I turn to the sociology literature, particularly the work of Max Weber.  
I employ Max Weber’s intertwined theories of rationality and rational action.   In 
doing so, I also incorporate his discussion of value spheres, bureaucracy, the firm, and 
the role of the state.  Weber’s concept of rationality provides a valuable theoretical 
tool in analyzing the CSR literature in that it helps us to understand the way in which 
various scholars and business executives understand society and business’ place in 
society, and how they orient their actions accordingly.  Viewing the CSR theories 
through the lens of Weber’s theory of rationality allows us to understand how the 
rationality employed by each CSR theory informs the arguments put forth by each 
theory’s adherents.   62 
I begin by presenting Weber’s concept of value spheres, which informs my 
subsequent discussion of his theories of rationality and rational social action.  I close 
this chapter by presenting an overview of Weber’s theories of bureaucracy, the firm, 
and the role of the state.  While I make brief mention of the relevance of the following 
concepts  to  CSR  in  this  chapter,  I  apply  Weber’s  theories  more  explicitly  in  my 
analysis of the three CSR theories in the final chapter. 
Value Spheres     
Important to the discussion of rationality, and particularly useful in the analysis 
of  CSR  through  the  lens  of  rationality,  is  Weber’s  concept  of  value-spheres,
34 or 
demarcated  realm[s]  characterized  by  definable  value  constellations  of  subjective 
meaning (Kalberg 2005, p. xxviii). There are many value-spheres (economic, religious, 
political, family, etc.), which are not entirely isolated from each other.  Rather, they 
overlap each other to varying degrees, often standing at odds with the logic or values 
of  other  spheres,  leading  to  a  constant,  dynamic  tension  between  spheres.    On  a 
societal level, value spheres influence large and small scale social processes, ranging 
from  public  opinion  to  institutional  behavior  to  state  and  corporate  policy.    The 
influence a particular sphere has on these processes relates to the sphere’s relevance to 
the particular process or institution, as well as to the overall dominance of the sphere 
in a given society.   
In a market economy, business corporations
35 operate in the economic sphere, 
where the pursuit of profit is the primary value.  Corporations’ purpose is generally 
understood as economic in nature.  While other value spheres, such as the religious 
sphere, may exert influence on individuals, these same individuals, when fulfilling 
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their role as corporate executive or board member, are influenced primarily, if not 
entirely, by the values of the economic sphere.
36  Unlike individuals, who exist in a 
dynamic  world  made  up  of  many  value  spheres,  corporations  are  single-minded 
creatures of the market that exist only in the economic sphere.  
Rationality 
Because values from the different spheres in which an individual exists are 
often in conflict with each other – for instance, in capitalism, religious and economic 
values are often in conflict – it can be difficult for actors to choose which values to 
follow.  Rationality – or a mental process that help actors to consciously master reality, 
ordering its seemingly disconnected fragments into meaningful regularities – helps 
actors make sense of the world around them and how it relates to their values, and 
helps guide their actions accordingly.  The rationality adopted by corporate managers, 
board members, and policy-makers greatly influences corporate behavior.  This is why 
understanding  the  rationality  underlying  each  CSR  theory  is  important  in 
understanding the CSR debate.   
Weber’s four types of rationality, as well as his types of meaningful social 
action, are ideal types, meaning that they are simplified distillations of patterns in 
society that serve as heuristic devices.  In this  case, they help us understand how 
people interpret the world and orient their actions according to this interpretation. 
The  four  types  of  rationality  Weber  identifies  are  practical,  theoretical, 
substantive and formal, the latter two being of particular interest to the discussion of 
CSR.    Practical  rationality  refers  to  an  individual  actor’s  means-end  rational
37 
response or adaptation to the random flow of daily events and interests (Kalberg 2005).   
That is, in seeking to satisfy one’s own purely pragmatic and egoistic wants or needs, 
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an  actor  employs  means-end  rational  calculations  to  determine  the  most  effective 
means of satisfying those needs (Kalberg 2005; Ritzer and Goodman 2004).  Because 
CSR  takes  place  on  an  institutional  level,  involving  a  complex  set  of  factors, 
regulations and interests, practical rationality will not be employed in this analysis.  
Theoretical rationality relies on cognitive processes, rather than any particular 
orientation to interests or values, to interpret reality.  In their quest to supply coherent 
meaning  to  the  random  events  of  everyday  life,  those  who  employ  theoretical 
rationality seek conscious mastery of reality through the construction of increasingly 
precise  abstract  concepts  rather  than  through  action  (Kalberg  1980,  p.  1152).    As 
opposed to the direct patterning of action as a result of practical rationality, theoretical 
rationality does not directly pattern one’s actions, although Kalberg suggests that it 
contains a potential indirectly to introduce patterns of action (Kalberg 1980, p. 1154).  
Corporate social responsibility is rooted in action, and within a dynamic framework of 
laws and other demands, so theoretical rationality has perhaps only a peripheral effect 
on the discourse and so will not be discussed further. 
Substantive rationality directly orders one’s actions into patterns in relation to 
ultimate  values,  regardless  of  the  nature  of  these  ends  (Weber  1921/1968,  p.  85).  
Unlike the other three types of rationality, substantive rationality involves a choice of 
means to ends within the context of a system of values (Ritzer and Goodman 2004, p. 
221).  That is, as opposed to choosing the most efficient means to a desired end, as in 
practical  or  formal  rationality,  substantive  rationality  emphasizes  choosing  among 
means and ends that are in line with an actor’s particular value constellation.  Because 
the number of possible constellations of values is infinite, action may be ordered into 
an endless number of patterns.  By assigning rationality to a particular set of values 
and orienting one’s actions to those values, subjectively rational actors are basing their 
actions on value-rational calculations.  But, because one’s actions, and one’s rational   65 
understanding of the world, are guided by his or her particular values, a believer in one 
set of values may find him- or herself in conflict with those believers of a different set 
of values, and both sides will try to discredit each other’s values as irrational.  This is 
readily apparent in the CSR discourse, as scholars from one theoretical perspective 
regularly  try  to  discredit  arguments  put  forth  by  scholars  coming  from  another 
theoretical  perspective,  even  when  they  are  making  the  same  argument,  as  is 
sometimes seen in the CSR debate.
38  
Despite  the  dominance  of  formal  rationality  in  the  economic  sphere, 
substantive rationality plays a significant role in the CSR debate.  Not surprisingly, 
substantive rationality is employed by those making moral arguments for CSR.  Also 
not surprisingly, those employing substantive rationality in the CSR debate are targets 
of  critics  who  attempt  to  portray  their  value-laden  arguments  as  irrational  in  the 
competitive, profit-driven market economy. 
Formal  rationality  is  the  dominant  rationality  in  modern  Western  society, 
according  to  Weber.    Unlike  the  first  three  types  of  rationality,  which  are  all 
intercivilizational  and  epoch-transcending…  formal  rationality  generally  relates  to 
spheres of life and a structure of domination that acquired specific and delineated 
boundaries only with industrialization (Kalberg 1980, p. 1158).  This is particularly 
true in the economic, legal, and scientific spheres, as well as in the bureaucratic form 
of  domination  (Kalberg  1980).    Formal  rationality  involves  means-end  rational 
calculation but, unlike practical rationality, where means-end rational action is taken 
strictly in relation to an actor’s own pragmatic and egoistic wants and needs, formal 
rationality occurs with reference to universally applied laws, regulations, and rules 
(Kalberg 1980).  That is, within a given system of laws and regulations, a formally 
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rational actor will choose the most effective means to achieving his or her desired ends.  
Within  the  economic  sphere,  particularly in  the  capitalist  market  economy, formal 
rationality of economic action is determined by the extent of quantitative calculation 
or  accounting  which  is  technically  possible  and  which  is  actually  applied  (Weber 
1921/1968, p. 85).  For corporations, which exist in the formally rational economic 
sphere, this quantitative calculation of actions in relation to desired ends leads to an 
unwavering focus on the bottom line.  Capital accounting, then, plays a significant role 
in the CSR debate in that the entire concept of CSR is framed, for many scholars and 
business leaders, in relation to the bottom line. 
 
Rational Action 
Weber’s  two  forms  of  rational  action
39 are  particularly  important  to  the 
discussion of CSR in that they help us understand the rational action orientation of 
business executives and board members, which, in turn, largely determines the extent 
of corporations’ socially responsible behaviors.   Weber’s two types of rational action, 
value-rational and means-end (instrumental) rational action, are linked, respectively, 
to substantive and formal rationality. 
Value-rational  action,  which  is  very  closely  associated  with  substantive 
rationality,  is  determined  by  a  conscious  belief  in  [a]  value  for  its  own  sake… 
independently of its prospects of success (Weber 1921/1968, p. 24-25).  This means 
that the values of an actor guide the actor’s actions entirely.  Ends do not justify means.  
While  ends  may  be  considered,  the  means  to  those  ends,  and  in  fact  the  ends 
themselves, are selected based on their accordance with the actor’s values, and not on 
                                                 
39 Weber believed that there are four types of meaningful social action – affectual, traditional, value-
rational and means-end rational – but I will only discuss the two types of rational social action, as the 
other two are not relevant to this discussion of CSR.   67 
the efficacy of the means or the desirability of the ends.  In terms of CSR, substantive, 
value-rational arguments for CSR are often marginalized in the formal, means-end-
dominated economic sphere.  But in the face of formidable opposition, value-rational 
proponents of CSR hold their ground in terms of their values.  As Weber theorized, 
value-rational action is characterized by a clearly self-conscious formulation of the 
ultimate values governing the action and the consistently planned orientation of its 
detailed course to these values (Weber 1921/1968, p. 25). 
Means-end, or instrumental, rational action is determined by expectations as to 
the  behavior  of  objects  in  the  environment  and  of  other  human  beings;  these 
expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own 
rationally pursued and calculated ends (Weber 1921/1968, p. 24).  Weber believed that 
all human beings, in all epochs, were capable of means-end rational action:  
 
even everyday actions of ‘primitive’ man could be subjectively means-end 
rational, as, for example, when specific religious rituals were performed 
with the aim of receiving favors from a god.  In Weber’s eyes, this pure 
exchange relationship as it existed in sacrifice and prayer… was identical in 
form to the modern businessman’s calculation of the most efficient means 
to acquire profit. (Kalberg 1980, p. 1148) 
 
The means-end rational actions taken by the primitive man above are based on 
his practical rational desires to meet his purely egoistic needs.  The means-end rational 
actions  of  the  businessman  are  guided  by  a  formal  rationality,  meaning  that  the 
consideration  of  means  and  ends  is  constrained  by  universally  applied  laws, 
regulations  and  other  legitimate  means  of  compulsion.    In  the  formally  rational 
economic sphere, the desired end is profit, and a means-end rational orientation leads 
to quantitative calculations of the most efficient means to this desired end.  Capital 
accounting, a process necessitated by the rationality of the capitalist economic sphere, 
reduces actions to their quantitative value in terms of money, which Weber argues is   68 
the most ‘perfect’ means of economic calculation (Weber 1921/1968, p. 86).  The 
qualitative values of other spheres are thus overridden by the quantitative calculus of 
profits.  As Swedberg (2005, p. 211) argues, profit-making is indifferent to substantive 
postulates.   
Weber  (Weber  1921/1968,  p.  26)  considers  an  action  to  be  means-end 
(instrumental) rational action  
 
when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken 
into account and weighed.  This involves rational consideration of alternative 
means to the end, of the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, 
and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends.     
 
When considering this definition in regard to CSR, it is important to note that a 
corporate actor’s considerations of possible means and ends takes place within the 
corporation’s narrow constellation of interests; namely, the pursuit of efficient profit 
maximization.  For the rational corporate actor, this means that means and ends based 
on  values  or  interests  outside  the  economic  sphere,  especially  those  that  don’t 
contribute toward profitability, are rarely considered unless they are mandated by law 
or otherwise related to the firm’s bottom line. 
Bureaucracy 
Historically, societies have organized themselves and their component parts in 
myriad ways, employing a variety of organizational structures.  But the predominant 
organizational  structure  in  the  modern  Western  (rational)  world,  the  bureaucracy, 
constitutes the most efficient and (formally) rational way in which human activity can 
be organized (Swedberg 2005, p. 19).  A bureaucracy, simply put, is an organizational 
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duties, and institutionalized rules, regulations, and means of compulsion.  Bureaucracy 
is the ubiquitous organizational form in today’s business corporations. 
Bureaucracy and formal rationality are natural bedfellows, particularly in the 
economic sphere.  As organizations grow in size and complexity, this relationship 
becomes even stronger.  This is because bureaucracies possess several characteristics 
that make them the ideal organizational form in modern Western capitalism.  First, 
they are exceedingly efficient in handling a large number of varying tasks, particularly 
those that require a large amount of paperwork (Ritzer 2000).  Second, they reduce 
tasks and outcomes to quantifiable measures, ensuring a high level of calculability 
across organizational processes.  This calculability helps managers gauge performance, 
but does not take into account quality of outcomes (Ritzer 2000).  Third, due to the 
institutionalized  rules  and  specific  expectations  of  actors  in  any  given  role, 
bureaucracies are highly predictable (Ritzer 2000).  Finally, they are consistent in their 
orientation  to  the  organization’s  desired  ends  because  the  division  of  labor,  rigid 
hierarchy,  and  institutionalized  laws  and  regulations  effectively  remove  from  the 
process  any  element  of  human  judgment  or  imposition  of  any  outside  values  that 
might detract from the attainment of the organization’s desired end.  Those employed 
in a bureaucratic organization are compelled, even forced, to choose the most efficient 
means to achieve the organization’s desired ends (Ritzer 2000).   
Weber was explicit in his belief that the bureaucracy is the most efficient and 
rational organizational system, but he feared that bureaucracy, growing in scope and 
influence  along  with  the formal  rationality  of  the  increasingly  dominant  economic 
sphere, posed a threat to society:   
 
Weber is worried that, in a modern world in which impersonal political, 
economic, and legal orders dominate, and large-scale bureaucracies 
characterized by rigid hierarchies, specialized tasks, conformist pressures,   70 
and routine work are ubiquitous, individual autonomy and ethical 
responsibility will be eroded (Kalberg 2005, xxiv). 
 
Once  established,  Weber  saw  bureaucracies  as  escape  proof  and  nearly 
impossible to dismantle (Ritzer 2004).  Bureaucracies, and Weber’s fears about them, 
are  extremely  important  in  the  analysis  of  CSR  because  the  agency  of  corporate 
managers is greatly constrained, even coerced, by the bureaucratic structure.  An actor 
within a bureaucracy, even a high ranking manager, acts not according to his or her 
own value orientation, but more or less as a cog in the bureaucratic machine.  In their 
organizational role, they act in means-end accordance with the formal rationality of 
the organization.   
 
The Firm and the Modern State in a Capitalist Market Economy  
Weber  defines  an  economy  as  autocephalous
40 economic  action  (Weber 
1921/1958, p. 63).  He defines a market economy as an economy in which wants are 
satisfied as a result of [economic] action oriented to advantages in exchange on the 
basis of self-interest and where co-operation takes place only through the exchange 
process (Weber 1921/1968, p. 109).  
For Weber, capitalism, a rational market economic system, is characterized by 
the diligent, disciplined, calculated pursuit of profits.  This form of accumulation is 
distinct from the earlier forms of greedy accumulation present throughout history.
41  In 
a  capitalist  market  economy,  want  satisfaction  through  the  market  normally 
presupposes money calculation.  Where capital accounting is used, it presupposes the 
economic  separation  of  the  budgetary  unit  (household)  and  the  enterprise  (Weber 
1921/1968, p. 109).   
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In  modern  Western  capitalism,  the  seemingly  natural  economic  form
42 of 
choice  is  the  firm.      A  firm
43 is  an  economically  oriented  organization  whose 
organized  action,  as  governed  by  the  order,  is  primarily  autocephalous  economic 
action of a given kind (Weber 1921/1968, p. 74).  That is, it is a creature of the market 
and  its  actions,  oriented  toward  profits,  are  guided  by  the  laws,  expectations  and 
constraints  of  the  market  order.   Values  not  directly  related  to  a  firm’s  pursuit  of 
profits are rarely, if ever, considered in the firm’s calculation of means and ends.  The 
division of labor in a firm adds to its formal rationality and necessitates bureaucratic 
organization.  Bureaucracy becomes increasingly necessary and institutionalized as 
firms  grow  larger,  requiring  the  order  and  efficiency  of  bureaucratic  organization.   
Particularly in large firms, the agency of managers as moral actors is constrained by 
the bureaucratic organization of the firm. 
A market economy, particularly a large-scale market economy characterized 
by private enterprise, could not function properly without the state.  Weber defines the 
state as having monopoly control over the legitimate means of violence in a specific 
geographic territory (Kalberg 2005).  The legally legitimated, rational (bureaucratic) 
order  of  the  modern  state  is  particularly  suitable  to  capitalism  because  of  its 
predictability  (Swedberg  2005).    In  addition  to its  monopoly  on  legitimate  use  of 
violence,  the  modern  state  also  has  a  monopoly  on  the  creation  and  regulation  of 
money, as well as on economic policy, including taxation (Swedberg 2005).   
Central to capitalism and the concept of enterprise is the idea of profit-making, 
which  presupposes  private  property
44 (Swedberg  2005).        For  a  system  based  on 
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relationship of employers to workers, the type of accounting, the movement of capital, etc. (all of which 
can occur according to a traditional or modern economic ethic). (Kalberg, xxiii) 
43 A firm today may also be called a business corporation or a company. 
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private property to function, the state is necessary to protect private property rights 
and enforce contracts (Weber 1921/1968).  In addition to its role of enforcing formal 
order, the role of the state in a market economy is also to establish and enforce laws 
and  regulations  to  ensure  that  the  market  functions  properly  (Weber  1921/1968). 
While the role of the state, for Weber, is not primarily economic, the state does have 
economic interests.   
Conclusion   
Weber’s  intertwined  theories  of  rationality  and rational  social  action,  along 
with his discussion of value spheres, bureaucracy, the firm and the state, provide a 
unique and valuable lens with which to analyze contemporary CSR theories.  But what 
rationalities underlie each of the CSR theories?  Do they differ in the rationalities they 
employ?    How  does  the  underlying  rationality  of  each  CSR  theory  shape  the 
arguments their advocates put forth?  In the following chapter, I present and discuss 
the three CSR theories that have emerged from the literature.  I present them first as 
ideal  typical  theories,  which  allows  for  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  theories  to 
understand  their  fundamental  similarities  and  differences.    In  the  final  chapter,  I 
analyze the CSR theories through the lens of Weber’s theories outlined above.  Using 
Weber’s theories as an analytical lens will offer a unique insight into the CSR debate 
by helping us understand the underlying rationalities of the CSR theories and how 
each theory is informed by the rationality it employs. 
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CHAPTER 4  
CSR THEORY 
 
The CSR discourse has grown considerably, both in volume and in maturity, 
over the past 60 years.  Numerous theories and arguments have been put forth, but the 
concept  remains  nebulous  and  the  theory  fragmented.    Ample  space  in  business 
journals, including journals dedicated to CSR or related concepts, has been allotted to 
the discussion of CSR, but most of the articles simply attempt to define the concept, 
link CSR with profitability, or to make arguments either for or against CSR based on 
either economic or moral logic.  Despite the voluminous literature on the subject, there 
is not a single, integrated body of CSR theory that allows us to gain insight into the 
underlying thought processes and assumptions of the various CSR arguments.  
An inductive review of the CSR literature reveals three endogenous theoretical 
frameworks that inform the arguments for or against CSR based on a given normative 
orientation or logic.  I present the three CSR theories – corporate libertarian theory, 
enlightened self-interest theory, and moral theory – as ideal types, created to capture 
the essence of the arguments put forth in the mainstream CSR debate.  Presenting the 
theories as ideal types allows for comparative analysis, which helps make apparent the 
theories’ similarities to and differences from each other.  The ideal types were created, 
not by imposing theory on the literature, but by coding the literature according to four 
points of paradigmatic contention along which the various arguments diverge.  The 
four points of contention along which the three CSR theories emerge (and diverge 
from each other) are: 1) the role/purpose of business; 2) to whom corporations are 
responsible; 3) justification for engaging, or not engaging, in CSR: the bottom line; 
and, 4) democracy, the free market, and the role of the state.  Within each category, 
several arguments, or sub-categories, emerged.  It is according to these sub-categories   74 
that the three endogenous CSR theories emerge from the literature.  I highlight the 
four points of contention in my presentation of the three CSR theories below. 
Other  scholars  have  reduced  the  CSR  literature  into  general  themes  or 
categories for analysis.  Garriga and Melé (2004) recognized four categories of CSR 
theories, which they call instrumental theories, political theories, integrative theories, 
and ethical theories.  Their purpose was to provide a conceptual map of the various 
CSR-related theories that have been presented.  While helpful in understanding how 
the many CSR-related theories relate to each other, it does not offer significant insight 
into my research questions.   
Van  Marrewijk  (2003)  recognized  similar  patterns  in  the  CSR  literature  to 
those I present here, categorizing them into three approaches he calls the shareholder 
approach,  the  stakeholder  approach,  and  the  societal  approach.    However,  in  my 
inductive review of the CSR literature, the three patterns of arguments, or theories, 
that emerged did not exactly match his three approaches.  I chose not to adopt the 
categorical names he used in order to avoid any confusion and because the names I 
assigned are more appropriate for the ideal typical theories I developed.  Unfortunately, 
as elaborating on the three approaches was not van Marrewijk’s aim, he presents them 
in  such  little  depth  as  to  make  any  further,  meaningful  comparisons  between  his 
approaches and my ideal typical theories impossible.   
I  highlight  the  following  contributions  to  the  CSR  literature  because  they 
exemplify the ideal typical theories under which they are classified.   However, it 
should be noted that not all of the arguments put forth in the CSR literature fit neatly 
into one of the theoretical categories as I present them here.  Nevertheless, these ideal 
typical theories do capture the essence of the predominant arguments, or theoretical 
frameworks, employed in the CSR discourse.       75 
Outlining and comparing these CSR theories, their underlying assumptions and 
their similarities to and differences from each other, will help add clarity to the CSR 
discourse and help us to gain a new depth of insight into the CSR debate.  It will also 
provide the foundation upon which my sociological analysis will take place in the 
following chapter. 
Three CSR Theories 
  While the CSR debate is often reduced to pro- or anti-CSR arguments, 
an inductive analysis of the CSR literature reveals three endogenous theories: two pro-
CSR  theories  and  one  theory  that  stands  opposed  to  CSR.    Based  on  my  coding 
scheme,  the  three  CSR  theories  that  emerged  from  the  literature  are  corporate 
libertarian theory, enlightened self-interest theory, and moral theory.  The latter two 
theories favor CSR, though for fundamentally different reasons.  Corporate libertarian 
theory and moral theory stand diametrically opposed to each other on all four of the 
points of contention I present below.  Falling somewhere between these two polar 
opposites is enlightened self-interest theory, which shares similarities with each of the 
other theories, but also contains its own internal logic.  Surprisingly, however, this 
comparative analysis suggests that corporate libertarian theory and enlightened self-
interest  theory  are  more  closely  related  than  first  appears,  despite  their  opposing 
arguments on whether or not firms should engage in CSR.   
I present the three CSR theories in the following order – corporate libertarian 
theory,  enlightened  self-interest  theory,  moral  theory  –  as  a  way  of  tracing  the 
spectrum of arguments.  While presenting the polar opposite theories next to each 
other would be useful in highlighting their differences, I present the enlightened self-
interest  theory  second  in  order  to  highlight  its  surprising  similarities  to  corporate 
libertarian theory.  These similarities will be further highlighted in the final chapter.   76 
By  outlining  the  general  arguments  put  forth  by  each  theory,  as  well  as 
highlighting  how  they  diverge  along  the  four  points  of  contention,  the  following 
discussion offers insight into the similarities and differences in the three CSR theories, 
and  sets  the  table  for  discussion  of  their  underlying  rationalities  in  the  following 
chapter.  The following discussion of the three CSR theories is also important in that it 
contributes to the existing body of theoretical CSR literature, offering a potential step 
toward a more integrated CSR theory.   77 
 Table 1. Theoretical Ideal Types by Points of Paradigmatic Contention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
Libertarian 
Theory 
 
 
Enlightened 
Self-Interest 
Theory 
 
 
Moral Theory 
Role/Purpose 
of Business 
To Make Profits for 
Shareholders, to 
drive economic 
growth and 
innovation, and to 
provide goods and 
services to society 
while playing by the 
rules of the game  
To meet society’s 
needs for goods and 
services, to create 
wealth for 
shareholders, and to 
turn social problems 
into economic 
benefit  
 
Do well by doing 
good  
 
The corporation 
exists to serve 
society 
 
Profit is important, 
but not the sole 
purpose of 
business  
 
To create value for 
multiple 
stakeholders 
 
Responsibility 
to Whom 
Responsibility is 
owed to the owners 
of the corporation: 
the shareholders  
Concentric circles 
of responsibility: 
Primary 
responsibility to 
shareholders and 
customers; 
Secondary 
responsibility to 
other stakeholders  
Balance interests 
of a wide array of 
stakeholders: all 
those affected 
directly or 
indirectly from a 
corporation’s 
operations  
 
Triple Bottom 
Line: (Economic, 
Social, 
Environmental) 
 
Justification 
for Engaging 
(or not) in 
CSR: The 
Bottom Line 
CSR hurts 
profits/reduces 
returns to 
shareholders and 
should be avoided  
 
CSR is a PR 
gimmick/Trade-off 
  
Stretches 
management and 
resources – leads to 
competitive 
disadvantage  
 
CSR will stall 
Economic Progress 
 
CSR is good for 
business in the long-
term: it improves 
firm financial 
performance 
through reduced 
risk of regulation, 
improved public 
image, and a more 
loyal employee and 
customer base  
 
Strategic CSR leads 
to shared value 
creation  
It is the 
moral/ethical 
responsibility of 
the corporation to 
serve the public 
good/consider 
stakeholders’ 
interests 
 
With power comes 
responsibility 
 
CSR will help a 
firm be successful 
in the long-run 
 
Ideal Type Theoretical Framework of Corporate Social Responsibility 
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Table 1 (Continued). 
 
 
On Democracy, 
the Free Market, 
and the Role of 
the State 
CSR is a collectivist 
or salvationist doctrine 
that undermines the 
free market  
 
Society is best served 
when business acts in 
its own self-interest 
(invisible hand) and is 
unhindered by 
government regulation 
 
CSR leads to 
overregulation  
 
CSR helps preserve 
individual freedom 
and free enterprise 
system 
 
If firms are not 
responsible, the state 
will impose itself on 
the market/firms in an 
undesirable way 
 
CSR fosters 
democracy 
 
The State is a 
constraining force that 
CSR will help keep at 
bay 
 
The successful 
companies in the 
future will be the 
responsible ones 
 
Business is better 
suited to meeting 
society’s needs than 
any other institution 
(including State and 
NGOs) 
Americans look to 
business to solve 
society’s 
problems, whereas 
socialist countries 
depend on 
government 
 
Capitalism is in 
bad shape; CSR 
can save 
capitalism through 
corporations 
serving society’s 
needs 
 
CSR will preserve 
the free enterprise 
system by keeping 
it free from 
government 
regulation 
 
CSR fosters 
democracy 
because all 
stakeholders are 
given a voice 
 
Corporations who 
are responsible to 
all stakeholders 
will be successful 
in the long-term 
 
The State is a 
constraining force 
that CSR will help 
keep at bay 
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Table 2. Overview of Perspectives in CSR Debate, by Theoretical Orientation 
 
 
 
  Role/Purpose 
of Business 
Responsibility 
to Whom 
Justification 
for Engaging 
(or not) in CSR 
On 
Democracy, 
the Free 
Market and 
the Role of 
the State 
Corporate Libertarian Theorists     
Forbes 2004  EG, QL  Sh  ↓$, ↓EP  Coll, FM 
Friedman 
1970/1962 
S$  Sh  PR, ↓$, TO  Coll, FM 
Henderson 
2004a/2001 
EG, S$, QL  Sh  ↓$, ↓EP, OBM, 
TO 
Coll, OR, FM 
Laffer 
2005
45/2004
46 
S$  Sh  ↓$  FM 
Rodgers 2005  EG, QL  Sh  ↓$  FM 
Rostow 1960  GS, S$
47  Sh  ↓$  OR, FM 
Enlightened Self-Interest Theorists     
Birchard 1999  DWDG  Bal  ↑ $, CA, ↓R  FES, SCF 
Burke and 
Logsdon 1996 
--  Bal  ↑ $, LT$, ID, 
CA, ↓R 
FES, SCF 
Drucker 1984  C$, DWDG  PSh
48, SOS  ID, LT$  B+ 
Ford II 1970  S$, DWDG  PSh, SOS  ↑ $  Reg, SCF 
Porter and 
Kramer 
2006/2002 
DWDG, VC, 
EG 
--   ↑ $, ID, CA  Reg, Sup,  
FES, B+ 
Richardson 
1981 
GS, $$  CC, PSh, SOS,   ↑ $, LT$, IR, ↓R  Alt, Reg, FES 
Sparks 2003  S$  PSh  ↑ $, CA, LT$, 
↓R 
Alt, FES 
Moral Theorists       
Bowen 1953  Soc  Stk  Mor, Soc, Pow, 
↑ $ 
FES 
Goodpaster & 
Matthews 
1982 
Soc, QL  Stk, Bal  Mor, ↑ $  Reg, Sup 
Handy 2002  Soc, GS, EP  Stk, Bal, 3B  Mor, FES, 3B, 
Pow, ID 
FES, Dem, 
SCF, Alt, B+ 
Houser 1957  Soc, QL  Stk, Bal  Mor, Pow  FES, Dem 
Mackey 2005  VC, GS, 
DWDG 
Stk, Bal  Mor, ↑ $, VC, 
Ent 
FM, FES, SCF 
Stone 1975  --  Stk, Bal  Mor, Pow  Reg, Sup, FES 
                                                 
45 Taken from Gupte (2005). 
46 Laffer, Coors, and Winegarden (2004). 
47 Rostow explicitly recognizes the responsibility of business to maximize profit in the long-term.  
However, it should be noted that he wrote in 1960, when the pressure to produce immediate returns on 
shareholders’ investments was not as strong as it is today. 
48 Drucker argues that business should concern itself primarily with profit, but does not explicitly state 
that shareholders are owed primary responsibility. 
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Table 2 Coding Key 
 
↓$:   CSR hurts profits and/or reduces returns to shareholders 
↓EP:   CSR will stall economic progress 
↓R:   CSR reduces risk of regulation or sanctions 
↑ $:   CSR is, or can be, good for business 
$$:   Business exists to make profits (shareholder interests implied, but not explicitly 
stated) 
3B:   Triple Bottom Line (Economic, Social, Environmental) 
Alt:  CSR as alternative to government regulation of industry 
B+:  Business is better equipped, in many cases, than government to address society’s 
needs 
Bal:   A balance must be found among various stakeholder interests (including shareholders) 
C$:   Creation of capital 
CA:   Strategic CSR leads to competitive advantage (economics of reputation) 
CC:   Concentric circles of responsibility 
CDis:   Puts corporations at a competitive disadvantage 
Coll:   CSR is a collectivist doctrine that undermines free market system 
Dem:   CSR fosters democracy 
DWDG: Do well by doing good; turn social problems into economic benefit 
EG:   Business is driver of economic growth 
Ent:   The entrepreneur created the company and determines the terms of trade 
FES:   CSR helps preserve the free enterprise system (and avoid government overregulation) 
FM:   The free market functions best without government interference and when actors 
pursue their own self-interest (Invisible Hand) 
GS:   To provide goods and services to society at lowest possible cost 
ID:   Society and Business are interdependent (CSR is not a trade-off) 
LT$:   CSR is good for business in the long-term 
Mor:   Business has a moral obligation to engage in CSR 
MP:   Business exists for multiple purposes, with profit being but one purpose 
OBM:   CSR overburdens managers 
OR:   CSR leads to over-regulation by the state 
Pow:   In the free enterprise system, business enjoys significant freedom and holds great 
power, and with this freedom and power comes responsibility. 
PSh:   Primary responsibility to generate profits; usually, primary responsibility primarily 
owed to shareholders (and, in some cases, customers and/or employees) 
PR:   CSR is simply a public relations ploy 
QL:    Business improves quality of life 
Reg:    Laws and regulations are necessary to ensure a fair, well-functioning market 
S$:   Business exists to make profits for shareholders  
SCF:   Views State as constraining force that CSR will help keep at bay 
Sh:   Sole responsibility is to shareholders 
Soc:   Corporations exist to serve society  
SOS:   Secondary responsibility owed to other stakeholders 
Stk:   All stakeholders affected by a business’ operations are owed some responsibility 
Sup:   CSR as supplement to government regulation 
TO:   CSR means a trade-off between profits and ‘social responsibility’ (zero-sum 
relationship) 
VC:   Value creation for many stakeholders   81 
Corporate Libertarian Theory  
Corporate  libertarian  theory
49 is  the  most  straightforward,  consistent  theory 
that emerged from the CSR literature, and is the only theory that holds that firms 
should  not  engage  in  CSR.    Often  called  shareholder  theory,  corporate  libertarian 
theory presents a clear definition of the purpose of business and the responsibility of 
managers; business exists, in a free market system, to pursue maximum profits, while 
staying within the rules of the game (Friedman 1970).  By the very nature of the 
competitive  enterprise  system,  businesses,  by  pursuing  maximum  profits,  will 
effectively meet society’s material needs by efficiently allocating resources to where 
they  are  most  needed.    The  only  responsibility  of  managers  is  to  serve  the 
shareholders’  interests  by maximizing  profits,  and  therefore  maximizing  the  return 
they receive on their investments (Henderson 2004a, 2001; Friedman 1970).   Because 
corporate  libertarian  theory  depicts  CSR  as  harmful  to  profits,  it  holds  that  CSR 
should not be practiced by firms. 
The Role/Purpose of Business 
The  first  point  of  contention  along  which  the  three  corporate  social 
responsibility theories are distinguished is ‘Role/Purpose of Business.’  Within the 
CSR literature, those scholars categorized under the corporate libertarian theory view 
the  role  of  business  as  meeting  society’s  needs  for  goods  and  services  while 
maximizing  profits  for  shareholders  (Laffer  2005,  as  quoted  in  Gupte  2005
50; 
Henderson  2004a,  2001;  Forbes  2004;  Friedman  1970,  1962,  Rostow  1960).    For 
example, economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman (1970), using the language 
of responsibility, offered arguably the most famous corporate libertarian definition of 
CSR: 
                                                 
49 I borrowed the term corporate libertarian from Korten (2001). 
50 Hereafter referenced as Laffer 2005.    82 
 
there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as 
it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and 
free competition without deception or fraud. (Friedman 1970) 
 
Contemporary corporate libertarians argue that capitalist business enterprise, 
operating within a competitive market economy, has been a major driver of rapid, 
sustained progress in terms of material welfare and quality of life (Rodgers 2005; 
Henderson 2004a, 2001; Forbes 2004).  The primary role of business is to continue to 
drive this growth – to act as agents of economic progress (Henderson 2004a, p. 28).  
The  motives  of  those  who  own  or  manage  business  enterprises  are  irrelevant  in 
evaluating their performance (Rodgers 2005; Henderson 2004a; Friedman 1970).  The 
effective performance of business, argues Henderson (2004a, p. 61),  
 
does not depend on a conscious attempt by business leaders to make the 
world a better place.  It derives its legitimacy, and its significance, from its 
bearing on the welfare of people in general. 
Responsibility to Whom 
The second theme I used to code the CSR literature was to whom corporations, 
and corporate managers, are responsible.  In serving society and driving economic 
progress  through  its  solitary  pursuit  of  profits,  according  to  corporate  libertarian 
theory, corporate managers have responsibility to only one group: shareholders.  No 
other stakeholder interests should take precedence (Laffer 2005; Henderson 2004a, 
2004b, 2001; Forbes 2004; Friedman 1970, 1962; Rostow 1960).  This unwavering 
loyalty to shareholders lies at the heart of the corporate libertarian argument.  Again 
presenting a representative corporate libertarian perspective, Friedman (1970) argues 
that: 
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In a free-enterprise, private-property system a corporate executive is an 
employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his 
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with 
their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible 
while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in 
law and those embodied in ethical custom. 
 
As  Friedman’s  statement  suggests,  those  whom  I  classify  as  corporate 
libertarians  see  the  shareholders  as  the  legitimate  owners  of  the  corporation 
()FOEFSTPO B  'PSCFT  'SJFENBO  
3PTUPX
 Henderson (2004b) goes as far as to argue that managers have 
moral  responsibilities  to  owners.  Managers  can  best  fulfill  this  moral  duty  to 
shareholders  by  always  seeking  to  maximize  profits,  thus  maximizing  the  return 
shareholders receive on their investments (Henderson 2004a, 2001; Friedman 1970).  
While it may give us a warm and comfortable feeling to say that the director is a 
trustee for the community, argues Rostow (1960, p. 68), such a notion is misguided.  
The economic job of directors and managers is difficult enough without taking on the 
ill-defined  responsibilities  to  a  multitude  of  stakeholders  (3PTUPX
.    If 
society  expects  business  to  fulfill  higher  social  obligations,  then  the  explicit 
responsibility of managers must be redefined (Rostow 1960).   
Corporate  executives  share  their  responsibility  to  shareholders  with  the 
corporation’s board of directors.  From a legal standpoint, argues Rostow (1960, p. 63), 
The law books have always said that the board of directors owes a single-minded duty 
of  unswerving  loyalty  to  the  stockholders,  and  only  to  the  stockholders.  Because 
engaging in CSR involves a trade-off between social responsibility and profits, it is 
not  serving  shareholder  interests  and  should  therefore  not  be  undertaken  (Rodgers 
2005; Henderson 2001; Friedman 1970).   84 
Justification for Not Engaging in CSR: The Bottom Line 
The third theme with which I coded the CSR literature was ‘justification for 
engaging, or not engaging, in CSR.’  Corporate libertarian CSR theory is the only 
CSR theory that holds that firms should not engage in CSR.  Rostow (1960, p. 63) 
called CSR all bewildering balderdash, while Arthur Laffer (2005) argues that what 
corporate social responsibility really means… is irresponsibility.  This irresponsibility 
is  rooted  in  the  perceived  divergence  of  business  managers  from  their  explicit 
responsibility to serve the interests of shareholders by maximizing profits.   
The  corporate  libertarian  theory  depicts  CSR  as  being  harmful  to  a  firm’s 
profitability  by  increasing  costs,  overburdening  managers  and  limiting  their 
effectiveness, and making a firm less responsive to the market (Rodgers 2005; Laffer 
2005; Laffer, Coors and Winegarden 2004; Henderson 2001; Friedman 1970).  Every 
one of the scholars I classified under the corporate libertarian theory argued that, by 
deciding  to  engage  in  CSR,  corporate  managers  are  reducing  the  firm’s 
competitiveness and profitability (Rodgers 2005; Laffer 2005; Henderson 2004, 2001; 
Forbes  2004: Friedman  1970;  Rostow  1960).   In  doing  so,  they  are  stealing  from 
shareholders  by  redistributing  the  shareholders’  wealth  (Friedman  1970).    This 
divergence from managers’ perceived responsibility to shareholders lies at the heart of 
the corporate libertarian argument against CSR. 
On Democracy, the Free Market, and the Role of the State 
The  fourth  point  of  contention  I  employed  to  code  the  CSR  literature, 
‘democracy, the free market, and the role of the state,’ seems at first to be an unwieldy 
theme.  However, as its component elements are so intimately related within the CSR 
literature, I chose to aggregate them into a single theme for the purposes of accuracy 
and clarity.     85 
As  it  emerged  from  the  literature  based  on  my  coding  scheme,  corporate 
libertarian theory appears closely aligned with the free market libertarian view in its 
view of the free market and the role of the state (Rodgers 2005; Henderson 2004a, 
2001; Forbes 2004; Friedman 2005, 1970, 1962).  Based in neoclassical economic 
theory,  the  free  market  libertarian  view  contends  that  a  system  based  on  private 
property and free markets is a sophisticated means of enabling people to cooperate in 
their economic activities without compulsion (Friedman 2005).  Corporate libertarians 
see the role of the state as maintaining a properly functioning market by setting the 
necessary parameters and otherwise more or less staying out of it, allowing business, 
and the free enterprise system, to efficiently meet society’s needs (Henderson 2004a, 
2001; Forbes 2004; Friedman 1970, 1962).  Free enterprise – that is, freedom from 
government interference in the market – is the cornerstone of our capitalist system 
(Henderson 2001; Friedman 1962).  Henderson (2001, p. 140) argues that prosperity 
and economic freedom go together.  Relying on Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible 
hand, corporate libertarian theorists argue that profit-oriented business enterprise is the 
most  effective  mechanism  for  meeting  society’s  needs  (Rodgers  2005;  Henderson 
2004a, 2001; Friedman 2005, 1970).   
Corporate libertarian theory regards CSR as a deeply flawed ‘doctrine’ that is 
undermining the free market economy and reducing the general welfare by imposing 
on the market anti-competitive tendencies and overregulation (Henderson 2004a, p. 
19: see also Forbes 2004; Friedman 1970).  Friedman (1970) argues that:  
 
the doctrine of ‘social responsibility’ involves the acceptance of the 
socialist view that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the 
appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to 
alternative uses. 
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Henderson,  echoing  a  sentiment  put  forth  by  many  corporate  libertarians 
(Rodgers 2005; Friedman 1970) argues that CSR is a new variation on a standard 
collectivist theme (Henderson 2001, p. 143).  Friedman repeatedly bashes CSR as a 
radical collectivist doctrine that does clearly harm the foundations of a free society 
(Friedman 1970).  He goes on to say that 
 
[Advocates of CSR] are – or would be if… anyone… took them seriously – 
preaching pure and unadulterated socialism. Businessmen who talk this way 
are unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been undermining 
the basis of a free society these past decades. (Friedman 1970) 
Enlightened Self-Interest Theory 
Unlike corporate libertarian theory, enlightened self-interest theory does not 
see CSR as a zero-sum endeavor.  Furthermore, enlightened self-interest theory does 
not  hold  society  and  business  as  conflicting  interests,  but  rather  as  interdependent 
entities; a successful business needs a healthy society, and a healthy society benefits 
from  healthy  businesses  (Porter  and  Kramer  2006).    The  enlightened  self-interest 
theory presents itself in a way that makes it appear as a sort of middle ground between 
the corporate libertarian and the moral theories of CSR.  Its central premise is that, in 
today’s globalized market economy, where corporations are simultaneously faced with 
cutthroat competition and a constant barrage of new and complex societal demands, 
meeting society’s needs is the most effective means of gaining competitive advantage 
and ensuring continued profitability.  Simply put, firms should engage in strategic 
CSR because it is good for business in the long-term and, in many cases, also in the 
short-term.  The argument for CSR from an enlightened self-interest perspective is 
often called the business case for CSR (Dubee 2006).   87 
The Role/Purpose of Business 
When  it  comes to  the  role  or  purpose  of  business,  enlightened  self-interest 
theory appears to be rooted in a similar view of the role of business as corporate 
libertarian  theory.    Like  corporate  libertarian  theorists,  enlightened  self-interest 
theorists argue that the primary role of business is to generate profits while meeting 
society’s needs for goods and services (Drucker 1984; Richardson 1981; Carroll 1979).   
The two theories differ slightly, in that enlightened self-interest theorists see the role 
of business as catering to a broader range of societal needs (Sparks 2003; Drucker 
1984; Carroll 1979).  However, in meeting society’s needs, business should continue 
to concern itself primarily with profit (Ford II 1970, p. 32; see also Sparks 2003; 
Drucker 1984; Richardson 1981).   
Responsibility to Whom 
Coding the CSR literature based on the question of to whom corporations are 
responsible revealed another similarity between enlightened self-interest theory and 
corporate  libertarian  theory.    In  engaging  in  CSR,  according  to  enlightened  self-
interest  theory,  managers  must  always  remember  that,  while  some  degree  of 
responsibility is owed to employees and other stakeholders, the primary responsibility 
of managers is to shareholders (Sparks 2003; Richardson 1981).   
A  wide  array  of  stakeholders  may  demand  responsibility  on  the  part  of 
business; and it is business’ responsibility to meet these expectations, if for no other 
reason than that it makes good business sense (Sparks 2003; Burke and Logsdon 1996; 
Ford  II  1970;  Stryker  1966).    Drucker  (1984)  argues  that  calls  for  social 
responsibilities beyond profits are often short-sighted; if corporations don’t first meet 
their responsibility of earning profits, they will fail.  And if they fail, no one will 
benefit.  What’s more, by pursuing profits, business will be serving society’s best   88 
interests, both now and in the future (Sparks 2003; Burke and Logsdon 1996; Drucker 
1984). 
While enlightened self-interest theorists argue that corporations should engage 
in CSR because it is good for business, acknowledging the many and widely varied 
calls  for  corporate  social  responsibility  presents  a  new  challenge  for  corporate 
managers; that is, to whom are corporations responsible?  While corporate libertarians 
call CSR a trade-off, that to be responsible means sacrificing profits, and vice-versa, 
enlightened self-interest theory sees the opposite as true (Burke and Logsdon 1996; 
Richardson 1981; Ford II 1970), but acknowledges the new dilemma it presents.  In an 
effort to address this dilemma, Richardson (1981) presents a concentric circles model 
for understanding and guiding firms’ social responsibilities: 
 
it is clear that a number of groups are legitimately owed some degree of 
responsibility.  One can visualize them as being arranged in concentric 
circles.  In the inner circle are the shareholders and employees of the 
company.  In the next circle are the company’s customers, both actual and 
potential, including those who constitute the market as a whole.  In the outer 
rings are the claims of the industry to which the firm belongs and of 
business generally.  Finally, there are the interests of the general public in 
the behavior of corporate citizens toward such pervasive interests as the 
safeguarding of public health, the protection of the environment, and the 
maintenance of ethical standards. (Richardson 1981, p. 4) 
 
The clear priority Richardson’s model gives to shareholders’ interests is one of 
the distinguishing arguments that separates the enlightened self-interest theory from 
the moral theory, which gives more equal weight to disparate stakeholder interests.  
However,  by  acknowledging  business’  responsibility  to  other  stakeholder  groups, 
Richardson’s model is also distinct from corporate libertarian theory, which does not 
recognize any corporate responsibilities beyond the responsibility to shareholders.
51 
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Justification for Engaging in CSR: The Bottom Line 
  ‘Justification for engaging in CSR: the bottom line’ is the theme along 
which the enlightened self-interest theory distinguishes itself most significantly from 
the other two theories.  Whereas corporate libertarians argue that CSR hurts profits 
and should therefore be avoided, and whereas moral theorists argue that firms have a 
moral responsibility to multiple stakeholders, enlightened self-interest theorists assert 
that strategic CSR is good for profits, and should therefore be undertaken as part of a 
firm’s competitive strategy (Porter and Kramer 2006, 2002; Sparks 2003; Birchard 
1999; Burke and Logsdon 1996; Richardson 1981; Ford II 1970).    
According  to  the  enlightened  self-interest  theory,  CSR,  when  strategically 
integrated into a firm’s business practices, is beneficial in helping the firm gain a 
competitive advantage over its competitors (Porter and Kramer 2002; Birchard 1999; 
Burke and Logsdon 1996).  This competitive advantage, or what Sparks (2003) calls a 
firm’s economics of reputation, can be seen on three fronts: first, CSR will benefit 
firms by generating a positive image for the firm, attracting and maintaining customers, 
investors,  and  employees  who  value  responsible  business  practices  (Dubee  2006; 
Sparks 2003; Kramer and Porter 2002; Birchard 1999).  Second, CSR will help a firm 
avoid risk, in terms of both government and public sanction – avoidance of the former 
being of utmost importance (Heald 2004; Birchard 1999; Burke and Logsdon 1996).  
Government sanctions and regulations can be costly; CSR will help firms stay ahead 
of  regulations  and  ahead  of  competitors  when  regulation  does  occur  (Burke  and 
Logsdon 1996; Richardson 1981).  Finally, CSR is vital in meeting the future needs of 
all stakeholders, especially shareholders.  The unrestricted satisfying of present wants 
comes at too large of a cost to the firm’s ability to satisfy future wants.  A forward 
thinking CSR strategy will help firms continue to serve the interests of shareholders as   90 
the  business  landscape  changes  (Dubee  2006;  Sparks  2003;  Birchard  1999;  Davis 
1973). 
A successful firm engages in CSR – in addressing society’s issues and needs – 
in order to turn these problems into profits (Birchard 1999; Drucker 1984; Davis 1973).  
Peter Drucker (1984, p. 62) famously argued that:   
 
…the proper ‘social responsibility’ of business is to tame the dragon, that is 
to turn a social problem into economic opportunity and economic benefit, 
into productive capacity, into human competence, into well paid jobs, and 
into wealth.  
 
Beyond profitability, enlightened self-interest theorists argue that, in today’s 
political  and  economic  environment,  business  is  better  suited  to  meeting  society’s 
needs than any other institution, including government (Drucker 1984; Davis 1973).  
The strength of business is in its managerial skill, its capacity for innovation, and its 
technological  resources  and  human  capital  (Birchard  1999;  Drucker  1984;  Davis 
1973).   These  strengths,  along  with  the  incentive  of  profit,  allow  business  to  find 
innovative ways of meeting society’s needs.  Indeed, Drucker argues: 
 
Only if business, and especially American business, learns that to do well it 
has to do good, can we hope to tackle the major social challenges facing 
developed societies today… [T]he economic realities ahead are such that 
‘social needs’ can be financed increasingly only if their solution generates 
capital, i.e. generates a profit.  This governments cannot do.  But it is 
precisely what business is being paid for. (Drucker 1984, p. 55) 
 
On Democracy, the Free Market, and the Role of the State 
  Generally,  enlightened  self-interest  theory  views  the  state  as  a 
constraining force that CSR will help, to some extent, to keep at bay (Birchard 1999; 
Burke and Logsdon 1996; Davis 1973).  In a free market economy, it is ideal to rely   91 
first on market incentives for business to adjust its practices to meet arising social 
needs.    When  market  incentives  fail,  government  regulation  may  be  necessary  to 
create them (Ford II 1970).  
Enlightened self-interest theory sees CSR as a means of keeping the state from 
imposing itself on the market, thus allowing the market – and corporations – to operate 
unfettered (Heald 2004; Birchard 1999; Burke and Logsdon 1996; Davis 1973).  But 
the  state  plays  an  important  role  in  determining  what  is  seen  as  responsible,  or 
irresponsible, corporate behavior.  Laws and standards change.  A corporation with 
CSR integrated into their competitive strategy will respond more favorably than its 
less responsible competitors when state regulations do occur (Birchard 1999). 
While clearly in favor of free market competition over government regulation, 
enlightened self-interest theory does recognize that the state plays an important role in 
upholding laws, ensuring property rights, and setting regulatory standards that protect 
consumers and corporations (Porter and Kramer 2006). 
Moral Theory 
  Moral theory
52 is rooted in the fundamental view that corporations exist 
for the betterment of society, and that managers are morally obligated to consider and 
balance in their decision-making processes the interests of all stakeholders affected by 
a firm’s actions.  Like enlightened self-interest theory, moral theory sees society and 
business as interdependent, rather than competing, spheres.  Perhaps in recognition of 
the competitive demands of the market system, moral theory also holds that CSR is 
beneficial  for  businesses  (Mackey  2005;  Handy  2002;  Goodpaster  and  Matthews 
1982).  Goodpaster and Matthews (1982, p. 139) argue that: 
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The pursuit of profit and self-interest need not be pitted against the 
demands of moral responsibility.  Moral demands are best viewed as 
containments – not replacements – for self-interest. 
 
The Role/Purpose of Business 
Moral theory stands apart from the other two CSR theories in its understanding 
of the role of business in society.  Moral CSR theory views business as existing to 
benefit society, and not simply to make profits (Mackey 2005; Handy 2002; Houser 
1957; Bowen 1953).  Business holds great power today, but with that power comes 
concomitant responsibility (Handy 2002; Davis 1960; Houser 1957; Bowen 1953).  
Bowen (1953, p. 135) argues that business managers must 
 
recognize that ultimately business exists not for profits, for power, 
or for personal aggrandizement, but to serve society.  They must recognize 
that the freedom and the power which they enjoy [have] been committed to 
them by society… Such freedom and power, of course, entail great 
responsibility.
53  
 
  Moral CSR theory does not, as critics contend, suggest that business 
does not also exist for profits.  Rather, the role of business – or what Mackey (2005) 
calls  the  enlightened  corporation  –  in  society  is  to  create  value  for  all  of  its 
constituencies (Mackey 2005; Carroll 1991; Bowen 1953). 
Responsibility to Whom 
When  considering  the  variable  ‘responsibility  to  whom,’  moral  theory  is 
immediately  distinguishable  from  the  other  two  theories.    Whereas  the  other  two 
theories see shareholders as the group to whom managers owe primary responsibility, 
moral CSR theory contends that all stakeholders directly or indirectly affected by a 
corporation’s actions are owed some level of responsibility (Mackey 2005; Woller 
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1996; Goodpaster and Matthews 1982; Houser 1957; Bowen 1953).  Each of these 
stakeholders, ranging from shareholders to employees to neighboring communities, 
makes legitimate claims as to the responsibility of business (Mackey 2005; Woller 
1996).   
Both corporate libertarian theory and enlightened self-interest theory point to a 
contract  or  promise  running  from  management  to  shareholders  (Henderson  2001; 
Friedman 1970), but moral theorists argue that such an exclusive promise does not 
exist (Mackey 2005
54; Handy 2002; Goodpaster and Matthews 1982; Stone 1975).  
What’s more, the moral CSR theorists who address this idea of a ‘promise’ believe 
that shareholders today are no longer the owners of the corporation in the true sense of 
the  word  and  that  their  interests  should  not  be  privileged  as  such  (Mackey  2005; 
Handy  2002;  Goodpaster  and  Matthews  1982;  Stone  1975;  Houser  1957).    Handy 
(2002) argues that, while the shareholders are the legal owners of the corporation, it 
would be more accurate to call them investors, perhaps even gamblers.  They have 
none of the pride or responsibility of ownership and are, if truth be told, only there for 
the money (Handy 2002, p. 5; see also Mackey 2005; Stone 1975; and Houser 1957).  
Shareholders’  involvement  with  a  corporation,  in  the  form  of  their  investment,  is 
entirely voluntary (Mackey 2005; Handy 2002; Stone 1975; Houser 1957).  If they are 
unhappy  with  a  firm’s  actions,  they  can  file  a  claim  at  the  annual  shareholders’ 
meeting, or simply sell their stock in the company (Mackey 2005; Stone 1975).  Other 
stakeholders, including communities in which a business operates, those affected by 
air and water pollution, and others, cannot simply opt out of the harmful side-effects 
of a corporation’s actions (Stone 1975).  It is often the most vulnerable stakeholders 
that are most negatively affected by the corporate actions; and it is these groups that 
have  the  least  opportunity  to  remove  themselves  from  harm’s  way  or  to  pursue 
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avenues of recourse.  Moral theory regards the claims of all stakeholder groups as 
valid and worthy of consideration in a business’ decision-making processes. 
In response to the argument that managers owe sole or primary responsibility 
to shareholders, Goodpaster and Matthews (1982), among other moral theorists (see 
Stone 1975), argue that: 
 
The trust that managers hold does not and never has extended to ‘any means 
available’ to advance the interests of the principals.  Both legal and moral 
constraints must be understood to qualify that trust – even, perhaps, in the 
name of a larger trust and a more basic fiduciary relationship to the 
members of society at large. (Goodpaster and Matthews 1982, p. 139) 
 
Justification for Engaging in CSR: The Bottom Line 
The ‘bottom line,’ referring to overall costs and benefits, is often invoked as 
the guiding principle in, or justification for, either engaging or not engaging in CSR 
practices.    While  both  corporate  libertarian  theorists  and  enlightened  self-interest 
theorists employ the logic of the bottom line in their arguments for or against CSR, 
moral theory employs a fundamentally different understanding of the bottom line.  The 
‘bottom line’ employed by moral CSR theorists, whether explicitly stated or not, is 
often called the triple bottom line, in that it takes into account the economic, social and 
environmental
55 costs  and  benefits  of  a  firm’s  actions  (Henriques  and  Richardson 
2004).  That is, a firm’s performance cannot simply be judged in dollars, but rather in 
the firm’s impact on social and environmental well-being.  
Despite  criticisms  that  CSR  is  unrealistic  and  untenable  in  the  competitive 
global  marketplace,  moral  theory  holds  that  corporate  managers  have  unequivocal 
ethical  responsibilities  to  stakeholders  beyond  their  fiduciary  responsibility  to 
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shareholders  (Woller  1996;  Houser  1957;  Bowen  1953).    Corporate  social 
responsibility  
 
implies that [managers] also bear an ethical responsibility to those members 
of society who sustain the firm or who have a stake in or are affected by its 
operations.  These would almost certainly include the firm’s employees, its 
customers, its suppliers, and the local communities in which it operates 
(Woller 1996). 
 
While  the  economic  bottom line  isn’t  the  only performance  measure  moral 
theorists consider, many moral theorists appear to recognize that CSR is unlikely to 
become  widely  adopted  without  evidence  that  it  is  profitable  (Vogel  2005a; 
Goodpaster and Matthews 1982).  It is therefore not uncommon for moral theorists to 
share the enlightened self-interest theory’s argument that CSR is good for business in 
the  long-term  (Mackey  2005;  Davis  1973,  1960;  Houser  1957).    Beyond  simple 
profitability calculations, however, moral CSR theorists argue that more widespread 
acceptance of the moral theory of CSR will 
 
‘result in a more robust business model than the profit-maximization model 
that it competes against, because [it] encourage[s] business managers to] tap 
into more powerful motivations than self-interest alone. (Mackey 2005). 
 
On Democracy, the Free Market, and the Role of the State 
Like enlightened self-interest theory, moral theory recognizes CSR as a tool 
for ensuring (capitalist) democracy and keeping the state from imposing itself on the 
market  in  the  form  of  regulations  or  anti-competitive  laws  (Mackey  2005;  Handy 
2002).  While still favoring the free market system,
56 moral theorists recognize that the 
state has an important role to play and that CSR will help to keep the state from 
overstepping its bounds: 
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To be sure, the state and the political process will and must remain the 
primary mechanisms for protecting the public interest, but one might be 
forgiven the hope that the political process will not substitute for the moral 
judgment of the citizenry or other components of society such as 
corporations. (Goodpaster and Matthews 1982, p. 139) 
 
Many critics of CSR present the argument that staying within the ‘rules of the 
game’ – as determined by the law – is sufficiently responsible corporate behavior, and 
that CSR is simply altruism, which has no place in business.  Moral CSR theorists 
respond by arguing that CSR is not altruism (Mackey 2005; Stone 1975) – it simply 
refers  to  firms  considering  in  their  decision-making  processes  the  impacts  of  their 
actions  on  multiple  stakeholders  (Mackey  2005;  Handy  2002;  Stone  1975;  Davis 
1967).  While CSR is not altruism, neither is it mere legal compliance (Davis 1973; 
Walton  1960).    Although  coherent  laws  and  regulations  explicitly  outlining 
responsible  behavior  are  possible  and  even  desirable,  in  many  instances,  laws  are 
insufficient,  ineffective,  or  even  counterproductive  in  encouraging  responsible 
behavior (Handy 2002; Goodpaster and Matthews 1982; Stone 1975).   
Stone  (1975)  identifies  three  inherent  problems  in  reducing  corporate 
responsibility  to  legal  compliance:  first,  the  law  remains  a  primarily  reactive 
institution, meaning that there is a significant time-lag – in which significant damage 
can  be  done  –  from  the  identification  of  a  problem  and  the  appreciation  of  and 
response  to  the  problem  by  lawmakers.   Second,  while  the  law-making  process  is 
supposed  to  represent  the  interests  of  the  public,  this  is  often  not  the  case.  
Corporations  and  industries  have  a  heavy  hand  in  shaping  laws  that  we  trust  to 
constrain them (Stone 1975).  As Stone (1975) recognizes, many laws that are passed 
are simply acknowledgments of already established and accepted industry standards 
and rules.  Third, problems arise with the implementation and enforcement of laws and   97 
regulations.    Not  only  are  corporations  adept  at  sidestepping  regulations,  but  the 
existing legal system is unfit as a forum for dealing with such complex issues. 
While moral theory does not place unwavering primacy on profits, neither is it 
preaching socialism, as Friedman and other corporate libertarians suggest (Friedman 
1962, 1970; Henderson 2001, 2004).   Profits are still vitally important to any business 
in a market economy, and profit considerations must necessarily be given substantial 
weight in business decisions.  A business that fails can do no good.  However, moral 
CSR  theorists  argue  that  managers  must  find  the  appropriate  balance  and  [try]  to 
create value for all of our stakeholders (Mackey 2005; see also: Wood 1991). 
Far from preaching socialism, moral CSR theorists argue that it is the corporate 
libertarians  that  are,  in  fact,  undermining  market  freedom  with  an  unadulterated 
pursuit of profits and the deification of the free market at the expense of other societal 
values (Mackey 2005; Handy 2002): 
 
Both capitalism and corporations are misunderstood, mistrusted, and 
disliked around the world because of statements like Friedman’s on social 
responsibility. His comment is used by the enemies of capitalism to argue 
that capitalism is greedy, selfish, and uncaring. It is right up there with 
William Vanderbilt’s ‘the public be damned.’ (Mackey 2005) 
 
Moral CSR theorists view the state with less antagonism than the other two 
theories.    However,  moral  theorists  are  skeptical  as  to  the  state’s  ability  to  meet 
society’s needs; they see business as the most effective tool to do so (Handy 2002; 
Davis 1973).   If business is not responsible, it will lose the trust and confidence of the 
people.  If this happens, people will be left to rely increasingly on governments for the 
creation of our wealth, something that they have always been conspicuously bad at 
doing (Handy 2002, p. 3; see also: Davis 1960).   98 
Discussion 
A review of the CSR literature reveals three endogenous themes, or commonly 
recurring arguments for or against CSR based on a given normative orientation or 
logic, with each general argument representing a contemporary CSR theory.  The three 
CSR theories presented here – corporate libertarian theory, enlightened self-interest 
theory,  and  moral  theory  –  are  ideal  types,  created  to  capture  the  essence  of  the 
arguments put forth in the mainstream CSR debate over the past 60 years.  Presenting 
these  theories  as  ideal  types  allows  for  comparative  analysis,  which  helps  make 
apparent the theories’ similarities to and differences from each other.   
On  the  question  of  the  role/purpose  of  business,  both  corporate  libertarian 
theory and enlightened self-interest theory hold that the purpose of business is to meet 
society’s needs for goods and services through the pursuit of profits.  Moral theory 
diverges from the other two theories in that it views the corporation as existing to 
benefit  society.   This  suggests  a fundamental  difference  in  how  adherents  to  each 
theory approach the CSR debate, and perhaps begins to shed light on the often hostile 
verbal battle between those arguing from different theoretical perspectives. 
Corporate libertarian theory and enlightened self-interest theory again display 
similarities on the question of to whom firms are responsible, as both theories give 
primacy to shareholders’ interests.  However, the two theories diverge dramatically on 
the question of how shareholders’ interests are best served; that is, on the question of 
whether or not firms should engage in CSR practices.  Not surprisingly, theorists from 
each  side  point  to  empirical  studies  to  support  their  arguments.    However,  as  the 
arguments put forth by the pro- and anti-CSR groups remain strong in the face of weak 
empirical data, the question arises as to whether their arguments are based on the data, 
or whether they are rooted in their underlying normative orientations and conceptions 
of the role of business in society.   99 
It is important to note, however, that while both corporate libertarian theory 
and enlightened self-interest theory give primacy to shareholder interests, enlightened 
self-interest theory does recognize other stakeholder demands.  This divergence can be 
traced to each theory’s depiction of the business-society relationship, with corporate 
libertarian theory implying a conflictual, zero-sum relationship and enlightened self-
interest theory suggesting an interdependent relationship. 
In some instances, two theories share a similar argument, even though their 
underlying assumptions or logic may differ greatly.  For example, both enlightened 
self-interest  theory  and  moral  theory  favor  corporations  engaging  in  CSR,  but  for 
fundamentally different reasons.  While enlightened self-interest theory supports CSR 
on the grounds that it is good for business, and that business needs a strong society to 
be  successful,  moral  CSR  theory  supports  corporations  engaging  in  CSR  because 
corporations – or at least corporate managers – have moral obligations to multiple 
stakeholders.   
While both the enlightened self-interest and moral theories of CSR suggest 
finding  a  balance  in  the  decision-making  process  where  a  variety  of  stakeholder 
interests  are  considered,  the  fulcrum  used  by  each  theory  to  find  the  appropriate 
balance between stakeholder interests differs, with the enlightened self-interest model 
placing  greater  emphasis  on  shareholder  interests  –  see  Richardson’s  (1981) 
concentric circle model – and the moral theory giving more equal weight to multiple 
stakeholders.   
On the point of contention I label on democracy, the free market, and the role 
of  the  state,  my  analysis  has  shown  that  scholars  who  argue  from  one  theoretical 
perspective are often operating on a fundamentally different set of assumptions than 
scholars  from  another  theoretical  perspective.    For  instance,  corporate  libertarians 
Milton Friedman (1962, 1970) and David Henderson (2001, 2004a) argue that CSR is   100 
a  subversive  doctrine  that  is  undermining  not  only  the  free  market,  but  the  very 
foundations  on  which  our  democratic  society  is  built.    At  the  same  time,  moral 
theorists like Mackey (2005), Handy (2002), and Stone (1975) argue precisely the 
opposite; that arguments like those made by Friedman and Henderson are harmful to 
the  free  market  system  in  that  they  fuel  criticisms  of  capitalism  and  mistrust  of 
corporations. 
When  it  comes to  discussion  of  the  role  of  the  state, the  CSR literature  is 
notably thin.  However, of those who do make direct or indirect references to the role 
of the state, corporate libertarians share the free market libertarian view that the free 
market system is the best system for meeting society’s needs, and that the role of the 
state is to ensure proper functioning of the free market by more or less staying out of it 
(Friedman 1962).   Enlightened self-interest theory also holds the free market as the 
ideal system, diverging, however, in its view that proactive CSR will allow firms to 
stay ahead of government regulation, thus minimizing the negative impacts of state 
interference.  The moral theory makes little reference to the role of the state, although 
brief mention is made by Handy (2002) and Davis (1973) that business is better suited 
to meeting most of society’s needs than the state, and that increased state involvement 
in the market is undesirable. 
While  this  comparative  analysis  has  shown  that  many  of  the  differences 
between theories are rooted in fundamental differences in conceptions of the role of 
business  in  society,  or  in  normative  orientations  toward  the  business-society 
relationship, it could be argued that some of the discrepancies between theories are 
merely  a  matter  of  semantics.    Most  notably,  enlightened  self-interest  theory  sees 
corporate actions that are beneficial to society as CSR, even when those actions are 
also profitable or otherwise beneficial to the corporation.  Corporate libertarian Milton   101 
Friedman  (1970)  questions  whether  these  actions  should  be  considered  CSR.    He 
argues that, in many cases,  
 
there is a strong temptation to rationalize these actions as an exercise 
of ‘social responsibility’… this is one way for a corporation to generate 
goodwill as a by-product of expenditures that are entirely justified in its 
own self-interest. 
 
Conclusion 
This  comparative  analysis  of  the  three  CSR  theories  has  allowed  us  to  see 
many  of  the  similarities  and  differences  between  them.    Alone,  however,  a 
comparative analysis offers little insight into rationalities underlying each CSR theory.  
Important questions remain unanswered, such as: how is each theory informed by the 
rationality it employs?  Is the enlightened self-interest theory really a middle ground 
between the two other theories, or is it more fundamentally related to one of the other 
two theories than may first appear?  What structural factors influence the arguments 
put forth in the CSR debate?  In the following section, I seek to address these and 
other  questions.    I  begin  by  applying  Weber’s  theories  to  the  CSR  debate  to 
understand  the  rationalities  underlying  each  CSR  theory  and  how  the  rationalities 
employed inform the CSR discourse.  I then situate the CSR discourse in a broader 
social context by discussing structural factors that influence the CSR discourse and 
how the rationalities employed within the CSR debate relate to these broader social 
processes.    Finally,  I  present  an  alternative  perspective  on  the  business-society 
relationship and ask whether or not there is a place for CSR today.    
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In  the  face  of  economic  globalization,  transnational  capital  flows,  and 
increasing  corporate  power  vis-á-vis  the  state,  the  concept  of  corporate  social 
responsibility is as important today as ever.  Along with the state, corporations are the 
most  powerful  actors  in  the  world  today.    The  concept  of  corporate  social 
responsibility  arose  from this  recognition  of  the  transformative  power  of  business.  
The CSR literature offers a window into the different perspectives on the roles and 
responsibilities of business in society.  However, the CSR theories that exist, while 
each contributing to the larger body of scholarship on the business-society relationship, 
remain fragmented and fail, for the most part, to offer any depth of insight into the 
underlying rationalities and other factors influencing the arguments put forth either for 
or against CSR.  Understanding the rationalities that inform these arguments allows us 
to  gain  insight  into  the  corporate  decision-making  processes  and  the  rationalities 
guiding the actions of corporate managers. 
In  this  thesis,  I  set  out  to  answer  two  fundamental  questions:  first,  what 
patterns exist in the arguments put forth in the CSR literature, and can these patterns 
be  classified  into  an  integrated  theoretical  framework  of  CSR?    Second,  what 
rationalities underlie the predominant arguments (theories) in the CSR literature, and 
how do these rationalities inform the CSR debate?   
Through an inductive review of the CSR literature, three endogenous theories 
emerged:  corporate  libertarian  theory,  enlightened  self-interest  theory,  and  moral 
theory.  In the previous chapter, I presented a comparative analysis of these theories, 
exposing many of their underlying similarities and differences, as well as making clear 
their conceptions of the business-society relationship, the role of business, to whom   103 
business is responsible, justification for engaging, or not, in CSR, as well as each 
theory’s view of how CSR relates to the free market system and the role of the state.  
The comparative analysis proved valuable in exposing the theories’ similarities to and 
differences from each other, but offered little insight into the rationalities employed by 
each theory. 
In this chapter, I employ Weber’s theory of rationality to analyze each CSR 
theory, shedding light on how each theory informs the arguments being put forth in the 
mainstream CSR literature.  I then discuss CSR and the role of the state in the face of 
economic globalization, followed by a discussion of how bureaucracy also shapes the 
CSR debate.  Following the more theoretical discussion, I argue that all three CSR 
theories uncritically accept the realities of the current market system as a given, which 
greatly constrains the discourse.  I then present an argument that CSR, while important, 
does not address the root causes of many of the ills we face, and often blame on 
corporations, today.  Rather, it is the structure of the market system that discourages 
CSR  by  placing  ultimate  value  on  short-term  profits.    I  close  this  discussion  by 
illustrating the importance of rationality in the CSR debate.  Finally, after discussing 
suggestions for future research, I conclude by asking whether or not there is still a 
place for CSR in business today.  
Corporate Libertarian Theory 
Corporate libertarians see the role of the corporate executive as serving the 
interests of the shareholders by constantly seeking to maximize profits, while staying 
within the rules of the game (Friedman 1970).  Not only does CSR not fit into the 
profit  maximization  equation,  it  is  harmful  to  profits  and  should  therefore  not  be 
considered (Henderson 2004a, 2004b, 2001; Friedman 1970).  Corporate libertarian 
theory holds society and business as two separate, even competing, spheres.   104 
Corporate libertarian theory is based on the formal rationality of the market.  
Those who adopt this argument are employing means-end rational calculation, based 
on universally applied rules, laws, or regulations – or the ‘rules of the game’ – without 
regard to persons (Kalberg 1980, p. 1158), to determine the most effective means to 
achieve maximum profits.  Their use, whether conscious or unconscious, of formally 
rational, means-end calculations is based in their action orientation to the formal laws 
and demands of the market and necessarily precludes the employment of any values 
other than profit maximization.   
At first glance, this may seem contrary to Weber’s definition of means-end 
(instrumental) rational action, in which he states that 
 
action is instrumentally rational when the end, the means, and the secondary 
results are all rationally taken into account and weighed.  This involves 
rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relations of the 
end to the secondary consequences, and finally of the relative importance of 
different possible ends.  (Weber 1921/1968, p. 26) 
 
This  definition  of  means-end  (instrumental)  rational  action  suggests 
consideration  of  several  means  and  ends,  as  well  as  the  possible  secondary 
consequences of the action, in the decision-making process.  But this definition, taken 
alone, can be misleading.  As corporations today exist entirely (or nearly so) in the 
economic sphere, with profits as their solitary objective, the secondary results and 
different possible ends considered in their decision-making processes are considered 
only from the within the value constellation of the economic sphere, and in respect to 
their goal of profit maximization.  The quantitative, means-end capital accounting of 
all transactions – that is, the calculation of all of a firm’s activities in terms of its 
relationship to the bottom line – that dominates the economic sphere in today’s market 
economy  leaves  little  room  for  qualitative,  non-economic  values  or  socially   105 
responsible ends, such as social welfare or environmental protection, to be taken into 
consideration.    The  only  ends  considered  valid  in  the  formally  rational  economic 
sphere,  as  it  exists  today,  are  profits.  The  instrumental  rational  action  orientation 
necessitated by free market competition and the dominance of the economic sphere 
ensures that the most efficient means to that end will be undertaken.  Other values and 
other ends considered important in other value-spheres are dismissed as irrational and 
are rarely, if ever, considered in the calculations of means and ends unless explicitly 
enforced by laws or in some way beneficial to a firm’s bottom line.   
Enlightened Self-Interest Theory  
 The  corporate  libertarian  argument  against  CSR  and  the  enlightened  self-
interest argument in favor of CSR both stem from means-end rational calculations of 
costs and profits, rooted in the formal rationality of the economic sphere.  The desired 
end,  on  which  both theories  agree,  is maximum  profits,  and  both  theories  employ 
formal rationality to determine the most effective means to achieving their desired end.  
Both  theories  hold  that,  by  maximizing  profits,  managers  are  best  serving  their 
shareholders, to whom they owe primary responsibility.  Where they differ from each 
other most notably is on the technical question of means.  Corporate libertarians argue 
against CSR because they see it as irrational; that is, as going against shareholder 
interests  and  as  financially  costly  and  harmful  to  profitability.    Enlightened  self-
interest theory still privileges profits and shareholder interests above other values and 
other  ends.    Where  enlightened  self-interest  theory  diverges  dramatically  from 
corporate libertarian theory is in its belief that acting in accordance with other societal 
values will serve the interests of the corporation, and its shareholders, in the long-term 
and,  in  many  cases,  also  in  the  short-term.   That  is, firms  should  engage  in  CSR 
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Enlightened self-interest theorists argue that CSR is good for business on three 
fronts: 1) it will improve a firm’s economics of reputation – that is, the firm will 
benefit from its reputation as a responsible corporate citizen by its increased ability to 
attract  and  maintain  customers  and  high  quality  employees  who  value  social 
responsibility  (Sparks  2003;  Birchard  1999);  2)  CSR  will  help  a  firm  avoid  risk, 
particularly government regulation or negative public attention (Heald 2004; Birchard 
1999).  When regulation does occur, a firm already committed to CSR will be a step 
ahead of its competitors in adjusting to the new regulations (Birchard 1999; Burke and 
Logsdon  1996);  and,  3)  CSR  will  allow  a  firm  to  best  serve  its  customers  and 
shareholders in the future by meeting society’s needs today (Porter and Kramer 2006; 
Drucker 1984).  For enlightened self-interest theorists, these three arguments justify 
the  adoption  of  CSR  as  an  effective  means  of  maximizing  profits  and  serving 
shareholder interests in the long-term, as opposed to the short-sighted emphasis on 
immediate returns that characterizes the corporate libertarian theory.  This logic also 
demonstrates the means-end calculation process undertaken by adherents to this theory.  
The  means  may  be  less  direct,  and  even  less  visible,  than  the  means  adopted  by 
corporate libertarians, but they are nonetheless means calculated by their efficacy in 
achieving profits, the desired end.   
Moral Theory 
In contrast to the formal, means-end rationality employed by the other two 
CSR theories, the moral theory arises from a substantive rationality and employs a 
value-rational action orientation.  That is, profits are not, and should not be, the only 
ends pursued by business, nor do the ends (profits) justify the means to achieving 
them.  The purpose of business, as it should be, according the moral CSR theory,  
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is not to make a profit, full stop.  It is to make a profit so that the business 
can do something more or better.  That ‘something’ becomes the real 
justification for the business. (Handy 2002, p. 5) 
For  a  manager  to  justify  a  corporation’s  action solely  on  the  basis  of  shareholder 
interests, argues Handy, is to be guilty of logical confusion (Handy 2002, p. 5). 
Substantive  rationality  and  value-rational  action are,  by  Weber’s  definition, 
guided by values rather than ends.  In terms of CSR, adherents to the moral theory are 
united  in  their  value  that  all  stakeholders  potentially  affected,  whether  directly  or 
indirectly, by a corporation’s actions are legitimately owed responsibility from that 
corporation (Mackey 2005).   All stakeholders are not all given equal weight in every 
situation, and profits are necessarily given significant weight because de-emphasizing 
profits too much will lead to a firm’s failure (Mackey 2005; Handy 2002).  But the 
interests of all stakeholders must be considered and balanced, to some extent, in every 
instance in which they might be affected by a firm’s actions.  
Just as the corporate libertarians try to discredit the moral argument, rooted in 
values beyond profits, as irrational, proponents of the moral argument believe that 
unwavering  profit-seeking  is  both  unethical  and  irrational  in  that  the  social  and 
environmental costs of such behavior are unsustainably high.  As the literature reveals, 
many business leaders and academics want to believe that CSR is good for business, 
and there is a flood of articles arguing and attempting to prove that it is.  While moral 
CSR theorists argue that the costs of the profit-maximizing behavior of corporations 
are usually unfairly borne by the public and by the environment, the institutionalized 
formal rationality of the capitalist market system not only favors this behavior, but 
demands it (Korten 2001; Derber 1998; Henderson 1968).  To create an environment 
in which business can serve this higher purpose, we need to rethink our assumptions 
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CSR and the State in an Era of Economic Globalization 
In a capitalist society, the role of the State is to establish and enforce laws and 
regulations to ensure a healthy market and that the interests of the public are taken into 
account and protected.  Conservative economists and business leaders often bemoan 
government intervention in the market, but a properly functioning market depends on 
the  State.    And  corporations  need  the  State,  as  well.    The  State,  at  various 
administrative  levels  (federal,  state,  local),  provides  infrastructure  (such  as  roads, 
water and electricity), educational training (in the form of schools), police and fire 
departments, courts, and other services that corporations benefit from.  This is on top 
of the State’s more vital functions, such as passing laws and protecting property rights, 
establishing and enforcing foreign policy, and opening new markets for trade.   
Formally rational actors seek the most efficient means to desired ends within 
the context of laws and regulations.  But if those laws and regulations aren’t enforced, 
which can happen without a strong state, the formally rational actor will soon learn 
that means need not be constrained by laws and regulations.  This breakdown of the 
formal legal structure is antithetical to the notion of capitalist free enterprise, which 
presupposes State protection of private property (Swedberg 2005). 
The  state  is  also  vitally  linked  to  CSR  in  that  CSR,  while  reified  in  the 
discourse, is a nebulous concept defined, to a great extent, in relation to laws and 
regulations  established  by the  state.   As  laws  change,  the  CSR  landscape  changes 
accordingly.  What may have been considered responsible at one time may later be 
considered irresponsible with the passing of new laws.  To reach a point where CSR is 
widely practiced, and not simply given lip service, Vogel (2005a) calls for significant 
changes  in  the  business-government  relationship.    To  get  to  a  point  where  CSR 
actually benefits both business and society on a broader scale, CSR must move from a 
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create  an  environment  that  encourages  social  responsibility  and  discourages 
irresponsibility (Vogel 2005a).  However, alone, legal systems of rules and incentives 
are  insufficient,  even  though  they  may  be  necessary,  as  frameworks  for  corporate 
responsibility (Goodpaster and Matthews 1982, p. 138).   
In the face of neoliberal globalization, characterized by transnational capital 
flows and multinational corporations that have evolved to a point where they regularly 
and easily sidestep attempts by states to control them (Korten 2001), it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for any governing body to hold corporations accountable for the 
effects  of  their  actions.      Many  advocates  of  CSR  suggest  that  corporate  self-
monitoring  through  CSR  can  serve  as  an  alternative  to  government  regulation 
(Richardson 1981), but Korten (2001, p. 202) likens this argument to recommending 
that police departments and the courts be disbanded in favor of calling on criminals to 
police themselves. 
CSR and Bureaucracy 
By  treating  corporate  managers  as  individual  moral  actors,  which  they 
certainly are to some degree, both pro-CSR theories neglect the power of bureaucratic 
organization  to  reduce  individuals,  even  high  level  managers,  to  more  or  less 
programmed cogs in the bureaucratic machine: 
 
Rather than think of corporate actors as individual personalities, they should 
be viewed as actors who assume certain roles.  The requirements of these 
roles are defined by the organizations, not by the actor’s personality. (John 
Braithwaite, as quoted in Estes 1996, p. 75) 
 
Within the intellectual constraints of bureaucracy and the formal rationality of 
the economic sphere, corporate managers’ agency is limited, leaving them ill-prepared 
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Just as corporate managers are held hostage by the all-important bottom line 
(Estes 1996) – or, worse, reduced to amoral cogs in the corporate bureaucracy – and so 
constrained in their role as moral actors, today’s business corporations are creatures of 
the market – and highly adapted creatures at that.  Hazel Henderson argues that, if 
society expects corporations to engage in CSR, we must revamp the legal framework 
in which they function:  
 
Fundamentally, a corporation is like a computer in that it is programmed in 
the language of dollars and cents.  Once we understand this, we are then in a 
position, if we decide that we do want the corporation to participate in 
solving public problems, to establish ground rules to permit it to do so by 
changing the laws that govern its behavior.  Critic Ralph Nader takes this 
view of our present immobility in the face of staggering problems.  He feels 
that passing laws specifically mandating corporate involvement in these 
areas, with due accountability to the public, is the most pressing item on our 
society’s agenda. (Hazel Henderson 1968, p. 81) 
 
CSR and the Economic Sphere: Weber’s Fears Realized and Adam 
Smith Revisited 
Weber feared that the economic sphere would come to dominate in modern 
society,  overriding  or  pushing  to  the  margins  other  important  value  spheres.    In 
modern  Western  capitalism,  Weber  worried  that,  along  with  dominance  of  the 
economic sphere, would come the dominance of formal rationality, means-end rational 
action based on quantitative capital accounting, and bureaucratic organization: 
 
in the economic sphere, formal rationality increases to the extent that all 
technically possible calculations within the ‘laws of the market’ are 
universally carried out, regardless of either their effect on individual 
persons or the degree to which they may violate ethical substantive 
conditions. (Kalberg 1980, p. 1159) 
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In  many  ways,  Weber’s  prescient  fears  have  been  realized.   The  economic 
sphere is as dominant today as at any point in human history, and both the State and 
the  private  sector  are  under  its  influence.    The  logic  of  economics  has  become 
institutionalized  and  has  long  since  proven  its  utility  as  a  rationalization  tool  for 
management decision making, (Woller 1996) often at the expense of other values – 
even democracy.  Nader, Green and Seligman (1976) argue that 
 
…the nonmarket impacts of giant corporations have become 
institutionalized.  Pollution of the human environment is rationalized as an 
economic necessity.  Subsidies have become an entrenched corporate 
welfare system inducing inefficiencies and political rewards.  Such 
corporate excesses align big government with big business against public 
interests.  As power begets power, large corporations are able to pursue 
their activities beyond the law, above the law, or against the law – a state of 
affairs clearly incompatible with democracy.  (Nader, Green, and Seligman 
1976. p. 7-8) 
 
Central to the ideology of the market today is the idea of the free market as the 
ideal economic arrangement; its normative prescriptions have become the dominant 
framework for business ethics in American society today (Woller 1996).  However, 
the free market of neoclassical economics does not, nor will it ever, exist in reality 
(Woller  1996;  Goodpaster  and  Matthews  1982).    The  ‘invisible  hand’  so  often 
celebrated by free market libertarians was a conceptual tool designed by Adam Smith 
to  illustrate  the  ability  of  an  economy  based  on  small  scale  firms  to  efficiently 
distribute resources, guiding them to where they are most needed by society.  Smith, 
who  is  revered  with  near  religious  fervor  by  many  corporate  and  free  market 
libertarians, never intended for his theories to be uncritically applied to a market, like 
today’s, that is characterized by global capital mobility, giant corporations with huge 
market shares and governments, in many ways beholden to the interests of footloose 
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to keep jobs and resources within their borders.  As Woller (1996) and Korten (2001) 
suggest, these free market libertarians who cling religiously to Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations would be well-served to read Smith’s other major work, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments.  When taken together, as was intended by Smith, it becomes clear that 
Smith was not advocating for a value-free society characterized solely by formally 
rational, self-interested actors:  
 
Smith never did advocate an economic system based solely on self-
interested behavior.  While it is true that to Smith, self-interest was a 
necessary condition for free markets, it was never to him a sufficient 
condition.  The Wealth of Nations (originally published in 1776) must be 
interpreted in light of Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (originally 
published in 1759), and vice versa, which, when done, makes evident both 
his serious doubts about the efficacy of the invisible hand and the central 
role played by the moral sentiments in tempering self-interest and 
regulating human affairs.  In this light, the implications of Smith’s writings 
for business ethics are quite the opposite from those supposed by advocates 
of the liberal business ethos. (Woller 1996) 
   
CSR in a Rogue Financial System  
The rules of the game in the global market leave little room for corporations to 
deviate from the highly focused pursuit of profits.  Multinational corporations find 
themselves in cutthroat competition with each other and enslaved to the bottom line 
(Estes 1996).  Failure to stay competitive in the race to cut costs, gain market share, 
and increase profits spells disaster for any multinational corporation. 
However,  at  the  same  time  corporations  find  themselves  constrained  and 
driven  by  the  economic  system,  they  also  find  themselves  as  some  of  the  most 
powerful actors in society.  Under economic globalization, corporations have grown 
huge,  highly  mobile,  and  immensely  powerful.   As  transnational  capital  flows  are 
becoming  increasingly  difficult  for  states  to  regulate,  and  as  corporations  are   113 
becoming increasingly powerful actors relative to states in the global economy, the 
debate on corporate social responsibility takes on added significance.    
Despite its significance, Korten (2001, p. 204) argues that those who call on 
corporate managers to exercise greater social responsibility miss the basic point.  But 
this criticism is not directed primarily at advocates of CSR.  Rather, it is a criticism of 
the current market system.  Korten (2001, p. 204) argues that:  
 
A rogue financial system is actively cannibalizing the productive corporate 
sector.  In the name of economic efficiency, it is rendering responsible 
management ever more difficult… Corporate managers live and work in a 
system that is virtually feeding on the socially responsible. 
 
The  CSR  discourse  –  including  the three  CSR  theories  presented  here  –  is 
confined to a forum that has as its unspoken premise an acceptance, whether conscious 
or not, of the realities of the current economic order.  The arguments of virtually all of 
the participants in the CSR discourse, with the exception of a few advocates of the 
moral theory, such as Stone (1975), are constrained by an acceptance of the market as 
it exists today.   The uncritical acceptance of the current market system leads to an 
intellectual prison that restricts the way in which managers, and society, for that matter, 
frame issues, identify alternatives, and make decisions (Woller 1996).  If the market 
system itself forces corporations to behave in a manner that is contrary to the interests 
of the people, argue critics like Korten, Nader, Estes, and Hazel Henderson, it’s time 
to change the system.   
Most advocates for systemic reform are not arguing against corporate social 
responsibility,  per  se.    Rather,  they  are  arguing  that  social  responsibility  is  a 
problematic endeavor for corporate managers in today’s predatory economic system: 
 
there are a great many socially and environmentally conscious managers.  
The problem is that they work within a predatory system that demands they 
ask not ‘What is the right thing to do?’ but rather ‘What is the most   114 
immediately profitable thing to do?’ This creates a terrible dilemma for 
managers with a true social vision of the corporation’s role in society.  They 
must either compromise their vision or risk being expelled by the system. 
(Korten 2001, p. 202) 
 
The formal rationality of the economic sphere exerts enormous pressure on 
corporate  managers  –  a  pressure  that  is  irreconcilable  with  the  recognition  of 
substantive values from other spheres.  Such a system seems to leave little room for 
social responsibility. 
CSR and the Bottom Line 
While the majority of empirical studies conducted on the CSR-firm financial 
performance  relationship  have  found  a  slightly  positive  correlation,  the  criticism 
coming from corporate libertarians that CSR hurts companies by taking up resources 
and  managerial  energy,  and  that  it  puts  responsible  corporations  at  a  competitive 
disadvantage against less scrupulous firms in a very competitive market, may, in many 
cases, hold true.  The formal rationality of the capitalist market system doesn’t favor 
social  responsibility;  it  favors  profits.    Wall  Street  demands  short-term  returns, 
meaning that managers must focus on short-term profits or risk losing shareholders, or 
even  their  jobs.    Dozens  of  studies  have  been  conducted  attempting  to  find  a 
correlation between CSR and firm financial performance, but the findings have been 
consistently  inconsistent.    For  a  variety  or  reasons,  from  inconsistently 
operationalizing or measuring CSR to difficulty determining the direction of causality 
between  CSR  and  firm  financial  performance  to  the  intangible  benefits  of  CSR 
(Griffin and Mahon 1997; Vogel 2005), the body of literature attempting to answer the 
question of the economic impacts of CSR is far from conclusive.   
Despite  the  inconclusiveness  of  these  empirical  studies,  however,  both 
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that CSR is either beneficial or harmful for a firm’s bottom line or share price, which 
invariably limits the intellectual and practical parameters of the CSR discourse.  As 
Handy  (2002,  p.  4)  suggests,  one  result  of  the  obsession  with  share  price  is  an 
inevitable shortening of horizons.   
As this research suggests, while contributors to the CSR discourse regularly 
point to the effects of CSR on a firm’s bottom line, their arguments appear to be 
greatly influenced by the rationality they employ.  Nevertheless, in a numbers-driven 
economy, where pressure to show quantifiable results of nearly every action drives 
policy and strategy, the lack of convincing, or even consistent, evidence suggesting a 
positive  relationship  between  CSR  and  firm  financial  performance  presents  a 
significant  barrier  to  its  widespread  adoption.    Unless  CSR  advocates  are  able  to 
demonstrate quantifiable short-term benefits to the firm as a result of CSR, they will 
never win the CSR battle in practice. 
Beyond Quantification: Understanding CSR’s Mediating Factors 
While the quest goes on to measure the economic effects of CSR, Margolis and 
Walsh (2003) argue that it is time to go beyond reducing the CSR debate to such 
narrowly focused attempts to quantify its economic impacts.  The authors recognize 
that  business  organizations  operate  in  the  face of  a  sometimes  irreducible  conflict 
between humanitarian needs and economic objectives (Margolis and Walsh 2003, p. 
290).  In order to develop a more productive CSR discourse, Margolis and Walsh 
(2003, p. 296) propose a scholarly agenda that 
 
accepts this tension as a starting point. The dispute among justifiable but 
competing demands reflects the reality that firms face in society today. By 
honoring the dispute and exploring the tension, we offer a different starting 
point for organization theory and research. In the end, this new scholarship 
can inform managers and citizens alike as we struggle to meet these 
daunting challenges.   116 
 
Campbell (2007) recognized a major theoretical hole in the CSR literature.  
While much time and effort has been spent attempting to define CSR and determine its 
relationship to firm financial performance:  
 
little theoretical attention has been paid to understanding why corporations 
act in socially responsible ways or not… Indeed, much of the literature on 
corporate social responsibility has been more descriptive or normative than 
positivist in tone. (Campbell 2007, p. 1)  
 
Campbell  used  the  literature  from  institutional  analysis  and  comparative 
political economy to determine under what conditions firms are more or less likely to 
engage in socially responsible behavior, as opposed to simply paying lip service to the 
idea.  Campbell found that a poor economy or weak firm financial performance tends 
to reduce the probability of socially responsible behavior.  Interestingly, either high or 
low levels of competition also reduce the likelihood of CSR, leading to a curvilinear 
effect where moderate levels of competition tend to elicit more socially responsible 
behavior (Campbell 2007, p. 29).  However, economic and competitive factors are not 
the only relevant factors in explaining the likelihood of firms engaging in CSR.  He 
found that 
 
a variety of institutional conditions mediate these basic economic 
relationships. Corporations are more likely to act in socially responsible 
ways the more they encounter strong state regulation, collective industrial 
self-regulation, NGOs and other independent organizations that monitor 
them, and a normative institutional environment that encourages socially 
responsible behavior. Moreover, socially responsible corporate behavior is 
more likely to occur to the extent that firms belong to industrial or 
employee associations and engage in institutionalized dialogue with 
stakeholders. (Campbell 2007, p. 29) 
 
Campbell’s findings suggest that the proliferation of voluntary initiatives, both 
domestic and global, to encourage CSR will have a bearing on corporate behavior.    117 
The impact of the most significant of these initiatives, the UN Global Compact, has 
yet to be felt.  
Internalizing Externalities 
Under the law, or at least through legal loopholes or through side-stepping 
regulation  by  transferring  operations  overseas,  corporations  have  been  allowed  to 
externalize many of the harmful byproducts of their operations.   In doing so, they are 
often able to exclude from their cost calculus the costs of the harmful side-effects, 
such as pollution, disease, or other social costs caused by their operations.  These costs 
are borne by individuals, communities, and taxpayers, few of whom benefit from the 
activities that created the harm in the first place, and many of whom suffer from its 
lasting effects.  If corporations were required to internalize these costs they’ve been 
allowed to externalize, their cost calculus would change to include the entire cost of 
their production processes.  In order to cover their costs, they would then be forced to 
charge the full cost (price) for their goods.  Companies would seek ways to reduce 
costs in order to stay competitive by lowering the price of their goods in the market.  
Companies  would  thus  have  the  incentive  to  incorporate  mechanisms  into  their 
production processes that reduce harmful or costly side-effects (such as pollution) of 
their operations.  
The idea itself is a simple one, but the resistance to its implementation from 
corporations and those who benefit from the current paradigm would be immense.  For 
such a dramatic policy to be effectively implemented in the face of such opposition 
would require a strong State – one free from the influence, and financial contributions, 
of corporations.  It would also require a strong global governing body that would 
prevent  corporations  from  sidestepping  such  regulations  by  transferring  their 
operations to countries with more lenient regulations.  Voluntary global initiatives,   118 
such as the UN Global Compact, are a positive first step in encouraging this type of 
responsibility from corporations, but it is far from a solution. 
The Importance of Rationality in the CSR Debate 
Corporate decision-makers are confronted daily with a complex set of often 
conflicting demands, including economic, ethical, legal, personal and professional 
demands.  They are forced to weigh these competing demands in their decision-
making  processes,  determining  which  demands  will  influence  their  corporation’s 
actions.  Rationality is important in the study of CSR because the rationality business 
leaders employ determines how they interpret the constellation of demands placed 
upon them. 
Nobody  values  harmful  side  effects  of  industry,  such  as  polluted  rivers, 
exploited  workers  or  industry-related  increases  in  mortality  rates,  yet  corporate 
libertarians defend the corporations that cause these harms, as long as they are within 
the ‘rules of the game.’ Martin (2002, p. 6) argues that, in today’s economy, When 
the interests of shareholders and the larger community collide, management typically 
(and  quite  rationally)  sides  with  the  shareholders.  Critics,  including  moral  CSR 
theorists and those arguing for broader systemic reform, use the language of values 
and ethics in their arguments against the corporations and the system that cause such 
ills.  But adherents to the corporate libertarian theory do not argue from personal 
values.  They speak not as free moral actors, but as the formally rational cogs they 
represent in the corporate and economic orders.  They are mouthpieces of an amoral 
economic system – one they all have benefited from – and the formal rationality of 
that  system  permeates  their  arguments.    This  can  be  seen  in  Milton  Friedman’s 
argument that:   119 
The political principle that underlies the market mechanism is unanimity. In 
an ideal free market resting on private property, no individual can coerce 
any other, all cooperation is voluntary, all parties to such cooperation 
benefit or they need not participate. (Friedman 1970) 
 
It  hardly  needs  to  be  pointed  out  that  all  cooperation,  especially  indirect 
cooperation, in the market is not voluntary.  In most cases, it is those who have no 
choice  that  are  the  most  vulnerable,  and  that  are  most  negatively  and  inescapably 
affected by those voluntarily cooperating in the market – namely, corporations and 
their owners, the shareholders.  Shareholders can opt out of their involvement with a 
corporation by selling their stock.  Wealthy investors and executives can live far away 
from the ugliness of their corporations’ doings.  But for communities whose waters 
have been polluted, whose resources have been drained, or whose citizens have fallen 
ill, all due to a corporation’s selfish pursuit of profits, cooperation in the market was 
not voluntary.  Time and time again, it is those with the resources who benefit, and 
those without that suffer.  Corporate libertarians argue that society is best served when 
corporations are left to their own devices in their selfish pursuit of profits.  Whether 
they truly believe this or not, it is clear that they are engaged in one of man's oldest 
exercises in moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral justification for 
selfishness.
57 
As  this  example  shows,  scholars  and  business  leaders  engaged  in  the  CSR 
debate often fail to connect with each other in a productive dialogue because they are 
approaching the issue from such different rationalities that they are literally speaking 
past each other.  What’s more, while both opponents and proponents of CSR point to 
empirical studies of the CSR-firm financial performance relationship to support their 
claims, this analysis of the underlying rationalities of the CSR theories suggests that 
their arguments are based more on the rationality they employ than on the empirical 
                                                 
57 John Kenneth Galbraith, as quoted in Goldstein, S. (2006).    120 
data they cite to support their stance.  Understanding the rationality underpinning the 
major CSR arguments will not only aid in gaining insight into the CSR theories, but 
has  the  potential  to  contribute  to  a  productive  dialogue  between  adherents  to  the 
various theories.  
Is Enlightened Self-Interest Really CSR? 
This analysis of the three CSR theories has shown that the enlightened self-
interest  theory  is  quite  closely  related  to  the  corporate  libertarian  theory,  notably 
differing on the selection of the best means to maximizing profits.  Corporate social 
responsibility, for enlightened self-interest theorists, is a rationally calculated means to 
achieving profits.  This presents a question, then, as to whether these rationally means-
end calculated actions taken by firms can be considered corporate social responsibility, 
or whether they might simply be considered calculated business decisions to increase a 
firm’s profits.  Baron (2001, p. 9) argues that 
 
A firm motivated only by profits may adopt a practice labeled as socially 
responsible because it increases the demand for its product.  This strategic 
CSR is simply a profit-maximization strategy motivated by self-interest and 
not by a conception of corporate social responsibility.  
 
Whether or not actions taken by firms adhering to the enlightened self-interest 
theory should be considered CSR is a valid question, but the answer merely seems like 
a  matter  of  semantics.    As  enlightened  self-interest  theorist  Henry  Ford  II  (1970) 
argues,  good results  are  much  more  valuable  than  good  intentions.   If  a  desirable 
outcome arises from a corporation’s actions – say, reduction of air or water pollution 
in a manufacturing process – does the motivation, or rationality, of the firm matter?  
Whatever the answer to this question, understanding the rationality underlying this 
theory is still useful in adding clarity to the often muddled CSR debate and presents   121 
hope for a productive dialogue in the future – or at least insight into why the dialogue 
has been so unproductive. 
Weaknesses in the CSR Literature 
Corporate social responsibility has proven to be a pliable concept; that is, CSR 
means many things to many people and is often defined in a way so as to suit specific 
interests or arguments (van Marrewijk 2003).  Banerjee (2001, p. 42) argues that CSR 
is too broad in its scope to be useful to business organizations and Henderson (2001, 
pp. 21-22) argues that there is no solid and well-developed consensus which provides 
a basis for action.  Criticisms such as these, of CSR being too vague and inconsistently 
defined, are widespread, suggesting a major weakness in CSR theory and a significant 
challenge for scholars researching CSR.   
Another weakness in the CSR literature is the lack of critical discussion of the 
role  of  the  state.    Clearly,  the  state  is  vitally  important  in  shaping  not  only  the 
parameters of the CSR debate, but the very landscape in which businesses operate.  A 
more critical discussion of the role of the state will add greater depth and robustness to 
the CSR literature. 
Limitations of this Research 
Under time and space constraints, an exhaustive review of the CSR and CSR-
related literature was impossible.  While this research covers a significant portion of 
the CSR literature and includes seminal and often-cited works, an exhaustive review 
may reveal some unique perspectives not included in this work.  Another limitation of 
this  research  is  that  it  focuses  primarily  on  CSR  discourse,  which,  while  vitally 
important in understanding the phenomenon itself, resides primarily in the realm of 
theory.  It does not focus on trends or patterns in CSR practice, although discourse and 
practice  are  certainly  not  mutually  exclusive.    Finally,  this  research  is  entirely   122 
qualitative and contains no quantitative analysis.  While this qualitative analysis offers 
depth of insight into the CSR discourse, quantitative analysis would prove useful in 
recognizing broader trends and patterns in the discourse.   
Recommendations for Future Research: 
Today’s global economic landscape differs greatly from the more contained 
national economies of the past.  In our highly fluid global economy, where capital 
flows are unencumbered by national borders and regulations are but hurdles to be side-
stepped, it is imperative that more attention be paid to understanding the effects of 
globalization and transnational capital flows on corporate behavior.  For instance, how 
do factors such as increased capital mobility and decreased ability of states to regulate 
corporations affect a firm’s CSR strategy?   
Handy calls free market libertarians capitalist fundamentalists (Handy 2002, p. 
5).  Fundamentalism entails an unwavering devotion to a value, or set of values, that 
guides one’s actions.  This suggests a substantive, value-rational orientation on the 
part  of free  market,  and  corporate,  libertarians.   The  question  thus  arises:  has  the 
pursuit  of  profit  become  an  ultimate  value,  inspiring  unwavering  corporate  (and 
individual)  action  in  accordance  with  this  value?    And,  if  so,  might  corporate 
libertarians be employing a form of substantive rationality?   
Conclusion:  Is There a Place for CSR? 
In 1953, Howard Bowen recognized that business held great power to shape 
the lives and fortunes of us all (Bowen 1953, p. 3).  Bowen, the father of CSR (Carroll 
1999),  recognized  the  importance  of  CSR  as  one  way  to  attempt  to  harness  the 
transformative  powers  of  business  for  the  benefit  of  society.    However,  he  also 
recognized that CSR is not a panacea, although it contains important truths that must 
continue to guide business actions (Bowen 1953)   123 
In his book The Market for Virtue (2005), Vogel argues that, while there is, 
indeed, a market for virtue in today’s marketplace, it is a niche market (Vogel 2005).  
Corporate  social  responsibility  can  be  beneficial  for  some  firms,  in  certain 
circumstances, but not for all firms in all circumstances.  Individual firms engaging in 
CSR are in competition with less virtuous competitors; and the returns on socially 
responsible behavior don’t appear to be as positive as CSR advocates would like to 
believe.  Barring increased regulation of the market by the State – regulation that 
would  encourage  socially  responsible  business  practices  and  create  economic 
disincentives for irresponsible corporate behavior – the CSR movement is doomed to 
remain in its current, relatively marginal niche in the larger business environment.   124 
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